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Abstract
Taking cognisance of the fact that SSFs the major producers of maize in Zambia were most 
affected by the 1991 agricultural policy reforms, from 2005 onward, the state became very 
active in the maize market and production systems in order to mitigate their problems. The 
main objective of this study is to investigate to what extent the maize policy changes have 
contributed to the SSFs’ vulnerability to exploitation. This information will be of use in the 
policy formulation process to ensure that the formulation of policies take a holistic approach 
to mitigation of the SSFs’ vulnerabilities. The study draws from political economy, peasant 
rationality and risk aversion theories to explain the phenomenon under study. Qualitative 
research methodology was used to collect and analyse both the secondary and the primary 
data. The study indicates that the prevailing dual system where the state marketing system 
exists side by side with the private sector has resulted in forms of exploitation which can 
broadly be classified as petty and structural forms of exploitation. Several factors could be 
said to exacerbate SSFs’ vulnerability to exploitation such as FRA’s delay in opening its 
marketing season; delays in paying the SSFs’ for their maize by government/FRA; lack of 
monitoring of the FRA buying agents’ activities; SSFs’ passivity, and incomplete 
information. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
General Introduction 
1.0 Introduction  
Maize is an important crop in Zambia. Zambia’s staple food is made of it and it is grown on 
about 70 percent of cultivated land (Saasa 1996). Maize farming in Zambia has for several 
years been an economic activity dominated by the rural-based small scale farmers (SSFs) and 
Kähkönen and Leathers (1999) assert that most of the maize in Zambia is grown by such 
SSFs. Whereas the large scale maize farmers are mainly situated along the line of rail, that is, 
from Livingstone in the southern province to the Copperbelt province, the SSFs are found all 
around the country and often in remote areas. 
There have been several changes in Zambia’s agricultural policies from the colonial era to 
date. In each case the small scale maize farmer has been affected quite differently. Whereas 
in the colonial era agricultural marketing policies favoured the white settler farmers, the new 
government after independence in 1964 endeavoured to rectify this by incorporating the 
interests of the small scale farmers also (Chiwele et al. 1998). 
From independence in 1964 up to 1990, the Zambian government exercised substantial 
control over both maize production and marketing. The state was in charge of providing the 
farmers with inputs and credit, providing extension services, warehousing for the maize 
grain, output price setting, and was also to a large extent the sole buyer of the maize grain 
(Seshamani 1999). Things changed when the movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD) 
came into power in 1991 under the leadership of president of Fredrick Chiluba. This new
regime embraced the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) which the former 
government failed to implement in the mid 1980s. Zambia adopted market liberalisation as 
one of the conditionality within the SAP package in order to access financial assistance from 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.
Market liberalism is a development strategy within the neoliberal policies which advocates 
for the reduction of the state participation in the allocation, production and distribution of 
economic resources (Pieterse 2001). The advocates of market liberalism argue that the state is 
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not good at allocation, production and distribution of economic resources, thus it should 
allow the market to take charge of the economic activities of a country (Oatley, 2010). In this 
way, it is argued, a robust private sector which is considered the engine of economic growth 
would thrive leading to economic development. However, this process is not as simple as is 
suggested because as is argued by Winters et al. (2004, 72), ‘liberalisation by its nature 
implies adjustment and so is likely to have distributional impacts’. It is assumed that there are 
some underlying factors whose adjustments lead to distributional impacts which hurt the 
SSFs because of their susceptibility to exploitation and hence their being hurt by 
liberalisation of maize markets.     
The role of the state after the implementation of market liberalisation can be divided into two 
periods because of the notable variations in policies: the period between 1991 and 2004; and 
the period from 2005 to date (Govereh et al. 2008). Between 1991 and 2004, the 
government’s role was reduced to policy formulation to ensure the creation of a conducive 
environment for the private sector to thrive. The main characteristics of the liberalisation of 
agricultural markets in Zambia during this period can be summarised as ‘the dismantling of 
the state institutions for the marketing and distribution of agricultural produce and inputs, the 
abolition of agricultural subsidies, the liberalisation of import and export trade and the market 
determination of input and output prices’ (Seshamani 1999, 549). However, even during the 
Chiluba era when the Zambian economy could be said to have been more liberalised, the 
government did not entirely let the market rule when it came to maize markets, as it 
continued to set maize prices (Robinson et al. 2007, Dorosh et al. 2007).
Recent studies show that since 2005, the MMD government under the leadership of president 
Levy Mwanawasa to 2008 and now president Rupiah Banda, has gone back to heavy 
government involvement in the maize production and marketing, almost as was the case 
before the adoption of liberalisation in 1991 (Govereh et al. 2008, Robinson et al. 2007, 
Dorosh et al. 2007). Thus the role of the state in the production and marketing of maize is 
reminiscent of the pre-liberalisation period. The government, through the Food Reserve 
Agency (FRA) has become involved in the buying of maize in rural areas at pan-territorial 
prices, put in place input support programmes to support small scale farmers, as well as 
controls maize imports and exports   (Govereh et al. 2008). 
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A review of literature revealed that research has been done on the agricultural liberalisation 
policy implications in Zambia (Seshamani 1999; Saasa 1996; Chiwele et al 1998, 
Mwanaumo, 1998, Govereh et al. 2008). However, most of these researches have revealed in 
passing the predicament of the SSFs. This has been the case because in Zambia one cannot 
talk about agriculture especially food crop farming without mentioning the SSFs because they 
produce about three quarters of all the maize that is consumed in the country (Seshamani 
1999; Saasa 1996). 
Moreover, even if the above referred to research have revealed very important issues about 
the SSFs vulnerability to exploitation; not very much research has been done on SSFs’ 
vulnerability to exploitation in Zambia. Some of the issues raised in previous studies include: 
first, that the lowering of the SSFs’ income as a result of liberalisation have twofold 
implications- firstly, of driving their households further into poverty, and secondly, leading to 
lower productivity and reduction of area under cultivation dedicated to maize  in the 
subsequent farming season. Second, that by the end of harvesting time, the SSFs are almost at 
the end of their tether that they are ready to sell their produce at lower prices to unscrupulous 
traders. Third, that the belief by government that once the economy stabilised the negative 
impacts of market liberalisation on the SSFs would wane off was a misconception 
(Seshamani 1999, Govereh et al. 2008).
What has been observed in Zambia between 1991 and 2004 was that the welfare and 
distribution ramifications of market liberalism in the agricultural sector resulted in the SSFs 
bearing the brunt of this economic policy reform (Seshamani 1999, Mwanaumo 1998). To 
this effect the government changed the mandate of FRA to include marketing and market 
facilitation to mitigate the SSFs’ suffering but there has not been any remarkable 
improvement, (Government of the Republic of Zambia (GRZ) 2004). 
In his 2009 budget speech, the Minister of Finance noted that the agriculture sector’s 
performance between 2006 and 2008 was bad with the sector’s output growth declining by 
1.2 percent annually (Musokotwane 2009, 10). The crop production decline for 2007 and 
2008 were 2.7 percent and 7.0 percent respectively. The sector’s contribution to the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) has been on average 18 percent since the implementation of the 
liberalisation (GRZ 2006, 46).Some of the reasons put forward for this poor performance are: 
high cost of inputs; limitations in accessing credit, inputs, and extension services; over 
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dependence on rain fed agriculture; poor livestock management; weakness in the fertilizer 
support programme; failure to attract adequate private sector investment; and inadequate 
infrastructure inter alia.
Zambia’s economy has for several decades been heavily dependent on foreign exchange 
earnings from copper (GRZ 2004). However, with privatisation, the mines are owned mainly 
by foreign Multi-national Corporations (MNCs) which repatriate most of the profits they earn 
from the mining sector to their countries of origin as there are allowed by law to repatriate 
any amount of profits, dividends and royalties without any restrictions except that a 15 
percent withholding tax is slapped on the same (Ministry of Mines and Minerals 
Development nd). This has negative impact on economic development of the country because 
very little of the profit is being ploughed back into the economy. A more developed 
agricultural sector would ensure that the wealth that is created is reinvested in the local 
economy thereby having a multiplier effect.  
In this regard therefore it is hoped that an in-depth examination of the opportunities and 
problems to the SSFs arising from the policy changes with respect to maize marketing will 
contribute to greater understanding of whether policy reforms have brought in another twist 
to the way the SSFs experience exploitation. The main objective of the study is to investigate 
to what extent policy changes from 2005 onwards have contributed to the SSFs’ vulnerability 
to exploitation. The study also explored the effects of government intervention measures 
whether they mitigation or exacerbates the SSFs’ vulnerability to exploitation. This 
information will be of use in the policy formulation process to ensure the formulation of 
policies take a holistic approach to mitigation of the SSFs’ vulnerability to exploitation 
(instead of jeopardising their livelihoods.)
1.2 Study Objective  
The main objective of this study is to investigate to what extent the maize policy changes 
have contributed to the SSFs’ vulnerability to exploitation. 
1.3 Research Questions 
To help focus the study and ensure that only the relevant data is collected this study seeks to 
answer the following research questions:
1. What are the general features of Nyimba SSFs’ maize production system?
2. What costs and/or returns are linked to Nyimba SSFs’ maize production system?
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3. How is maize marketing organised in Nyimba?
4. What problems do the Nyimba SSFs encounter as regards selling of their maize 
and/or access to markets for their maize?
5. What opportunities accrued to the SSFs due to maize market liberalisation?
6. What impacts have state intervention measures had on their vulnerability to 
exploitation? 
1.4 Study Area 
Zambia covers a surface area of approximately 752, 0000 square kilometres of which 58 (42 
million hectares) percent is suitable for growing crops (GRZ 2006, 46). Zambia is endowed 
with good climatic conditions, abundant underground and surface water resources suitable for 
irrigation, and abundant labour (ibid). However, the sector is so under developed that by 2004 
only 14 percent of its arable land was used for agricultural purposes (ibid). Zambia boasts of 
40 percent of the water resource in southern Africa but unfortunately only 170, 000 (40.2 
percent) of the estimated 423, 000 hectares with irrigation potential is under irrigation (GRZ 
2011, 85).
Zambia is divided into three agro-ecological zones. Zone I covers about 12 percent of the 
country’s surface area (Siegel 2008).  Siegel further describes the region as very hot, very dry 
very sandy, with soils of poor fertility, and low rainfall patterns (600-800mm). This area 
covers the southern part of southern and western provinces. Zone II covers around 42 percent 
of the country’s surface area located in the central parts of the southern, eastern part of 
western, central, Lusaka and most of the eastern provinces of the country. Zone II is 
characterised by medium rainfall patterns. Of all the three zones, zone II is the most suitable 
agro-ecologically for crop production as it has good rainfall patterns (800-1000mm), good 
quality soil, and is not infested with tsetse flies thus suitable for livestock rearing (ibid). This 
zone is further subdivided into two zones, with one subdivision characterised by lower 
rainfall patterns than the other and being more prone to drought. Zone III covers the northern 
part of the country which comprises the Copperbelt, Luapula, Northern and North-Western 
provinces. This region covers about 46 percent of the country’s surface area. Zone III is 
characterised by high rainfall patterns (1100-1700mm), acidic sand soils.
According to the 2010 national housing and population census, Zambia has a population of 
13, 046, 508 of which 61 percent were based in the rural areas while 39 percent were based in 
the urban areas (CSO 2011). Agriculture is one of the major economic activities in Zambia as 
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it is the source of livelihood for the majority of the rural based poor people. According to the 
2004 Living Conditions Monitoring Survey (LCMS) 69 percent of Zambians depend on 
agriculture for their livelihood especially those in rural areas (CSO 2005, 71). Of the total 
rural population, 92 percent are employed in agricultural sector while in urban areas only 20 
percent of the urban population are employed in the agricultural sector (CSO 2005, 71). 
The Post Harvest Survey 2003/2004 revealed that the eastern province had the highest (27.7 
percent) of households engaged in agricultural activities in the whole country (CSO 2006, 5). 
In addition, in 2004, 14 percent of the total population of Zambians were living in the eastern 
province of which 76 percent lived in the rural areas (CSO 2005, 13). Among all the nine 
provinces in Zambia, this put the eastern province among the top five provinces which had 
the majority of its population living in rural areas. The eastern province is also among one of 
the poorest provinces in Zambia with poverty levels at 70 percent of the total provincial 
population (CSO 2005, 133). Of all maize growing households in the country, almost all (99 
percent) of the households in eastern province were involved in maize production, with 92 
percent growing local maize and 22 percent growing hybrid maize (CSO 2005, 87, 88). Of all 
maize growing households in the country, the highest was in the eastern province at 20 
percent.
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Figure 1: Administrative Map of Zambia  Source: www.nationsonline.org
Nyimba is one of the districts in the eastern province of Zambia. Thus Nyimba district being 
part of the eastern province is a good example of a place suitable for the study which was 
undertaken as it gives a good picture of the salient characteristics relevant for the study.
The research was conducted in Nyimba district which is one of the districts in the eastern 
province of Zambia. This study was conducted in Vizimumba Block (see figure 2) which is 
divided into five camps namely: Chipembe, Lubamba, Mtilizi Resettlement Scheme (MRS), 
Mwape, and Vizimumba. However, I only managed to interview SSFs from four of the 
camps except for Mwape due to logistical constraints. 
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Figure 2: Nyimba District Map showing Study Area Source: Agricultural Map Services 
 
1.5 Study Outline 
Chapter one gives a general overview of the research problem and justification, research 
objectives and research questions, a description of the study area. Chapter two highlights the 
theories that provide the basis for the empirical part of the study. In chapter three I discuss the 
research methodology that was used in the study. Chapters four and five are descriptions and 
discussions of the empirical findings. Chapter four focuses on the production of maize in 
Nyimba district. Chapter five is divided into two parts: Part I focuses on the maize marketing   
while Part II focuses on exploitation as it is experienced by the small scale farmers in Nyimba 
district. Chapter six is a discussion of how theory links with the empirical findings and gives 
the main conclusion of the study.
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CHAPTER TWO  
Theoretical Framework 
2.0 Introduction 
Theory is important for any research that is undertaken for several reasons some of which 
include: ‘gives concepts, provides basic assumptions; directs [researchers] to the important 
questions; and suggests ways for [researchers] to make sense of the data, ... increases 
[researchers’] awareness of interconnections and of the broader significance of data’ 
(Boolsen 2005, 156). This chapter highlights the theories that were used to identify the 
relevant data for understanding the phenomenon under study, instrumental in the analysis of 
the collected data and also in the structure and presentation of the information.
Development being a multi-faceted concept, the study drew from an array of political 
economy theories in dealing with the phenomenon under study. Several theories were used as 
‘frameworks for the behavioural linkages between the data which was collected’ (Sumner & 
Tribe 2008, 83). 
The chapter is subdivided into eight sections. In the first part of the chapter I define some key 
terms. In the second part I highlight and discuss theories about the relationship between 
agriculture and development. In the third part I discuss some of the peasant theories, 
specifically singled out are theories on peasant rationality, risk aversion, strategies to increase 
peasant productivity, peasant and surplus, and peasant and the state. Lastly I give a summary 
of the chapter.
2.1 Key Terms Used 
2.1.1 Small Scale Farmer 
A rural-based small scale farmer (SSF) as used in this study refers to a maize farmer based 
in the rural area who grows maize for both home consumption and also for sale (Govereh et 
al. 2008). The rural-based SSFs are the main focus of this research because they are the ones 
deemed to be most vulnerable to exploitation, thus relevant for the study. 
2.1.2 Local Conceptualisation of Exploitation 
From the research it became apparent that among the SSFs no single word exists in Nsenga 
(the local language) to mean exploitation. SSFs used different words to express the problems 
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they encounter when selling their maize. Local words such as kunyengelelewa, kuibiliwa, 
kutaya, kufyengewa, kulyela mulimi, kuzyelelane, were used by the SSFs to describe some of 
the problems they encounter when selling their maize. Kunyegelelewa is a term some SSFs 
used to describe their feeling of not being treated fairly. Kuibiliwa is simply translated to 
mean ‘stealing from’. Kutaya (meaning throwing away) was a word that was used to 
describe feelings of giving away something at a giveaway price, which is as good as just 
giving something away for nothing or simply throwing it away in their view. Kufyengewa is a 
word that was used to describe feelings of not getting what one feels he/she rightfully 
deserves. Kulyela mulimi is a phrase which describes a situation where one reaps where 
he/she did not sow, in this case the maize buyers/traders, it was felt were reaping benefits 
from what they did not work for.   Kuzyelelane is a word which was used to describe the 
feeling that someone is getting more than the other person. Some research participants with 
good command of English used the word exploitation to describe their feelings of being taken 
advantage of. 
2.1.3 Exploitation 
Exploitation is a main concept in this study. The concept of exploitation has been defined 
differently by different authors. For example, Olson (1971, 29) defines exploitation as ‘a 
disproportion between the benefits and sacrifices of different people’. Roemer (1989, 90) 
defines exploitation in terms of unequal exchange which states that ‘an agent who expends in 
production more hours of labour than are embodied in the goods he can purchase with his 
revenue from production (which may come from wages, profits, or the sale of commodities) 
is exploited’.  Others still argue that ‘[t]o exploit someone or something is to make use of 
him, her, or it for your own ends by playing on some weakness or vulnerability in the object 
of your exploitation’ (http://science.jrank.org/pages/21673/exploitation.html). 
Arneson (1981) considered Karl Marx’s belief that capitalism is synonymous with 
exploitation, a technical conceptualised of exploitation which implies ‘the appropriation by a 
class of non-workers of the surplus product of a class of workers (p|203). This follows from 
Marx’s notion of the composition of a capitalist economy which comprises the owners of 
capital and the labourers. Arneson asserts that Marxists’ normative perception of exploitation 
is the premised on ‘the labour theory of value’ (p|202). As such he argues that technically 
speaking exploitation does not exist where surplus product is absent. He notes that not all 
exploitation is bad. Exploitation is bad in the Marxist sense when it is imbued with unequal 
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power relations between the capitalists and labour which disadvantage the latter who are less 
powerful in this relationship. To this effect Arneson argues that the unequal power relations 
are decisive in the redistribution of the benefits from the interaction between the two classes. 
Arneson argued that this is what confers the owners of factors of production with more 
bargaining power than their workers. However, according to Arneson exploitation is bad 
‘when there is appropriation of a surplus product by non-producers and mistreatment or ... 
violations of the rights of the producers’ (p204). 
Lewis Lorwin argued that the characteristic inherent in exploitation is ‘“that some 
individuals, groups, or classes benefit unjustly or unfairly from the labour of, or at the 
expense of, others”’ (cited in Scott 1976, 157-158). This conceptualisation of exploitation 
seeks to portray that in society there are some people or groups of people who enjoy benefits 
at the expense of other people’s sweat. He also argues that there is some common 
understanding among socialists and non-socialists that exploitation should be perceived as 
‘relationship between individuals, groups, or institutions ... [and] an unfair distribution of 
effort and rewards’ (author’s italics, ibid p158). Scott argues that the notion of fairness 
introduces justice into the discussion of exploitation. This he argues is contentious because 
there are divergent views about what constitutes justice. Mayer (2007) argues that ‘exploiters 
always gain at the expense of others by inflicting relative losses on disadvantaged parties’ 
(p137). This means the winners do not deserve the gains.
According to Scott (1976) three aspects must be considered if an analysis of exploitation is to 
be viable: special attention should be paid to ‘the relational or exchange quality of social 
relations; it must seek out the shared human needs that social actors expect from these 
relationships; and, in this context, it must work from the actual notions of ‘“fair value”’ that 
prevail’ (p165). 
Scott (1976) contends that ‘the power of some and the vulnerability of others make for 
bargains that violate common standards of justice’ (p163). As such he concludes that ‘it must 
be assumed that there are genuinely normative standards of value in exchange that are to 
some degree independent of the actual alternatives available in a given context’ (ibid). 
Whereas, Scott was particularly referring to the tenant-landlord relationship, these ideas 
could also apply to producer-buyer relationships which are imbued by unequal power 
relations. 
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According to Scott (1976), a peasant’s conceptualisation of exploitation is based on peasants’ 
test, that is “‘what is left?’” than “‘how much is taken’” (p7). For the peasant the question is, 
is what is left after honouring all the claims by outsiders able to sustain my household and 
enable me meet my other social obligations? Scott further argues that this test ‘offers a very 
different perspective on exploitation than theories which rely only on the criterion of surplus 
value expropriated’ (ibid). The idea is that what is taken away should not jeopardise the lives 
of those who gave by leaving them with very little to the extent of pushing them to starvation. 
Ellis (1993) argues that what constitutes exploitation in the real sense of the word according 
the Marxists is surplus appropriation through wages whereby the peasants work for other 
people. Otherwise, he argues all else which is dubbed exploitation is actually not necessarily 
exploitation as it is consistent with the ‘normal working of the capitalist economy’ (ibid) 
whereby only those who produce their products efficiently survive. He further contends that 
peasant exploitation is by and large due to social relations other than capitalism, and/or the 
exercise of unequal market power relations. He calls the appropriation of social surplus by 
the state through prices as exploitation. Ellis argues that the state does this in order to please 
certain interests groups who in most cases are owners of productive resources (capitalists).
The definition of exploitation adopted in this study that stated on this internet source  
http://science.jrank.org/pages/21673/exploitation.html which recognises the fact that there 
exists weaknesses or vulnerability that are the premise the exploiter uses to gain unfair 
advantage of the vulnerable. This definition is adopted because SSFs are vulnerable which 
make them susceptible to being taken advantage of, thus their vulnerability to exploitation.
The decision to adopt this definition is informed by the local conceptualisation of exploitation 
in which the SSFs allude to their feelings of being taken advantage of by the maize buyers.
Rural-based SSFs are vulnerable in many ways, but this study will focus on exploitation. 
Exploitation is the focus of this research because it is often assumed that maize market 
liberalisation contributed to some extent to increasing the rural-based SSFs’ vulnerability to 
exploitation. The liberalisation of maize markets policy led to the private sector participating 
in maize marketing and trading. According to neoliberals this is a good thing because it 
would facilitate economic growth which will ultimately benefit everyone. Apparently 
majority of the rural-based SSFs have failed to take advantage of the presence of many 
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traders by way of reaping higher profits for their produce for several reasons and this study
sought to find out if some of them could be attributed to changing policies.
2.3 Agriculture and development 
There has been an evolution in the perception of how agriculture contributes to overall 
development over the years. Staatz & Eicher (1984) argue that during the 1950s agriculture 
was not considered relevant to economic growth. Thus economic surplus extraction from 
agriculture was the norm, and development was synonymous with ‘structural transformation 
of the economy’ (p4) whereby agriculture which was a labour reservoir would shrink in its 
contribution to economic growth. Thus the policies which were promoted at the time were 
those that facilitate surplus extraction from agriculture to the industrial sector which was 
considered the engine of economic growth. 
Martinussen (1997) illustrates the four different ways in which the agricultural and the 
industrial sectors are linked. First, he argues that there is a reciprocal relationship between the 
agricultural and the industrial sectors, whereby the agricultural sector’s products are sold 
either as consumer goods to the city dwellers or sold as raw materials for further processing 
to the industrial sectors. On the other hand the rural dwellers also buy consumer goods and 
inputs and implements from the industrial sector. (The difference in relations between the two 
sectors is, whereas the agricultural sector sells raw materials to the industrial sector, the latter 
sells intermediate goods to the former.) Second, the exportation of goods from both sectors 
earns a country foreign exchange which is used to import goods that benefit both sectors. 
Third, the two sectors are linked through the loans and investments which are financed by 
savings from both sectors. Fourth, the two sectors are connected through each sector’s 
contribution and/or benefit from government revenue and government spending respectively.
Staatz & Eicher (1984), summarise this as the scholars’ acknowledgement of the important 
contribution agriculture made to overall development through the interdependence which
exists between the agriculture and industrial growth. 
Different scholars over time suggested different interventions in order to increase agricultural 
productivity in the global South. One of the intervention measures focused on the diffusion of 
new agricultural technologies. There was a general belief that to increase agricultural 
productivity there was need for such technology transfer from the industrialised countries to 
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the third world countries (Staatz & Eicher 1984). An evaluation of the failure these 
programmes to yield the expected results led to the rational choice models.
2.4 Peasant Rationality 
Previous studies have shown that SSFs have been perceived to be irrational simply because 
they did not ‘recognise and exploit the opportunities available to them for increasing their 
production and incomes’ (Martinussen 1997, 135). Other studies still have shown that 
actually SSFs are indeed rational, except that they make decisions based on other forms of 
rationality. This fact is made vivid in the rational choice approach.
The rational-choice approach is an ‘attempt to explain a pattern of social behaviour or an 
enduring social arrangement as the aggregate outcome of the goal-directed choices of large 
numbers of rational agent’ (Little 1991, 35). This approach is based on the fact that 
‘individual behaviour is goal-directed and calculating’ (p36). The idea here is that each 
person’s course of action is guided by his/her assessment of the costs and benefits of the 
intended action based on that person’s interests. In this sense a person’s action is considered 
rational if it is the only appropriate way of achieving that outcome after taking into account 
one’s beliefs (Little 1991). They argue that norms and values are crucial in determining social 
action.
There are variations in views within the rational-choice approach. There are those referred to 
as the formalists and other group called the substantivists. For the formalists ‘individual 
rationality is relevant to understanding social phenomenon in a wide range of cultural and 
historical circumstances and that peasant societies may be analysed in terms of the aggregate 
consequences of individually rational choices’ (p35). The substantivists on the other hand 
hold that ‘the concept of self-interests is overly narrow, neglecting the powerful influence of 
norms and values in social action’ (p36).   
T.W. Schultz (1964) argued that ‘peasants were “poor, but efficient’” (Martinussen 1997, 
136). His argument was that, through experience over several years of engaging in farming, 
peasants discover what techniques work for them in the most efficient way given the 
resources available to them. Peasant farmers choose to employ technologies that ensure their 
survival. This is what he called allocation efficiency as no reallocation of resources is needed 
to get the required production (Lundahl 1988). 
15 
 
Lipton (1968) disagreed with Schultz thesis of poor but efficient peasants, arguing that this 
does not hold in the real world situation (Lundahl 1988). The problem according to Lunahl 
was Schultz assumed that the peasants pursued profit maximisation goal as postulated in 
traditional economic theory. An analysis of traditional agriculture reveals that the conditions 
for efficiency are not met thus negating Schultz theory. Ellis (1993) also argues that 
efficiency in a strict economic sense does not happen under peasant farming because of their 
partial integration in incomplete markets since the notion of efficiency applies to competitive 
markets. Adams (1986) also argues that ‘peasants farmers are in a particularly poor position 
to acquire information about future prices of products and inputs’ (1986, 277). Peasants are 
usually information starved thus the decisions they make are compromised. As such Adams 
argues that the decisions they make cannot be deemed rational.
Conversely, Lipton (1968) argued that peasant farmers seek to ‘either minimize the 
probability of obtaining a farming outcome which falls short of the subsistence level or 
guarantee survival in some other way’ (cited in Lundahl 1988, 122). Profit maximization is 
not their production objective. According to Lipton, the choices peasant farmers choose to 
‘maximize the return that can be attained with a given maximum acceptable probability of 
disaster’ (ibid). To achieve this Lundahl argues that the farmers adopt what he calls ‘risk 
dampening arrangements, i.e. devices designed to reduce the probability of an unfavourable 
production outcome’; and consequences mitigation arrangements in case of the former 
happening (p123). He considered subsistence farming and diversification as examples of the 
former. Producing using proven traditional methods and peasants tendency to fall back on 
social capital in unfavourable times, he considered as an example of a strategy that ensure 
mitigation of the consequences of the unfavourable production outcome. 
2.5 Risk Aversion 
According to Martinussen (1997), studies have revealed that for the peasants  ‘risk avoidance 
and risk minimising behaviour are both necessary and more sensible than profit maximisation 
that involves considerable risk taking’ (p135). Risk avoidance and risk minimisation 
behaviour is apparently characteristic of SSFs. This is because they have so many odds 
against them such that they cannot afford to jeopardise their lives. On the basis of the above 
Martinussen (1997) argues that SSFs ‘generally act rationally in terms of their own situation 
and in terms of the way they perceive the options available to them’ (p135). Rationality is 
therefore a relative concept.
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Ellis (1993) highlights the main theories of peasant risk behaviour which include: crop 
diversification as a typical example of the peasants’ risk aversion behaviour by which they 
seek to ensure that their households do not starve whatever happens as opposed to 
maximising profits; risk aversion makes farmers use resources inefficiently; risk aversion 
makes the spread and acceptance of innovations which have the potential of increasing the 
farmers’ production and incomes difficult if not impossible; and there is an inverse 
relationship between risk aversion and income, that is , as incomes increase risk aversion 
behaviour declines. 
Ellis’ (1993) reviews of other studies show that it is wrong to assume that peasants are always 
risk averse. For example, in the Philippines and Bangladesh it was found that the farmers 
were risk takers. So he argued against treating peasants as a homogenous group when it 
comes to risk aversion because while some maybe risk averse others are not. Other studies 
also revealed that risk aversion does not decline across the board with the rise in income but 
that there could be variations. Another thing is that crop diversification not only ensures food 
security for the farmers but also helps them meet their profit maximisation goal. Ellis 
concludes by saying ‘risk avoidance strategies are not of necessity in conflict with efficiency 
criteria, nor can all economic behaviour not in consistent with profit maximisation be 
attributed to risk’ (p98). 
Feeny (1983) argues that crop diversification does not necessarily imply risk aversion as is 
believed by many authors. He argues that there are several factors that would lead a farmer to 
diversify other than risk aversion. For example, he says that the type of land a farmers 
cultivates on may necessitate that he/she diversifies, or that a farmer may decide to try out a 
new crop or technique on a part of his/her land, or that limited amount of labour he/she may 
also necessitate diversification in order to maximize that factor’s use and the returns from it.  
Feeny believed that contrary to the notion that risk aversion led to apathy toward adoption of 
new innovations and cash crop farming, and crop diversification, risk aversion could actually 
result in the opposite reaction.
According to Adams (1986), peasants in traditional societies like their counterparts in the 
modern societies make rational decisions with respect to resource allocation and innovation 
adoption. Peasants weigh the pros and cons whenever confronted with choices about resource 
allocation and what innovations to adopt regardless of what type of society they belong to. 
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According to Scott (1976), ‘the overriding importance of meeting family subsistence 
demands frequently obliges peasants not only to sell for whatever return they can get but also 
to pay more’(p14). Peasants in this case are said to put their family subsistence first 
regardless of how much it costs them. For people believed to be living close to the margin, 
access to family subsistence to the peasants could be viewed more in terms of a life and death 
situation. Scott, argues that ‘the goal of a secure subsistence is expressed in a wide array of 
choices in the production process: a preference for crops that can be eaten over crops that 
must be sold, an inclination to employ several seed varieties in order to spread risks, a 
preference for varieties with stable if modest yields’ (p22-23). This suggests that the type of 
crops small scale farmers grow could be very revealing of the underlying safety first 
principle. 
There are variations in the factors believed to determine SSFs’ risk aversion behaviour. 
Lundahl (1988) argues that there are several factors which determine the extent of risk 
aversion behaviour such as ‘education, family size, income opportunities outside agriculture 
and access to public institutions that allow the farmers to overcome a bad year’ (p122). 
Adams (1986) argues that cultural values matter when it comes to peasant agricultural 
practices. Testimonies to this are the different outcomes of pricing policies in different 
countries. For Bates (1988) rationality of the peasants in decision making is influenced so 
much by what is considered rational in their societies (cited in Martinussen 1997). This 
suggests that what is considered rational in one society is may not necessarily be rational in 
another.
Scott (1976) argued that it was because peasants lived lives which were just above the 
subsistence levels that they are afraid of food shortages. This condition led to the 
development of what he called ‘subsistence ethic’. The peasants’ aim was to have a harvest 
which would enable them have enough food and a surplus which can be sold in order for 
them to buy essential goods such as salt, soap, and cloth, and also enable them ‘meet the 
irreducible claims of outsiders’ (p2). He argues that a peasant ‘seeks to avoid the failure that 
will ruin him/her rather than attempting a big, but risky, killing’ (p4). Thus for a typical 
peasant, survival is the overall goal of his/her economic activities and not profit 
maximization. So peasants according to Scott are risk averse as they seeks to minimize ‘the 
subjective probability of maximum loss’ (ibid). As such he argues peasants adopt 
technologies that would assure them of such even in the midst of uncertainties such as 
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weather which is outside their control. This kind of reasoning led to what Scott refers to as 
the ‘safety first’ principle. It was on the basis of this that the peasants made their production 
decisions. The idea of the safety first principle is that rather than maximize the returns, a 
farmer opts to minimize the chances of disaster. 
According to Scott (1976), the economic behaviour of peasants is peculiar because they are 
not just producers but also consumers of part of their own production. So for them, their
decision making on what technology to employ is based on choices which assure them of 
sustainable and reliable consumption. As a result Leonard Joy, argued that ‘subsistence 
farmers may resist innovation because it means departing from a system that is efficient in 
minimising the risk of catastrophe for one that significantly increases this risk’ (cited in Scott 
1976, 19). SSFs therefore need assurance that the new technology is reliably capable of 
keeping them afloat whatever the uncertainties. According to Scott the farmers consider the 
expected crop yield in relation to weather patterns as well as costs of inputs.
Popkin (1979) found that “‘... peasants are continuously striving not merely to protect but to 
raise their subsistence level through long- and short-term investments, both public and 
private”’ (cited in Adams 1986, 278). Peasants were seen as calculators who seize 
opportunities presented to them. According to Popkin, peasants took proactive individual 
actions rather than depend on social capital in times of hardships because such arrangements 
have shortcomings embedded in them.  This is somewhat contrary to Scott’s assertion that the 
peasants sought to safeguard their subsistence level given the uncertainties they had to 
contend with. 
Theories of peasant rationality and risk aversion have been chosen because in this study 
because it was assumed that these theories could help in the analysis of decision making 
process of the SSFs in Nyimba in their choices of production and technology. An insight into 
the rationale for Nyimba SSFs’ decision making processes would be helpful in understanding 
why their agricultural activities are organised the way they are. In addition, knowledge 
gained would be instrumental in informing policy makers in formulating appropriate policies.    
2.6 Strategies to increase Peasant Productivity  
Different scholars have suggests different strategies to increase production of SSFs. Schultz
(1964) argued that in order to increase productivity among the SSFs, it was important not 
only to avail them with the information about new existing technology which increases 
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productivity but most importantly those technologies should be accessible to them (cited in 
Martinussen 1997). He was convinced that since SSFs act rationally, they would respond 
accordingly. Bryceson (2002) is another scholar who has called for investment in green 
revolution in order to increase agricultural productivity in the rural areas. In addition, Schultz 
proposed education as a way through which productivity could be increased (Lundahl 1988). 
He saw education as a way of modernising the peasant farmers because it entails 
improvement in human capital which enhances communication of knowledge.  His argument 
was that ‘neither market signals ... nor policy-induced incentives for peasants could bring 
about production increases or productivity improvements’ (cited in Martinussen 1997, 136). 
According to Martinussen (1997) new technological innovations such as the high yielding 
varieties have the potential of substantially increasing the yield derived from a specified area 
planted provided the specified conditions are adhered to (p140). For example fertilizer has to 
be applied correctly and at the right time during the growth of the plants failure to which the 
yield will be compromised. However, the high yielding varieties are said to be more 
susceptible to attacks by insects than the traditional varieties thus necessitating the need for 
insecticides to kill the insects which is an extra cost which the farmers are not familiar with 
especially those who grow the local varieties which are somewhat resistant to destruction by 
the pests (Marinussen 1997). The use of new technologies has been criticised by some 
theorists that it assumes that the farmers have the resources to make use of them and 
everything that comes with them such as the need for fertilizers, insecticides, and irrigation, 
which is not the case in most developing countries (ibid). 
For Bates (1988) what were crucial in determining peasant productivity were the prevailing 
socio-economic conditions under which peasants carried out their production and not 
physical or biological conditions (ibid). His argument was that ‘if these conditions embody 
sufficiently strong incentives for the peasants,’ then peasants would respond accordingly. 
However, he said this could only happen if proper institutional frameworks were put in place. 
Contrary to Schultz, Bates believed that ‘the free market forces provide the peasants with the 
best and strongest incentives to increase production’ (ibid 244). 
Bates (1988) also argues that if government pursued ‘positive pricing policies’ in favour of 
the peasants, the peasants would definitely be motivated to increase production, more so if 
they could even buy processed/industrial goods at affordable prices (ibid, 245). The idea here 
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is that such policies would increase the peasants’ income. However, he argues that states find 
it hard to implement such policies for several reasons such as: they do not favour the political 
elites and the urban population who benefit from policies that keep the prices of agricultural 
products low and also because such policies are not discriminatory against the opposition. 
Political leaders do not pursue such policies because they harm other players in the cities who 
are very crucial their remaining in power. Bates found that instead, some peasants have been 
offered incentives which have helped in drumming up political support for them. He argues 
that ‘they [African leaders] have used public resources to support selected groups of peasants, 
who in return have supported the political rulers’ (ibid). The argument is that the political 
agenda of the African leaders have always taken precedence.
Lipton (1977) and Bryceson (2002) was also of the view that in order to achieve increased 
production there was a need for institutional reforms whereby more resources were invested 
in the SSFs. According to Martinussen (1997), the establishment of the ‘cooperative societies 
for production, trade and credit, and extension of material infrastructure’ are yet other ways 
through which the goal of increased production among SSFs can be achieved (p139). 
However, he argues that there has been lack of political will by most third world countries’ 
governments to follow this route. In addition, he argues that the other problem has been that 
SSFs have not formed robust interest groups to lobby their governments to provide them with 
the much needed infrastructure and services.
2.7 Peasants and Surplus 
Peasants have been known to produce beyond their subsistence needs. Over the time there 
has been an evolution in how this surplus has been captured by other members/sectors of 
society. Surplus extraction takes various forms one of which is the ‘unequal exchange of 
industrial and agricultural goods, where the industrial goods are sold at ‘artificially’ high 
prices and agricultural goods at ‘artificially’ low prices (Martinussen 1997, 131). It is 
artificial he argues because in most cases states deliberately play with the prices through 
pricing policy to disadvantage the agricultural sector. By so doing he argues that the states 
facilitate the transfer of resources from the agricultural sector to other favoured sectors. In 
this way the state uses its structures to exploit the agricultural sector.
Different terminologies have been used to refer to the peasants’ production which is captured 
by other people in the society. Ellis (1993) notes that some refer to the same as ‘“marketed 
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surplus”’, while others still refer to the same as ‘“financial surplus”’ (p54). According to 
Ellis, the former refers to that portion of the peasants’ production which they sell in the 
market, while the latter refers to the monetary value of that part of peasants’ production 
which is sold on the market but which is part of the price they receive exclusive of the 
marketing costs. Informed by the Marxists, the same surplus is referred to as social value- the 
part of peasant production beyond their subsistence level. Ellis distinguishes social surplus 
from surplus value which he says is appropriated by the capitalists. His argument is that 
social value is not entirely appropriated by the capitalists in the society because peasants are 
able to retain part of their surplus.    
Ellis (1993) argues that social surplus is appropriated by other people in society. He argues 
that they do this in several ways which can broadly be categorised as through the markets, 
rents, and the state. An example of how surplus appropriated which is relevant to this study is 
that done through the market which Ellis calls ‘appropriation via prices- ...the potential for 
peasant incomes to be squeezed, either through falling prices for output sold in the market or 
through rising prices of market inputs, or a combination of both’ (p55, 56). This type of 
extraction he argues is ‘intensified by unequal exercise of market power in imperfect 
markets’ (p56). An example of surplus appropriation through the state is ‘peasant taxation’ 
(ibid). This is mostly indirect tax which the peasants pay when they purchase inputs or pay 
levies on their output.
The most notable ways through which the state increases its involvement in the market is by 
fixing prices of both farm produce and inputs, the establishment of agricultural products 
marketing institutions, compulsion of peasants to grow specified crops, and persuasion of 
peasants to acquire state financed inputs (ibid).   
According to Ellis (1993), command of power over means of production and what becomes 
of the products so produced is a crucial determinant of the livelihoods of groups of people 
everywhere in the world. This same power is what distinguishes the powerful from the 
vulnerable.
Ellis (1993) argues that in some countries with large agricultural sector the state is usually 
under pressure to extract surpluses from the agricultural sector for its own survival. In such 
circumstances the state has been seen to succumb to the interests of the capital. Some of the 
ways by which the state does this is ‘when it fixes the price itself of the inputs and outputs of 
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farm production, establishes exclusive state channels for the handling of farm commodities, 
insists on peasants growing particular export crops, or encourages them to use purchased 
inputs financed by state loans’ (p57)
Bates (1988) highlights some of the ways in which African governments intervene in 
agricultural markets.  First, they prefer lowering prices of agricultural output and hiking 
prices for consumer goods consumed by farmers. Such policies are not beneficial to the SSFs 
as the rich large scale farmers are the ones who have been found to reap the benefits of such 
policies. Second, African governments prefer project-based policies instead of price-based 
policies in order to achieve production expansion. Bates argues that these projects are limited 
in their spatial coverage and appropriately target the specific people in order to serve their 
ulterior motives. Third, African governments opt for lowering production costs to facilitate 
production increase instead of increasing agricultural output prices. Fourth, ‘intervene in 
ways that promote economic inefficiency: they alter market prices, reduce market 
competition, and invest in poorly conceived agricultural projects’ (p332). 
Bates contends that African governments opt for such policies/intervention measures based 
on: first, the thesis that government policy interventions are for social interests (Bates 1988, 
343). The goal is to achieve economic growth so as to lift poor people poor out of poverty. 
This policy preference entails prioritising industrial development at the expense of 
agriculture; 
Second, that government policy interventions seek to serve private interests (ibid, 345). In 
this regard government policy is influenced by the political pressure of interest groups which 
push for their private interests. Two of the private interest groups he highlights are the urban 
poor and the employers. The argument here is that the urban poor who spend more than half 
of their income on food as well as employers do not entertain high food prices because this
lowers their real income, and reduce their profits respectively (ibid 346, 347). He argues that 
because the urban poor are geographically clustered it is easy for them to organise themselves 
for protests which thing politicians always seek to avoid because it threatens their legitimacy. 
Thus the groups whose incomes are affected by food price increases gang up against the 
incumbent government as it is considered to be incompetent (ibid). Bates also argues that 
infant industry protection policy harms peasants because it means the industrial goods they 
buy are unnecessarily expensive for them.
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The arguments put forward by Bates are based on Michael Lipton (1977) arguments about 
urban bias. Lipton (1977) argues that urban bias is a manifestation of the class conflict in 
most third world countries between the urban population and the rural population. His 
argument is that, it is the policy preferences of the urban population that prevail in national 
marketing policy objectives because political policy makers reside in the cities. According to 
Lipton the politicians tend to deliberately divert most development efforts to the cities at the 
expense of the rural areas, thereby disadvantaging the rural population. To exemplify, Lipton 
cites issues such as how that ‘public and private services are much more extensive in the 
cities and towns than in the rural areas ... both the state and the market mechanisms generally 
function in favour of the cities by extracting surplus from agriculture’ (Martinussen 1997, 
137).
Lipton proposed that in order to achieve pro-poor growth more resources should be invested 
in agriculture. His suggestion was informed by facts showing that the industrial sector was 
only employing a small fraction from the available labour force. So meaningful growth
should be in the agricultural sector where the majority of the poor people are. Rigg (2006) on 
the other hand disagrees with investments that revamp agricultural development because it 
entails consigning the rural population to agriculture when the trends on the ground indicate 
that rural dwellers are shying away from agricultural activities. 
Third, Bates (1988) argues that governments favour agricultural projects because they use 
them as tools to drum up support from the rural dwellers, selectively reward the people who 
would ensure their continued stay in power, and use the ‘markets as instruments of political 
organisation’ (351-355).   
Bates suggested democratic elections as the solution to urban bias. His assumption was that 
democratic elections are good for rural development in Africa because the majority of people 
live in rural areas thus politicians would seek to please the rural dwellers in order to win an 
election. According to Bates ‘the impact of organised interest groups works to the detriment 
of agrarian interests, whereas competitive elections work to their advantage’ (p350).
2.8 Peasants and State  
States as has been mentioned above have a role to play in facilitating overall development. As 
such states play an important role of organising their economies. Bernstein (1982) argued that 
colonial governments facilitated the advancement of capitalism and were also responsible for 
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coming up with structures through which labour and land were to be exploited in the natural 
economy. This resulted in the reorganisation of the economy which existed in precapitalist 
periods. The other way through which the natural economy was destroyed was through the 
creation of ‘peasant commodity production which does not involve the direct separation of 
the producers from the means of production’ and also very little ‘technical changes in 
production’ (p162). The activities of the colonial governments also led to the break in the 
peasant reproduction cycle and this was done through the attachment of monetary value to 
some of its aspects (ibid). Bernstein argues that the peasants were forced into commodity 
production by the colonial governments. The colonial governments did this by creating 
conditions which necessitated the peasants’ need for cash. Some of the methods used
included taxation, and forcing farmers to grow specific cash crops. The monetisation of some 
elements of simple reproduction, Bernstein argues is the motivation for reproduction. 
Production below subsistence therefore entails perpetual indebtedness. Moreover, this makes 
peasants very desperate for cash by the time they are harvesting that they can meet their 
immediate financial needs. This is as a result of commoditisation where farmers produce not 
only with the intention of subsistence but also for sale in order to meet their other financial 
needs. In this way the colonial governments made commodity production obligatory for the 
peasants. Thus peasants ended up combining production by producing crops for home 
consumption as well as some crops for commercial purposes. 
Scott (1976) argues that two main factors greatly affected the peasants’ way of life: the 
introduction of capitalism; and the establishment of the contemporary nation-state. These two 
factors resulted in the commoditisation of land and labour whereby, Scott argues that 
peasants were forced to earn a minimum income. This entailed that a household had to ensure 
that it earns a minimum income with which to live on and contribute to the social and 
ceremonial obligations in the village.
According to Bernstein (1982) the consequences of colonial states actions undermined the 
natural economy by extracting labour from subsistence production and other petty non-farm 
activities; the substitution of subsistence goods which local producers used to produce or
obtained through local trade. The whole process led to the undermining of the way 
production in its entirety used to be undertaken and also the stopping of many indigenous 
production skills outside agriculture (ibid). 
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Bernstein describes the type of production which existed between capital and peasants after 
the destruction of the natural economy as ‘simple commodity production’.  Simple 
commodity production refers to a type of production where production by the households is 
subsistence in nature (p163). Bernstein distinguishes simple commodity production from 
capitalist commodity production. The latter refers to production dominated by appropriation 
and where the surplus is reinvested resulting in capital accumulation (ibid).
Bernstein also argued that three main interests influenced what cash crops were produced and 
supplied by the colonies. According to Bernstein the industries from the cities, the merchant 
and the state worked together to achieve this (p165). The peasants as such were only left with 
the task of organising production. Meanwhile, what the peasants produced and how they 
reproduced themselves was determined by the outcomes of the commodity relations, 
economic and political actions of these main interests.
Bernstein saw peasant households as different from a capitalist as its economic system was 
determined by subsistence needs and not accumulation as is the case for capitalists. He argues 
that for this reason a peasant household experiences a fall in the price of its produce as a fall 
in its terms of exchange when compared to its subsistence needs (p166). This entailed ‘a 
reduction in levels of consumption or an intensification of commodity production, or both 
simultaneously’ (ibid). Bernstein considered this as simple reproduction squeeze. According 
to Bernstein the implications of simple reproduction squeeze are both direct and indirect. He 
argues that simple reproduction squeeze directly increases the costs of productive resources 
and indirectly increases the cost of reproducing the producers. He also argues that the cost of 
production is also raised ‘by the exhaustion of both land and labour ... and by rural 
development schemes which encourage or impose more expensive means of production’ 
(ibid) without guaranteeing the remuneration to labour given the costs that have been 
incurred. 
Bernstein argues that simple reproduction squeeze is as a result of a mix of the peasants’ 
production in material and technical terms, and the demands of commodity relations. An 
increase in production costs can either be through an increase in time expended by labour 
and/or money wise through the acquiring and/or replacing of productive resources in order to 
increase yields. Bernstein argues that the intentions of rural development programmes are to 
facilitate the peasant integration into the market, and also to ensure that peasant production is 
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rational and adheres to stipulated standards of the domestic as well as the international 
market. He also argues that these programmes have a tendency of compelling the peasants to 
gravitate towards certain technologies thereby reinforcing the ties with proponents of the 
same. 
Bernstein contends that the simple reproduction squeeze is a mechanism which is used by 
capital which fuels peasant self exploitation in order to stabilise and/or increase production 
while not spending anything in terms of managing and supervising production. 
Out-grower scheme arrangements are an example of commodity relations intensification. It is 
through these arrangements that companies that contract farmers to produce agricultural 
products for them seek to ensure that the supply of the products to their organisations is 
guaranteed and under their control (Bernstein 1982). In this way then, the companies dictate 
what the farmers produce and how they produce it.
Ellis (1993) argues that because peasants have ‘one foot in the [incomplete] market and the 
other in subsistence they are neither fully integrated in that economy nor wholly insulated 
from its pressures’ (p3). He argues that the consumption of their own production is the reason 
why peasants’ participation in the market is partial. The markets peasants are confronted with 
present them with both opportunities and challenges. Ellis argues that peasants participation 
in these markets among others ‘exposes them to the possibility of ruin either from adverse 
price trends or from the exercise of unequal market power’ (p6).
To explain the phenomenon under study I choose to use economic surplus extraction 
through unequal exchange of consumer and agricultural goods as theorised by Martinussen 
(1997), Ellis’ (1993) theory of social surplus appropriation through the state and the market 
and Bernstein’s (1982) theory of simple reproduction squeeze. These theories are useful in 
explaining the structural exploitation. I do not dwell on the Marxist conceptualisation because 
it is based on labour theory. The SSFs in most cases use their own labour and land to produce 
their maize, as such they are owners of some factors of production. Besides, these SSFs are 
not employed by the capitalists to produce the maize as is implied in the Marxist 
conceptualisation of exploitation. This makes analysis in the Marxist way somewhat tricky. 
Scott’s (1976) peasant test of what is left as against what is taken is used to explain petty 
exploitation. 
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2.9 Summary  
The main concepts in the study are small scale farmers, local conceptualisation of 
exploitation and exploitation. From the 1950s to date there have been several theories about 
how agriculture contributes to overall development. There has been disagreement among 
scholars about whether peasant decision making is rational, while others argue that peasants 
are not rational other argue to the contrary, and say peasant make decisions based on other 
forms of rationality. Peasant risk aversion behaviour vis-a-vis pursuit for profit maximization 
has been the main areas of interest. Several strategies have been proposed to increase peasant 
production either through the state or private sector. The state, the industrial sector and urban 
populations are the different interests that capture peasants’ surplus. This aspect is fraught 
with exploitative tendencies which are the focus of this study.
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CHAPTER THREE  
Research Methodology 
3.0 Introduction 
Research design is an important aspect of research as it makes a researcher make decisions 
about the methodology that will best generate the desired data for the research given the 
available resources. 
This chapter has thirteen sections. In the first section I discuss the choice of the qualitative 
research approach I took for this study. In the second section I discuss why I decided to use 
the case study approach. The third section is a brief discussion of the choice study area. In the 
fourth section I briefly discuss the choice of the research participants who have been grouped 
into two categories: primary and other research participants. I then highlight their general 
characteristics. Section five discusses both the secondary and primary data sources used in 
the study. Multiple primary sources of data collection methods such as observation, semi-
structures interviews, focus group discussion and photographs were used to collect data 
during fieldwork. In section I highlight the fact that I engaged a research assistant. In section 
seven I discuss very briefly the methods of data analysis which I used to analyse the data. 
Section eight is a discussion about the study limitations. In section nine I discuss my 
reflections from the study. I discuss the ethical considerations in relation to the study in 
section ten.  In sections eleven and twelve, I discuss the validity and reliability of the data 
respectively. Section thirteen is a summary of the whole chapter. 
3.1 Qualitative Research Method 
As the aim of my study was to investigate to what extent the liberalisation of the maize 
markets has contributed to the SSFs’ vulnerability to exploitation, I needed an approach that 
would enable me to collect first hand data from the farmers themselves about how they have 
experienced the policy change and enable a researcher to get a broader understanding of ‘... 
how individual people experience and make sense of their own lives’ Longhurst (2003, 123). 
By being an approach through which one can ‘study things in their natural settings, 
attempting to make sense of, or interpret, phenomena in terms of meanings people bring to 
them’ I was convinced qualitative method was the right approach to help me get the data I 
needed to get an understanding of the SSFs vulnerability to exploitation in relation to maize
market liberalisation. The methods used for data collection such as interviews gave me an 
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opportunity to discuss with the farmers a number of issues that helped me to gain insight on 
how they make sense and interpret the maize marketing system in Zambia and how it has 
affected them. Ragin (1994) also argues that ‘[q]ualitative methods ... are best understood as 
data enhancers’ (1994a, 92 quoted by Neuman 2006, 14). This is in contrast to the 
quantitative methodology which gives a bird’s view of the data because of aggregation of 
data thereby concealing the originality of research (ibid). Thus qualitative methodology was 
chosen so that a clearer understanding could be given about the SSFs daily experiences.
Further, qualitative methods was employed so that respondents’ everyday lives can be 
captured because it is assumed that they are the ones who know best what problems they 
encounter as they sell their produce (Smith 2001). I felt that this methodology was better 
because my knowledge of how the policy of the liberalisation of the maize market has 
impacted the SSFs is limited to what I have read and observed from a distance since I do not 
live among them nor have I asked them about it. So the qualitative method enabled me to 
hear them out. Moreover, any lasting solution to the problems facing SSFs should be 
informed by their struggles. So the knowledge that they have is very important for shaping 
the right solution to the problems they are currently encountering.   
Qualitative research methodology was adopted for this research because it allows for an in-
depth understanding into the ‘complexities and processes’ (Marshall & Rossman 1999, 57) of 
the phenomenon under study. In order to establish to what extent the liberalisation of maize 
markets contributed to the vulnerability to exploitation of the SSFs entailed speaking to the 
farmers to find out their experiences and their opinions on the issue. By virtue of the 
qualitative method being an approach which is best suited for the investigation of the 
intricacies of a study, it seemed logical to me to adopt the method as it would ensure the 
collection of the relevant data.
According to Marshall & Rossman (1999) qualitative methods are helpful in identifying 
inconsistencies inherent in policies and thus help in correcting them. Thus qualitative 
methods by virtue of facilitating personal encounter with the research participant as is the 
case in interviews are able to get to the root of the problems between policy and practice 
3.2 Case Study 
This study has the characteristics of a case study. Case study approach is considered suitable 
in situations where the researcher’s investigation is based ‘... on a contemporary phenomenon 
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within some real-life context’ (Yin 2003, 1). Thus I decided to adopt a case study approach in
this instance because I felt it would help me understand how the SSFs are experience the new 
maize marketing system. Yin (2003) also asserts that ‘the case study method allows the 
investigators to retain the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life events...’ (2003, 
2)
Case studies are always criticised for the difficulty of generalising the findings. Whereas 
generalisation to a whole population might be difficult to attain, case studies are still useful in 
the sense that they provide ‘detailed information’ (Rice 2003, 225) of the particular case that 
is studied. This is because by focusing on a single case allows the researcher to be intensive 
in his/her investigation of the phenomenon under study. My aim for focusing on Nyimba was 
so that I could be extensive in my research as I recognise that there are variations within a 
population which I could highlight well by taking the case study route.
The other advantage of case studies according to Rice (2003) is that they ‘... may present 
unique opportunities for understanding the mechanisms that underlie empirical observations’ 
(2003, 226). Some researchers (Seshamani 1998; Govereh 2008) have found that SSFs have 
been exploited since the introduction of maize market liberalisation. However they do not 
elaborate how this is done. Thus my study is one way of gaining insight into how the SSFs 
this happens in the era of maize market liberalisation at the grass root level.
3.3 Choice of Study Area 
Nyimba district in this case was chosen as my study area because it has some characteristics 
of that I was interested in such as, it is a rural area where majority farmers are. According to 
Silverman (2010) the reasons for adopting purposive sampling in choosing a case should be 
‘the groups, settings and individuals where ... the processes being studied are most likely to 
occur’ (2010, 141). Looking at Nyimba district it presents a good example of a group, setting 
and individuals who have the relevant features to the study. In addition, besides being easily 
accessible I can speak the language that is spoken in the area so that made my research 
relatively easier.
3.4 Choice of Research Participants 
The primary study participants were both small scale maize farmers who have been involved 
in maize farming prior to the implementation of the maize market liberalisation policy and 
also those who started maize farming after the implementation of the liberalisation policy to 
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date. The reason for including both categories of farmers was to see if there are any variations 
in the feelings and experiences such as opportunities and struggles, and how they are coping 
with the current situation. 
3.4.1 General Characteristics of Primary Research Participants 
Fifteen SSFs were interviewed. In addition, the spouses (one male, one female) of two of the 
SSFs chipped in as the interviews with their spouses progressed. Of the fifteen, three were 
women, while the rest where men.
The primary research participants comprised persons aged between 32 and 72 years old. By 
Zambian definition of youth comprise persons up to the age of 35 years, so that four of the 
respondents can be classified as youth. Two of the participants were senior citizens above 65 
years old at the time of interviewing them. Nine of the primary research participants were 
aged between 38 and 52 years old.
The education backgrounds of the primary research participants were varied. Six of them had 
primary school education; another six of them had junior high school education, only two of 
them went as far as grade twelve, the highest in secondary school education; and one had 
never been to school at all.
All the small scale farmers interviewed were married except for one of the women who was a 
widow at the time of the interview. All the SSFs had families and were taking care of their 
children and some dependents. On average a household had at least five people and at most 
twelve people. 
3.4.2  Other Research Participants 
Also included in the study were government officers from the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Cooperative (MACO). All these government officers were included in the study in order to 
get an understanding on the role government has played in the whole process of liberalisation 
of the maize markets in relation to SSFs.
A staff member at the Food Reserve Agency (FRA) was also included in the study in order to 
get data related to the government’s maize marketing strategy intended to serve the interests 
of the small scale maize farmers.
Officials from agricultural community based organisations (CBOs) such as the cooperatives,
women’s club, information centres were also included in the study. 
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Maize buyers and traders were also included in the study. Millers were also included in the 
study were both city and rural based. There are variations in the activities of millers between
those located in the rural area and those located in the city. The Farmers’ Union was also 
included in the study. From him I managed to get data about how the Union is serving the 
interests of the small scale farmers at the district level and how they lobby government on 
their behalf. A wide array of research participants has been included in the study in order to 
broaden ‘the scope and validation of information’ (Mikkelsen 2005, 180).
I used purposive sampling to select the research participants. I did this to ensure that all the 
relevant informants were included in the research. I was also aware of the problems related to 
bias that this choice of sampling procedure introduces to the study such as the limitation of 
my prior knowledge. However, I was open-minded about the selection of study participants 
such that I took the advice of those who knew about the kinds of people involved in maize 
marketing. Thus I followed their lead and followed up some of the people they suggested 
whom I felt would be relevant. Of course this again introduces the issue of subjectivity on my 
part as well as those helping me (snowball sampling). Besides several considerations have to 
be made because not all potential research participants possess the salient characteristics such 
as what I have already mentioned above in the case of the SSFs. 
3.5 Data Sources 
3.5.1 Secondary Data Sources 
Given the limitations time and financial resources under which this research was undertaken, 
there was the need of supplementing primary data with secondary data. Secondary data is 
necessary ‘to provide a context for a study, for comparison and as the prime evidence for 
analysis (White 2003, 67). For example, with respect to the data providing the context for the 
study, I was able was from the information already available to find data to assist me in the 
description of my study area by picking out the relevant features that I needed about Nyimba 
in particular and Zambia as a whole.  
3.5.1.1 Document Analysis 
Besides the primary data collection, I also collected secondary data from some of the research 
participants, media, books, reports, journals, internet which was relevant to the study. The 
data derived from these secondary data sources was helpful in understanding what has been 
done on the topic by other researchers. This assisted me in focusing my research on areas or 
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aspects that have not been very much researched on by other researchers so that new 
knowledge can be generated and/or distinguish my work from other studies that have been 
done before (Kitchin & Tate 2000). The data was also used to supplement primary data 
(ibid). Document analysis also helped me to position my research 
3.5.2 Primary Data Sources 
There are several sources of primary data such as interviews, focused group discussions, 
observations inter alia. I collected primary data in order to ensure the relevancy and quality 
of the data by the research questions and tools of data collection I employed (Mikkelsen 
2005). I did this because I recognised that much as I could get data from secondary sources of 
data, secondary data is ‘information [that] has been collected by someone else, for another 
purpose’ (White 2003, 68) other than mine. As such it raises questions of how perfectly 
applicable such data would be to my study. 
Semi structured interviews and focus group discussions (FGDs) were employed in collecting 
the data for the study. Longhurst (2003) describes the two instruments as interviews which 
involving ‘talking with people but in ways that are self-conscious, orderly and partially 
structured’ (2003, 118). The two instruments were chosen because they ‘allow for an open 
response in the participants’ own words’ (Longhurst 2003, 119). By getting responses in the 
informants’ own words the experiences or meanings are not watered down as would have 
been the case if the responses were just yes and no as is the case in a questionnaire. In fact, in 
this way, the participants broaden my understanding of the complexities they experienced 
which I would have otherwise taken for granted.
3.5.2.1 Non-Participant Observation 
I conducted non participant observation whereby I did not participate in the activities I was 
observing but simply observed as these activities where happening before my eyes (Bailey 
2007). I observed events as they unfolded before my eyes. I initially did not intend to use 
observation method of data collection. However, since my fieldwork was done during the 
time when the maize marketing season was in full swing, I could not avoid observing what 
was going on as I saw with my own eyes what was happening as I travelled around the 
villages. Observation is acknowledged as one of the methods of primary data collection. 
However, observation alone is not a sufficient method of primary data collection because ‘... 
researchers cannot always see everything in a setting, determine what is important to notice, 
and know the meanings of what they observe, even their first account of observations will be 
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partial and filtered’ (Bailey 2007, 79). Thus data collected through observations alone are 
incomplete and does not give the full picture. Observation did not form the main part of data 
collection methods.
3.5.2.2 Semi-Structured Interviews 
Semi-structured interviews are ‘... about talking with people but in ways that are self-
conscious, orderly and partially structured’ (Longhurst 2003, 118). Interviews have several 
advantages which I chose to capitalise on. For example, interviews allow for the study of 
people whereby the ‘... understanding of the meanings in their lived world, describing their 
experiences and self-understanding, and clarifying and elaborating their own perspective on 
their lived world’ (Kvale 1996, 105), they also facilitate ‘a more thorough examination of 
experiences, feelings or opinions’ (Kitchin and Tate 2000). I envisioned that the vulnerability 
to exploitation of the SSFs’ which is the focus of this study could be best investigated if I 
asked the farmers to describe their experiences with respect to the phenomenon. In addition, 
an interview according to Valentine (2001), is an efficient and effective tool of data 
collection because it ‘can generate a lot of information very quickly; it enables the researcher 
to cover a wide variety of topics, to clarify issues raised by the participant and to follow up 
unanticipated themes that arise’ (2001, 44). The interview method of data collection also 
enabled me to rephrase or paraphrase the questions for the interviewees to understand what I 
meant. Similarly they were able to clarify things I did not understand upon being asked to. In 
this way misunderstandings were taken care of. Thus the interviews facilitated an in-depth 
understanding of the phenomenon under study. The decision to conduct interviews was also 
among other things influenced by the fact that most SSFs who were interviewed were 
illiterate. 
I adopted semi structured interviews because of their flexibility. That is, I was able to follow 
up relevant issues which the research participants raised up during the interview which I was 
not aware of with probing questions (Mikkelsen 2005). In this way I was able to get data that 
I would not have collected had I used a rigid method which does not allow for such 
flexibility.  
Prior to leaving for Zambia, I prepared interview guides (refer to Appendix A) for all the 
respective categories of research participants which I used to elicit information from them. I 
did this in order to ensure that the interviews were more focused and not haphazardly done. 
The guide also helped me in the sense that it was like a checklist by which I ensured that all 
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the relevant issues and/or themes I needed to addressed where raised of course not necessarily 
in the order they appeared on the guide but as conversation flowed (Bailey 2007). In total, 
fifteen small scale maize farmers where interviewed within Vizimumba Block. Most of the 
primary research participants were from Vizimumba Camp where nine SSFs were 
interviewed. The distribution of the primary research participants in other camps was two 
SSFs from Lubamba Camp, three from Chipembe Camp and one MRS.
A total of six members of staff from Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperative (MACO), of 
the five, two were from MACO headquarters in Lusaka, two were from the Nyimba district 
agricultural office and the last two were from Vizimumba and MRS camps. One of the 
interviews with the staff from MACO headquarters was informal with promises to conduct a 
formal one at a later date, which never materialised. From the two MACO officials I was able 
to get data related to MACO’s overview at the national level of the plight of the small scale 
maize farmers and what government has been doing to help them. The MACO staff at the 
district office provided the same data but at a district level. The Officers at the MACO camps 
were my gate keepers. I was in the field when the government maize marketing season 
opened so it was not possible to meet with all the Camp Extension Officers as they were busy 
with arrangements of the maize markets. So I only managed to interview two of them one 
from Vizimumba camp and the other from MRS Camp. One of the interviews with one of the 
camp officers was not recorded as the officer refused to have the interview recorded with the 
possibility of being directly quoted.
I also had an interview with an officer from Food Reserve Agency when I returned to Lusaka 
from Nyimba because it was not possible to meet him before then. From him I was able to get 
data related to the government’s maize marketing strategy intended to serve the interests of 
the SSFs. I also interviewed officials from agricultural community based organisations 
(CBOs) such as the cooperatives, information centres. 
Three maize buyers were interviewed one from each of the following camps Chipembi, MRS, 
and Vizimumba. All the three buyers were based in Vizimumba Block but working for maize 
traders based in Nyimba Central Block and Petauke district respectively. Six maize traders 
were interviewed: two from Vizimumba Block, that is one from Lubamba and the other one 
from Chipembe Camps; and four from Nyimba Central Block. 
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I interviewed three millers in total, two millers in Nyimba, one from Lubamba Camp and the 
other one from Chipembe Camp, and one from Lusaka. There are variations in the operations 
of millers between those located in the rural area and those located in the city. From the
Lusaka based milling company I was able to get data about the suppliers of maize to the mill, 
the prices at which the milling company buys the maize, and the products that the milling 
company processes from maize and their customers. Similarly, from the Nyimba based 
millers I was able to get data about a typical rural based miller’s activities. 
The Farmers’ Union was also included in the study and were represented by a staff from the 
Nyimba District Farmers’ Association (NDFA). From him I managed to get data about how 
the Union is serving the interests of the small scale farmers at the district level and how they 
lobby government on their behalf.
3.5.2.3 Focus Group Discussion (FGD) 
A FGD is a form of interview where ‘a group of people, usually between 6 and 12, who meet 
in an informal setting to talk about a particular topic that has been set by the researcher’ 
(Longhurst 2003, 119). FGD was also used to collect data because of the financial and time 
constraints under which this study was undertaken. The FGD as an instrument of data 
collection was used because it enabled me to collect the opinions and feelings of several 
people on an issue under discussion within a short time and at relatively lower cost 
(Longhurst 2003). Further, FGDs facilitate the exploration of how ‘meanings and experiences 
are negotiated and contested between participants’ (Valentine 2001, 44). Thus I was able to 
determine the preferences of the different SSMFs on market liberalism. FGD was also used to 
triangulation and add-on to the interviews to assure validity of the data collected in through 
interviews (Longhurst 2003). I was however wary of problems associated with FGDs such as 
the fear that some participants might have problems expressing themselves because of fear of 
embarrassment or criticism inter alia which might in turn affect the information that they 
share (Kitchin and Tate 2000). Such a case arose and the research participant who was 
discouraged by someone (whom I later learnt was the daughter) was encouraged to speak and 
the critic was kindly asked to respect the wish of the one who wanted to speak.
I had one FGD with the women’s club whose membership comprise both men and women 
farmers. It was difficult to organise more FGD because farmers were busy with preparations 
and arrangements to sell maize to the government maize market which opened during the 
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time of the fieldwork. I moderated the FGD assisted by one of the farmers who in the 
leadership of one of the local agricultural CBOs.   
3.5.2.4 Photographs/Images 
I also took photographs of aspects that I thought could be better expressed visually. 
Photographs like the other tools of primary data collection also tell stories.    
3.6 Research Assistant 
I engaged a researcher assistant from Nyimba who knew the area relatively well, is a native 
speaker of the Nsenga language spoken in Nyimba and is involved in agricultural activities 
with the local farmer groups. In fact he is the vice chairperson one of the NDFA Information 
Centres. He is also a SSF. He assisted me in translating and/or interpreting whenever need 
arose. With his background, he also enlightened me on several intricacies in maize marketing 
in his area. He also helped in transcribing of the interviews. I oriented him about his role in 
the fieldwork on the day I contracted him.   
3.7 Methods of Data Analysis 
3.7.1 Qualitative Data Analysis 
Dey’s approach to qualitative data analysis as adapted by Kitchin and Tate (2000) was used 
to analyse the data from the interviews, and FGD. This approach ‘consists of the description, 
classification and making of connections between the data’ (Kitchin and Tate 2000, 231). 
 3.8 Study Limitations 
The field work was done within 8 weeks, the period when I went home for my summer 
vacation after being in Norway for almost a year. One of my challenges prior to embarking 
on the research was how I was to divide time between being with family and carrying the 
research. Fortunately though, I was lodging with family, so this helped me to kill two birds 
with one stone. I was with family in the evenings and weekends and did my fieldwork during 
working hours.
My other challenge was technical in nature. The battery charger for the cells for the camera 
and recorder did not work when I got to the Nyimba. I had to ask someone who was coming 
to eastern province from Lusaka to bring me new cells as the ones I bought in Nyimba could 
not work. This resulted in my incurring extra costs for still photographs taken by a local 
cameraman. As if this was not bad enough, the solar energy at the house I was staying was 
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not adequate enough to charge my laptop battery. This meant if I wanted to use the laptop I 
had to charge the battery at Nyimba Boma which was expensive as I had to pay for transport 
to and from there plus charging costs. So I decided to have the first transcription hand 
written. 
Other issues of concern were time and financial resources. I recruited a researcher assistant in 
order to ensure that the research was carried out within the vacation period. This was also for 
complementary and supplementary reasons. However, involvement of the researcher assistant 
had financial implications. Besides, this there were other materials also that were required 
such as a recorder and all the accessories that go with it, stationery and also local transport 
costs to ensure mobility considering that the research was done in a rural area. I had to carter 
for all these expenses using the meagre resources available to the researcher.
The other challenge I encountered during my fieldwork was difficulties in getting round some 
gate keepers especially in large companies where I had to go through the security and then 
the secretaries to get to the informants. This proved to be a challenge that in some cases I 
ended up giving up as I was told from the security point that the person I was supposed to see 
was not available.
3.9 Reflexivity 
Dowling (2000) contends that a researcher’s reflexivity centres around two main issues: 
power and subjectivity. By reflexivity she means the process where a researcher is self 
analytical throughout the research process. With respect to power, she recognises that the fact 
that qualitative research takes place in environments where power relations have to be 
negotiated because of the different socio-economic, socio-cultural positions inter alia of the 
different parties involved in the research. Field work for this study took place in the villages 
where the majority of the farmers are of humble education background and with high 
illiteracy levels. As such I was able to foresee ‘potentially exploitative’ (Dowling 2000, 29) 
power relations between the research participants in the villages and myself. My education 
level was perceived as being of a high level therefore I was held in high esteem. Even if this 
was the case I made sure to point out to the research on the phenomenon under study they 
were the experts hence I went to consulted them in order to get more insight on the 
knowledge they had. 
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I think where one is studying and what qualification one will get at the end of the studies also 
influences how research participants view and relate to you. The fact that I was studying as a 
European university made some my research participants to respect me and spare me their 
time. While others wanted to undermine my work and show me that they were more 
knowledgeable. I only had two such cases and it turned out that one of them was not the right 
person for the interview while I was not able to see because he had a busy schedule. The fact 
that I conducted my research in the rural areas where few go to do research also made some 
of my research participants open up to me as they felt they had information which would be 
beneficial. In this regard the nature of power relations that manifested were unequal as well 
as asymmetrical. So I made sure to adequately prepare for these encounters to ensure that the 
quality of the information I get from them was not compromised.
Dowling (2000) argues that, one cannot rule out issues of power relations during research 
because it is part and parcel of social interactions of which qualitative research is one. Since I 
realised at an early stage that power relations issues are inevitable during field work, in the 
case of the small scale farmers, I endeavoured as much as possible to make them aware of the 
fact that giving honest responses from the knowledge they had about the phenomenon under 
study would be very insightful in the research findings thus being reflective of their 
interpretation of reality. In the case of the elites, and in high socio-economic strata, awareness 
of the potential existence of unequal power relations I made sure I adequately prepared before 
embarking on the interview so as not to be seen to be wasting their time and also to be able to 
engage with them at that high level. 
I made adequate preparation prior to the interviews and this helped me in power negotiations 
during the interviews from unequal to reciprocal. As Dowling (2000) suggests, I incorporated 
reflexivity throughout the whole research process thus I allowed for flexibility which enabled 
me to make modifications as need arose.
With regard to subjectivity, it is impossible for qualitative research to be strictly objective 
because all researchers bring to the study their ‘personal histories’ and worldviews Dowling 
(2000, 31). So according to Dowling (2000) the concept of subjectivity is an 
acknowledgement by the researcher that these aspects about themselves will be introduced 
into the research by virtue of it being a social encounter. With respect to the phenomenon 
under study, since I originate from Nyimba district, I was an insider. This presented both 
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advantages and disadvantages during the field work. It was advantageous because, as an 
insider, farmers felt free to speak to me and offer relevant information for the study as 
language and natal place were my assets in this context, thus the two were helpful/ 
resourceful in creating relations of trust. 
The disadvantage of being an insider in my case arose from the fact that I was empathetic 
with my kinsfolk. For example, as an insider, I am personally involved in the topic of study 
as most of my family are small scale farmers. So I had first-hand experience of their 
predicament. From the little that I know, I am sympathetic to their lamentations that things 
are not as good as they used to be in the olden days when they had to sell to the 
NAMBOARD (a government parastatal which was in charge of buying grain from the 
farmers). This as Kitchin and Tate (2000) argue has the problem of introducing biases into 
the view point and the selection of criteria or issue of study. However, with this prior 
knowledge of the problem, I was cautious to ensure that this problem does not affect the 
outcome of the research. As the saying goes, to be forewarned is to be forearmed. Thus I 
adopted an open minded approach during the whole research process and thesis writing.
3.10 Ethical Considerations 
Ethics in research is concerned with the researcher’s ‘responsibility to research participants 
with regard to matters of privacy, informed consent and harm’ (Dowling 2000, 24). With
respect to privacy, as I used a recorder and took field notes, I was very careful to ensure 
restricted access to them in order to ensure the privacy of the research participants (Dowling 
2000). It is also acknowledged that using a recorder in a rural setting during interviews and 
FGDs might influence the kind of data the participants may give. Thus before starting the 
interview or FGD, I sought prior permission from participants so as to foster a rapport 
atmosphere in order to dispel any fears about security issues the participants might have had 
because of recording the conversation. In addition, in the case of the those informants from 
organisations most especially, I sought prior permission in the event that a need arose to 
quote them in the research because of the difficulty of ensuring anonymity in their case 
(Dowling 2000). So only those who gave their consent have their identity revealed. Thus 
anonymity was highly guaranteed.
In order to get informed consent, I availed the research participants with the necessary 
information about the essence of the research and their role in the research (Dowling 2000). 
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Those that could read were availed with both written text and word of mouth of the same, 
while the illiterate were informed verbally. This was done to ensure that they knew what they 
were involving themselves into and that all the parties involved in the research knew their 
roles. The clear definition and execution of roles by all the research participants, researcher 
assistant and I inclusive also assisted in reducing biases in the study
To ensure that neither the research participants, research assistant nor I were not exposed to 
either physical or social harm, I tried my best to do the right thing by observing all protocols 
throughout the field work and presentation of the findings (Dowling 2000). In addition, I will 
endeavour to share the findings of the study with all the research participants.
3.11 Validity of Data 
Issues of validity according to Kitchin and Tate (2000) pertain to ‘the soundness, legitimacy 
and relevancy of theory and its investigation’ (2000, 34,). To systematically consider the 
issue, they categorise validity into two broad categories, those related to theory and the other 
related to practice, which Mikkelsen (2005, 193) refers to as ‘communicative validity’ and 
‘pragmatic validity’ respectively. To ensure validity of my research findings the following 
actions were undertaken: First, fortunately for me, I speak Nsenga and Chewa the local 
languages spoken in Nyimba, this enabled me to communicate with the research participants 
effectively. That is not to say there were no situations when the Nsenga 
equivalents/expressions escaped me because such cases where there or when they said things 
I did not understand because of my language limitations. As I have said such situations where 
there but when it happened, my research assistant who is a native of the area and is up to date 
with the language came in handy to clarify things both for me and the research participants. 
In addition, when I arrived in Zambia I made enquiries about the definitions or expressions of 
some of the words that I was not too sure about before leaving Trondheim in order to get the 
current local expressions/words so as to avoid misunderstanding when I finally got to the
field. This strategy proved very useful because I had very few problems related to such issues 
and when they did arise as already mentioned the research assistant came in handy to clarify.
Second, I adopted qualitative methodology in because of the claim that as an approach, it 
takes a holistic view especially with regard to the emphasis on ‘processes, relationships, 
connections and interdependency among the component parts’ (Denscombe 2003, 84 quoted 
by Boolsen in Mikkelsen 2005, 125). Thus through the tools and techniques that this 
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approach provides I was able to gather data that would be able to bring out the salient 
issues/aspects which I would not if I had used the quantitative methodology. For example, by 
focusing on only a few farmers, I was able to go into detail about the phenomenon under 
study and get the experience of the farmers as opposed to suggesting responses to them which 
would have been the case had I used the questionnaire.
Third, besides interviews, I conducted a focused group discussion with some farmers for 
triangulation to ensure that what has been missed and/or taken for granted is incorporated. In 
addition, as the field work was conducted at the government maize marketing season had 
opened I was able to observe both private and government maize market mechanisms. I also 
took photographs which also further portray the reality on the ground.
Four, I recognised that transcription of tape recordings by virtue of being a translation of 
what is communicated both verbally and non-verbally during the interview to written text 
should not be assumed to be exact reflections of the original conversation (Kvale 1996). 
Power to charge my laptop battery was a challenge so I did not type my transcript until I left 
Nyimba. However, this was a blessing in disguise, as I ended up transcribing the tape 
recordings twice. I decided while in Nyimba to have a hand written transcript done together 
with my research assistant. The reason for this decision was, he best knew language and the 
jargon so it was better for him to translate them before I left as I did not want to have a 
problem of not reaching him by phone because he lives in an area where mobile telephone 
network is difficult. In the whole process, I was able to counter check the transcript with the 
tape recordings as I went about to type. I noted a few omissions which I then included. 
3.12 Reliability of Data 
Reliability is a concept which has to do with the extent to which the results of the research 
would be the same if a similar study was undertaken using the same approach (Kitchin and 
Tate 2000). As people who are the object of study are dynamic it is hard to guarantee 
reliability of the findings. Besides the research findings as pointed out by Crang and Cook 
(2007) ‘... speaks to a unique group of people at a specific moment in time’ (2007, 146). In 
addition, they speak about issues of the researcher’s own baggage which she/he brings to the 
research process. This is important because it takes cognisance of the uniqueness of research 
participants and researcher alike. This therefore also explains why different results might be 
obtained by different researchers undertaking similar research. This being the case does not 
43 
 
imply that rigor will not be observed. Further by transcribing the tape recordings twice first 
using only the tape recording, secondly using the tape recording and the hand written 
transcript I was able to spot omission which I included in this way rigor in the process of 
highlighting the fact that rigor to ensure that whole was undertaken in a transparent manner is 
assured. 
I also assured the research participants about the confidentiality issues which in a way made 
them open to air their views and share their experiences. Striking rapport was easy because I 
was in the company of someone they knew and trusted (the research assistant). I also think 
his company helped in facilitating their speaking the truth for fear that he would question 
them if they did not since he knew them.   
3.13 Summary 
Qualitative research methodology is used in study for both data collection and analysis. A 
case study approach was used in this study. The study drew upon both primary and secondary 
sources of data. The main study limitations were time and financial constraints, technical 
challenges and getting access to some of the secondary research participants. I also share my 
experiences. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Production of Maize in Nyimba District, Zambia 
4.0 Introduction 
This chapter is an account of the research findings focusing on the production of maize in 
Nyimba district, Zambia. In the first section I present a description of the various agricultural 
activities that the respondents are engaged in.  The second section is a description of the 
technology that the SSFs use in their maize farming. In the third section I describe how the 
SSFs access inputs such as fertilizer and hybrid seed and the challenges the encounter to 
access the same. The fourth section is a description of the primary research participants’ 
motivation for joining farmer groups. In the fifth section I describe the differences in yield 
between local maize and hybrid maize grown by the SSFs. In the sixth section I present a 
brief description of how the SSFs I interviewed store their maize. In the seventh section I 
describe and discuss the cost and returns of maize farming. Section eight is a summary of the 
chapter.
4.1 Agricultural Activities  
The SSFs interviewed were involved in several agricultural activities such as growing of 
traditional crops, gardening, rearing of livestock, bee keeping, and agriculture related wage 
labour. A brief description of these activities is given below
4.1.1 Rain Fed Crops 
All SSFs who were interviewed engaged in the cultivation of a variety of crops. Thirteen of 
them entirely depend on rain to carry out their farming activities; two were also engaged in 
gardening using water from the streams in the cold and dry seasons. The crops grown during 
the rainy season include beans, cassava, cotton, groundnuts, maize, and sunflower. Apart 
from maize, groundnuts and sunflower are the most commonly grown crops. 
Maize
The maize seed varieties grown can be broadly categorised into two: hybrid varieties and 
local maize variety which is popularly known as nseenga. All the fifteen SSFs interviewed 
grow hybrid maize. Five of the SSFs interviewed do not grow the local maize variety in 
addition to the hybrid maize variety, so that ten SSFs grow both local maize and hybrid 
varieties.
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The five SSFs who grow only hybrid maize variety grow it for home consumption as well as 
for sale. The reasons for this course of action include: first, changing rainfall patterns. Of 
the five SSFs, three argued that with the current changing rainfall patterns crop failure with 
nseenga is more prevalent than hybrid. This is because there are customised varieties like 
early, medium and late maturing varieties. This being the case one finds that whatever 
happens weather-wise he/she is assured of harvesting something from any of the three 
varieties. Apparently, this is not the case with nseenga, as when the rainfall patterns are not 
favourable, a farmer suffers loss. For example, one SSF said ‘we have sidelined nseenga 
because of the changing rainfall patterns. With hybrid, even when the rains are not enough, 
you will harvest something at least as opposed to local maize which when the rains are not 
enough, you will have severe crop failure that’s why hunger was rife’. SSFs have turned to 
hybrid varieties because it is a hedge against total crop failure. For instance, another SSF said 
‘should one variety perform badly, uzafuzila kuliyenangu (you will be relieved through the 
other varieties)... So when there’s drought, you will get relief from the early maturity’. The 
other advantage of hybrid that was highlighted was the fact that it does not require many days 
to mature. For example, one SSF said ‘when there is insufficient rains, the yield of local 
maize is low, whereas that of hybrid is relatively good because it doesn’t require a lot of days 
for it to mature’. Apparently, local maize takes longer (about 90-120 days) to mature than 
hybrid. 
On the contrary, JAICAF (2008) argue that given the changing weather conditions, there was 
no difference in yields between hybrid and local maize. And yet local maize is grown cheaply 
as few inputs are used. For this reason they propose the intensified use of local maize to 
‘better avert the risk posed by drought and other adversities’ (p4), as it is most convenient 
given the changing weather patterns. 
Second, hybrid varieties give high yield with or without fertilizer. The argument here is 
that regardless of whether one uses fertilizer or not, the yield for hybrid is still higher than 
that of local maize. So the SSFs harvest a lot of maize. For example, one SSF said ‘the 
difference is when you grow nseenga on 1Lima you expect to harvest 12 bags, but in the case 
of hybrid, you expect to harvest about 20 – 25 bags from 1Lima ... If the land is fertile, the 
yield is still as if you have applied fertilizer. But if the land is not fertile, the yield is not 
good. Anyhow, the yield for hybrid is still higher than that of local maize’. This is the case 
where maize is grown under proper management. However, according to MACO the 
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expected yield per lima for hybrid maize grown with fertilizer and good management is 
between 15-20 bags (50kg) (Donovan et al 2002). 
Some of reasons the SSFs gave for not discarding nseenga completely include: first, ‘better 
safe than sorry’- one SSF quoted a local proverb which says “‘osataya chi kabudula 
chakale, chanyowani pakine chingambike lombapano chisile  (don’t throw away own pants 
or shorts because you never know whether the new pair of pants will soon get torn and be 
good for nothing)’”as the reason she would not abandon local maize entirely for hybrid. She 
has several years of experience with local maize and sees it as more reliable than hybrid with 
which she has little experience, so she still clings to nseenga for that reason. Her comment 
suggests that she is risk averse. Second, lack of willingness to bear fertilizer costs and fear 
of crop failure in case of bad weather- A MACO official in commenting on the issue said 
‘he (SSF) would think of if I grow hybrid I will be buying fertilizer, “where do I get the 
money? and in case the rains are not okay, hybrids are a problem as they will all be wiped 
out”. So he would go for a one lima (a quarter of a hectare) or one hectare local maize which 
will give him less than what he was supposed to get from one lima’. If hybrid was cultivated 
the extra costs involved and the higher risk of crop failure in case of poor rains makes SSFs 
to continue growing the more reliable but low yielding nseenga. This line of argument is 
challenged when one factors in the issue of different hybrid varieties such as early, medium 
and late maturing varieties mentioned above.
For the ten SSFs who grow both maize varieties, nseegna is grown for home consumption 
while hybrid is grown for sale. The SSFs based their decision to distinguish the purposes for 
the two varieties on several factors. For example, they said they choose to grow nseenga for 
home consumption because: 
x the nseenga grain is hard thus difficult for weevils to destroy;
x nseenga, does not require chemicals to store for long time; 
x the grain is heavier than that of hybrid thus one gets more maize meal and less maize 
bran from it compared to hybrid; 
x the maize meal made from it is whiter than that of hybrid. 
With respect to hybrid, they said they choose to grow hybrid for sale because: 
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x the hybrid grain is soft thus easily attacked by weevils by 
September/October/November. 
x fear that the grain would be infested by weevils; 
x they do not have funds to buy chemicals to protect the grain from attacks by weevils; 
x they do not have proper storage facility in which to store the grain; and 
x it gives high yield thus is good for business. 
The argument here is that hybrid is not easy to store but is bountiful. So in order to make 
money from it, one has to sell it as it would go to waste if no extra care is taken. The 
precautionary measures that have to be taken have financial implications.
Groundnuts
Fourteen of the SSFs interviewed grow groundnuts. Out of the fourteen, only two of those 
who grow the crop said they grow it solely for sale. Six of them said they grow groundnuts 
for sale as well as for home consumption. Whereas six of them said they grow the crop solely 
for home consumption.
Sunflower 
Nine of the SSFs interviewed grow sunflower. Of these nine, three grow sunflower purely for 
home consumption, one grows it solely for sale, two grow it for subsistence purposes, while 
the remaining three grow it with the intention to both sell and consume some at home. Some 
in this last category process the sunflower into cooking oil before selling it while some sell it 
unprocessed.
Cassava
Out of all the SSFs interviewed only three grow cassava. All the cassava growers grow the 
crop for both home consumption and for sale. Not much of the crop is grown.
Cotton
At the time of the fieldwork, only three farmers where growing cotton. And all of them grew 
the crop under the out-grower arrangement, whereby they were contracted by cotton 
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companies to grow the cotton on the companies’ behalf. These companies provided the 
farmers with the necessary inputs and after harvest buy the crop off the farmers. It is at this 
stage that the cotton companies recover the costs of inputs they gave the farmers to grow the 
cotton. Some of the SSFs interviewed used to grow cotton but stopped citing low prices and 
that the crop is difficult to grow as the reason for stopping. For example, one SSF said ‘that’s
why the company has realised and increased the price in order to attract farmers.’  Apparently 
several people had stopped growing cotton because of low prices. One SSF, a 70 years old 
widow said ‘... elders ... cannot manage to grow cotton because cotton farming is very 
difficult’. In comparison to maize farming, apparently cotton farming is too demanding 
and/or involving thus the older people shun the crop. 
4.1.2 Gardening - (Irrigated Crops)
Only two of the SSFs interviewed grow beans. Both of them grow the crop for sale.   
Of all the SSFs interviewed, only two were also engaged in gardening. They did this 
agricultural activity during the cold and dry season. This is the period when most of the other 
farmers rested from their labour. Gardening is mainly done by those who have pieces of land 
along the banks of streams or rivers. The farmers use watering cans to draw water from the 
stream/river to water their crops. The crops cultivated include cabbage, onions, rape, 
tomatoes to mention but a few.  The farmers who engage in this activity argue that it is very 
profitable compared to maize farming because from a small portion of land one is able to earn 
a lot. For example, one SSF argues that ‘when I plant 1,000 head of cabbage and I peg them 
at a giveaway price of ZMK1, 000.00 (USD) 0.20); it means I will have ZMK1, 000, 000.00 
(USD201.05) on a small piece of land. But for me to get ZMK1, 000, 000.00 (USD201.05) 
from my maize field I will need a large piece of land. So the advantage of having a garden is 
you cultivate a small piece of land but you reap a lot of returns’. He argues in terms of the 
surface area and the crop that can be planted. The other farmer involved in gardening argues 
that ‘when I use 4 bags of fertilizer in the field, I don’t think it gives me ZMK2, 000, 000.00 
(USD402.10) but here at the garden when I use 2 bags I am able to raise ZMK2, 000, 000.00 
(USD402.10)’. His argument is that besides cultivating on a small piece of land, the amount 
of fertilizer needed is less but the returns high.
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Months 
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
Rainy Season (Mainza) Cold Season (Mwela) Hot & Dry Season 
(Chisalo) 
Rainy Season 
(Mainza) 
Nseenga (Local Maize)    Nseenga 
Early Maturing          H
Y
V
Medium Maturing          HYV 
Late Maturing HYV          
Groundnuts     Groundnuts 
Sunflower     Sunflower 
 Cassava          
Cotton     Cotton 
  Vegetables   
Figure 3: Crop Calendar showing crops grown by SSFs in Nyimba District 
Source: 2010 Fieldwork (Interviews)
SSFs start preparing their fields in August up to October.  Maize planting starts as early as 
October to the first week of January. For those SSFs who start planting in October, nseenga is 
the maize variety which they plant because it takes a long time to mature. However, most of 
the maize is planted in November and December. Some SSFs plant early maturing hybrid 
varieties in November while other plant during the first week of January. The cultivation 
period of maize which last from November to April is true for the rest of the maize growing 
areas in Zambia (JAICAF 2008). Maize is normally harvested in May and June. However, 
some people sometimes start harvesting as early as April. Planting period for groundnuts is 
similar to that of maize. Groundnuts are usually harvested in April and May. The planting 
period of sunflower starts in November all the way to February, while harvesting is done in 
June. Cassava is planted in February and March and harvested the same period the following 
year. JAICAF (2008) cite this long period cassava takes before it can be harvested as the 
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reason why the crop is not highly favoured. Cotton is planted in November and December, 
and then harvested in May and June. Vegetables are mostly grown from March to October.
4.1.3 Livestock Rearing 
All the SSFs interviewed reared at least one form of livestock. The livestock reared range 
from chickens, to ducks, goats, pigs and cows. Cows and chickens are the most reared of all 
the livestock highlighted. Eleven out of fifteen SSFs interviewed reared cows. The reasons 
given for rearing cows include provision of milk; to assist in field work such as ploughing, 
planting and weeding; means of transport; and sometimes source of meat because SSFs rarely 
slaughter cows. With respect to help in field work, during land preparation the oxen are used 
to pull the plough. With respect to planting, the oxen pull the plough which rips the ground 
and the farmer follows behind sowing his/her seed in the ground so ripped. When it comes to 
weeding, oxen help in making ridges in the maize fields by pulling a ridging plough that is 
attached to them. 
Ten of SSFs interviewed reared chickens. Chickens are usually reared as a source of food as 
well as for sale. Only seven of SSFs interviewed reared pigs. Pigs are reared for home 
consumption in ordinary times and also on special occasions such as funerals or weddings. 
Pigs are also sold in order to raise money to meet pressing financial needs, and/or used as 
payment for hired labour during rainy season when people are hired to work in other people’s 
fields. Five of the SSFs interviewed reared goats. Goats are reared for reason similar to those 
for rearing pigs. Only one of the SSF interviewed reared ducks. Most SSFs have suffered loss 
in their livestock due to livestock disease outbreaks. Chickens and pigs are the livestock most 
seriously affected by these diseases outbreaks. 
The livestock like the crops SSFs grow serve several purposes such as source of food and 
income as well as being used as payment for labour power. Thus the SSFs have diversified 
sources of income from agricultural activities.
4.1.4 Bee Keeping 
Only one of the SSFs interviewed said he was also engaged in bee keeping for business, 
though at a very small scale. 
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4.1.5 Wage Labour in other Farmers’ Fields (Non-Farm Activity) 
Only two of the SSFs interviewed do agricultural related wage labour in other people’s fields, 
while the rest of the SSFs interviewed said they actually hire people to work in their fields 
and maize is the payment given for wage labour supplied. For example, one SSF said ‘I tell 
people to work in my field and I give them a tin of maize’. This form of wage labour is 
common during the rainy season when there is both food shortage and farmers need help with 
field work. Payments received for wage labour is either maize or cash. Those who engage in 
wage labour to earn some money do it to meet some pressing financial needs such as money 
to mill the maize. For example, one SSF, a father of eight children said ‘when we encounter a 
problem but hear that someone is looking for piece workers, we go and till the land for them 
and thus earn the money to enable us mill our maize’. The SSFs who engage in wage labour 
to get maize do it because they have insufficient or run out of their maize stocks. For 
instance, one SSF said that ‘he/she is desperate and cannot go home empty handed since there 
is completely nothing there.’ Shortage of the staple food makes some people to engage in 
wage labour. 
4.2 Technology Employed 
The SSFs interviewed still used traditional tools such as hoes and ploughs. This is also true 
for SSFs in most other parts of Zambia and Malawi (JAICAF 2008). All the SSFs as already 
mentioned grow hybrid maize seed. All the SSFs applied fertilizer to their crop except for 
one. The reason which was given for not applying fertilizer was lack of money to afford the 
fertilizer. All those that used fertilizer applied it to hybrid maize, as it is believed that nseenga
does not need fertilizer. For example, one camp extension officer said ‘local maize doesn’t 
require a lot of fertilizer. In fact if anything, it doesn’t require any fertilizer because even if 
you apply fertilizer, there is no impact.’ (The belief is that regardless of whether one applies 
fertilizer or not the yield is still low.) So instead of wasting fertilizer on nseenga, SSFs
choose not to apply it in the first place. Only those SSFs who cultivated fields that are 
believed to be degraded applied fertilizer to nseenga. For example, one SSF who cultivates 
fields which were handed down to him by his parents said ‘we use fertilizer on nseenga also 
because the soils here are not fertile anymore. There are other areas where you don’t need to 
apply fertilizer on nseenga or even hybrid to get high yield not this area, where I am the fifth 
generation and I also have my own children who will inherit the same land’. The perception 
of the soil fertility to a large extent determines the use of fertilizer on the crop whether hybrid 
or nseenga.
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4.3 Fertilizer and Seed (Inputs) 
The SSFs main sources of inputs are the government through Farmer Input Support 
Programme (FISP), the private retailers, and the farmers’ organisations. All the SSFs 
interviewed were beneficiaries of FISP.  These inputs were accessed through the different 
farmers’ organisations in which the farmers where members. Fourteen of the farmers 
interviewed were users of fertilizer except for one who did not use due to lack of funds. 
While most farmers mainly depend on the FISP for their inputs some buy extra from the 
private retailers in Nyimba Boma, Petauke or Chipata. The government under the FISP has 
been selling seed and fertilizer to SSFs who are members of farmers’ organisations. The 
government sells the inputs in packs. When the programme started a pack had eight bags of 
fertilizer and a 10kg bag of seed. However, for the 2009/2010 farming season the pack was 
reduced to four bags of fertilizer and 10kg bag of seed in order to increase the number of 
SSFs accessing the inputs (Musokotwane 2009b). One camp extension officer said ‘before
last year [2009], farmers could get 4 bags of D compound and 4 bags of Urea. But then 
looking at the number of farmers in need of inputs, they [government] thought of reducing, 
instead of giving them [SSFs] 8 bags, they gave them 2 bags of D compound and 2 bags of 
Urea.’ The price for a bag of subsidised fertilizer was ZMK50, 000.00 (USD10.05), while 
that of seed was sold for ZMK63, 000.00 (USD12.67). For these inputs acquired through the 
FISP farmers had to pay cash. 
The government has influenced the employment of fertilizer and high yielding maize seed 
varieties by the SSFs through FISP. This is not any different from what used to occur before 
the implementation of the liberalisation policy in the 1980s. Govereh et al (2008) argue that 
SSFs increased their use of inputs such as fertilizer and hybrid maize seed varieties during the 
1970s and 1980s. They also add that consequently the output increased during the same 
period.  
SSFs highlighted a number of problems associated with the FISP. First, they said that access 
to the government subsidised inputs was restricted to farmers belonging to farmers’ 
organisations. For example, one SSF’s sentiments were ‘the badness of that government 
subsidised fertilizer which comes is it is only given to those who are members of 
cooperatives, meaning that if you don’t belong to a cooperative you can’t buy that fertilizer.’ 
This means that SSFs who are not members of any farmers’ organisation had to buy inputs at 
the ruling market price from the retail shops. 
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Second, the FISP did not supply farmers’ organisations with subsidised input packs according 
to the number of members in the farmers’ organisations. For example, the research assistant 
said that ‘as Pamodzi farmers’ group we have a membership of 32 but they gave us 5 packs’. 
The allocation of packs per farmers’ organisation is not based on number of members or 
people who are able to afford the inputs. Moreover farmers are not given inputs as per their 
requirement. 
Third, related to this issue is the fact that each farmer who is lucky as to be sold the inputs is 
restricted to one pack. For example, one SSF said that ‘we are not given according to our 
need but forced to get only 4 bags. Those are inadequate resulting in some part of the maize 
goes without fertilizer.’ This means that for those SSFs who entirely depend on FISP for 
access to inputs some of their crop has to do without fertilizer. However, some people found 
ways of going round this hitch by buying on behalf of those who had money but were not 
allowed to buy more than a pack. For example, one SSF got an extra bag of seed through this 
way and said that ‘some people buy from the cooperative and sell it to their friends’. Some 
SSFs turn to their social networks to help them in accessing the inputs. Some farmers’ 
organisations in their quest to serve every member dismantle the packs and issue fewer bags. 
For example, one SSF said ‘we got two bags from the club. Ideally each person was supposed 
to get four bags. But because we are many in the club we had to spread the number of bags 
among all the members.’ The insufficient number of packs delivered to the organisation 
resulted in the organisation’s leadership taking this initiative. This further reduced the amount 
of fertilizer available to each farmer. 
Fourth, FISP does not respect the rules of farming. For instance, one SSF said ‘they don’t 
follow the rules, not only do they bring the fertilizer late but they bring top dressing first and 
later bring basil.’ The inputs are delivered late and the sequence of delivery for fertilizer is 
wrong. This distorts the farming programme of farmers.
With respect to private sector supply of inputs, the SSFs said they had problems with access 
to inputs generally. One of the problems they highlighted was scarcity of inputs in the rural 
areas. For example, one SSF said ‘when you go to the shops at Nyimba Boma, at the time 
you want the seed, you find that at times the variety you want is not there.’ There appears to 
be scarcity of some hybrid seed varieties. 
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Related to this, is the problem of few input outlets in Nyimba. This problem was also 
recognised in the Agricultural Inputs Marketing (AIM) Plan (GRZ 2005). It is stated in the 
plan that distributors of fertilizers and seed are mainly located in cities. For instance, one SSF 
said ‘[t]here are very few points where to buy the inputs. Sometimes when you prepare to buy 
you find that they don’t even have the products. Most of the times these inputs are found in 
cities where there are no farmers instead of the rural areas where the farmers are.’ Nyimba is 
not adequately supplied with inputs by the private sector.  On the same issue a MACO 
official said ‘for Nyimba we only have one major outlet who is an Indian, Gulamu. So if he 
doesn’t have fertilizer, for you to access it, it becomes a problem. For the other one, Omnia, it 
depends on, normally it brings fertilizer when it is bought by the government and it sells the 
leftovers.’ The provision of inputs in Nyimba can be said to be by two institutions, 
government through Omnia it agent and Gulamu. However, some company Panar, found 
some agent in one of the villages and supplied seed to the villagers. For example, one SSF 
said ‘Panar volunteered to be our agents so they promised to be supplying us’. This measure 
serves those SSFs who choose to grow panar hybrid seed.
The SSFs also raised the issue of distance as one of the problems they were experienced in 
accessing inputs. For example, one SSF said ‘the problem is the distance to the place where 
we buy these inputs. For example, you will find that one has to travel to Nyimba Boma or 
Petauke to buy inputs.’ Transportation cost is an issue for farmers who do not live within 
Nyimba Boma but have to buy inputs from the retail shops. In the case of the inputs provided 
by FISP, transport is not an issue as one SSF pointed out ‘they bring these inputs at our door 
steps instead of us looking for money to go to Nyimba Boma to buy these things.’ The 
provisions of inputs by FISP means no transport cost, thus most preferred. 
Some farmers’ organisations also sell seed to their members for cash as well as credit basis.
However, SSFs who buy seed on credit basis are asked to pay back a specified number of 
bags of maize after they harvest. For example, one SSF said for the 2009/2010 farming 
season ‘they [cooperative] gave us 10kg bag of seed and we are supposed to pay back 3 Bags 
(55kg) of maize’. This is some form of loan to the farmers. The price of a 10kg bag of seed at 
the time was ZMK125, 000.00 (USD25.13) while that of maize was ZMK1, 300.00 per kg. 
This means that this farmers’ group sold the 10kg bag of seed to its members at ZMK214, 
500.00 (USD43.13). It follows that the SSFs paid back ZMK89, 500.00 (USD17.99) more for 
a 10kg bag of seed which was costing ZMK125, 000.00 at the time the SSF bought it on 
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credit. When time value of money is taken into consideration, assuming that the SSFs paid 
back after seven months, it turns out that the SSFs pay interest of about ZMK34, 776.11 
(USD6.99).
SSFs’ opinion of the prices of inputs was varied. Of course all the farmers said the prices of 
the subsidised inputs were affordable. One SSF said ‘the goodness of FISP is, fertilizer is 
cheap and you can manage to buy fertilizer to enable you cultivate’. The low price would 
ideally enable many to employ the technology in their farming. However, there were varied 
views about the prices of inputs bought from the private retailers. Commenting on the prices 
of seed sold by private retailers, one SSF, a former seed grower, argues that ‘seed prices are 
okay because what one spends to grow seed is a lot.’ His knowledge of what it takes to grow 
seed made him reach that conclusion. One SSF’s views on the issue were ‘I think the prices 
are okay, because those Indians are in business, so they cannot sell at the same price as the 
government which is not there to make profit’. The business motive behind the provision of 
inputs by private retailers should be recognised.
In contrast, the majority of the SSFs interviewed said that the prices of inputs sold by private 
retailers were expensive. For example, one SSF’s assessment was ‘it’s expensive when you 
buy from the shops, but in the case of those sold by government, the prices are much better. 
For example, the government was selling Panar seed at ZMK63, 000.00 (USD 12.67) per 
10kg, but the same was costing ZMK125, 000.00 (USD 25.13) per 10kg in the shops. It was 
the same thing in the case of fertilizer, the government was selling fertilizer at ZMK50, 
000.00 (USD 10.05) while in the shops the price was as high as ZMK186, 000.00 (USD 
37.40)’. A comparison of the prices gave the indication of the differences which made the 
farmers to reach their conclusion.
4.4  Membership in Farmer’s Organisations 
There are three main types of farmers organisations in Vizimumba Camp namely: 
Cooperatives; Information Centres (under Nyimba District Farmers’ Association [Farmers’ 
Union]); and Legal Women’s Clubs (camp extension officer). All the SSFs interviewed were 
members of some form of farmers’ organisation. 
The main reasons the farmers gave for joining the farmers’ organisations they were members 
of included: ‘We joined this group in order to receive fertilizer because our friends were 
getting fertilizer which is given only to group members’ (Phiri); ‘whenever, agricultural 
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officials came they said things will be given to groups thus if you are a member you will 
benefit. That is what led me to join’ (Tembo); ‘for those of us who don’t have money, when 
you get seed for gamphani it helps you in your farming’ (Mwanza); ‘the main reason was to 
learns from my friends and thus be better equipped to take care of my family’ (Tembo); ‘gain 
knowledge (maphunziro) using our extension officer coming to teach farmers about how to 
go about farming’ (Njobvu); ‘I went to join a cooperative which was active so that I would 
get information as you know you can’t be in farming without information’ (Banda); ‘I joined 
after seeing that our friends where being taught as a group’ (Daka). In a nutshell the major 
reasons the majority of the SSFs joined their respective farmers’ organisation was in order to 
access the subsidised inputs, access inputs such as seed on credit, and gain knowledge about 
new farming techniques.  
4.5 Difference in Terms of Yield between Nseenga and Hybrid  
Generally the observation by the farmers was that the yield for hybrid is higher than that of 
nseenga with or without fertilizer. Govereh et al (2008) also found that in all cases the yield 
of hybrid seed varieties is always higher than that of local maize even if fertilizer is not 
applied. To determine the differences in yield some farmers count the number of lines per cob 
of maize. For instance, one SSF made this observation ‘for local maize, mostly you will find 
that on one cob there will either be 8 to 10 lines [round the cob]., that’s all. But for hybrid
you will find about 16, 18 to 20 lines on one cob’. Hybrid’s yield is usually double or more 
than that of local maize. Some farmers look at the number of maize bags they harvest from a 
piece of land. For example, one SSF said ‘the difference is when you grow nseenga, from a 
lima (quarter of a hectare) you expect to harvest 12 bags, but in the case of hybrid, you expect 
to harvest about 20 – 25 bags from a Lima’. In this case also, the yield of hybrid is double 
that of nseenga. Contrary to the assertions of the SSF, Donovan et al (2002), in their study 
argue that for hybrid maize grown with fertilizer, a farmer is expected to harvest 15-20 bags 
(50kg) of maize per lima. So there seems to be no agreement on the yield a farmer can 
harvest per lima.
There are some variations in yield within the hybrid seed varieties. The observation by 
farmers is that some hybrid varieties produce a single cob per stalk while others produce two 
cobs per stalk. For example, one SSF’s experience is that ‘with Panar [hybrid seed variety] no 
matter how long the stalk is there’s always one cob on each stalk. But DK [hybrid seed 
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variety] has two cobs per stalk thus the difference in yield’. Some hybrid varieties have 
higher yield than others.
There were mixed answers to the question of the difference in yield in cases where fertilizer 
was not applied to hybrid. Some farmers said nseenga out performed the hybrid in terms of 
yield in such instances. In response to a question about the observable differences in yield 
between hybrid grown without fertilizer and nseenga also grown without fertilizer, one SSF, 
said ‘the area where we didn’t apply fertilizer because the 4 bags we bought through the 
cooperative were not enough considering that our field is big, the hybrid maize didn’t do 
well, the yield wasn’t good. ... [while] the yield for nseenga which we grow without fertilizer 
was very good’. When the same question was posed to another SSF his response was 
‘especially DK, its yield is low. But local maize performs relatively well, because it is not 
used to fertilizer’. The belief is that since nseenga is normally grown without fertilizer, its 
yield comparatively speaking is relatively better than hybrid grown without fertilizer because 
it is ideally supposed to be grown with fertilizer. While others maintained, that whatever the 
case the yield of hybrid is still higher than that of nseenga. One SSF’s conclusion is that ‘It 
[nseenga] can’t measure up to the other two [Panar and DK hybrid varieties]’. Whether there 
are fewer or more cobs per stalk, hybrid yield is still higher than that of nsenga.
4.6 Storage 
Storage of maize is problematic for the SSFs especially with respect to hybrid varieties. The 
main problem was that hybrid maize is easily attacked by weevils. For example, one SSF in 
referring to hybrid said ‘by the time you are harvesting the maize will have already been 
infested, the insects attack it while it is right in the field. But that is not usually the case with 
local maize.’ On the same issue, one camp extension officer said ‘it’s [nseenga] not easily 
attacked by weevils because the grain is too hard unlike most of these hybrids; they are dent 
varieties, so they are attacked easily by weevils’. The genetic makeup of hybrid varieties 
makes them more susceptible to weevil attack thus problematic to store. 
Variations where observed in the way the SSFs stored their maize. There are two ways in 
which the farmers store their maize, some store it unshelled while others store the shelled 
grain. Those who store shelled maize used chemicals to preserve their grain. Those who store 
the unshelled maize, still store in barns made of bamboo. This is the traditional way of storing 
maize. Of the SSFs who were interviewed ten still stored their maize in this way. The photos 
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in Figure 4 are typical examples of the traditional maize barns. The traditional barn on the 
right in Figure 4 is not roofed to allow for further drying of the maize after harvesting 
 
Figure 4: Photos showing traditional barns 
Another notable issue was the use of granaries for maize storage. There were two types of 
granaries of observed. One was made using local materials (Figure 5) while the other was 
made using cement (Figure 6). The storage of shelled maize by SSFs in personal granaries is 
relatively new to Nyimba to the extent that few farmers have constructed them. For example, 
one camp extension officer’s observations are that ‘very few farmers are constructing these 
improved structures for storage of maize.’ Reasons being some SSFs were sceptical of the 
viability of the improved granary made using local materials. For instance, one SSF’s 
sentiments about a granary made of local materials were ‘there are others who did 
[constructed the granary], and put their maize in there. But as days went by, they thought 
their granary was okay but when they checked after some time they found that their harvest 
was destroyed by termites. In this area there are a lot of hills, and so termites are in 
abundance and very destructive’. Care needs to be taken to ensure the safety of grain. 
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Figure 5: Photos showing granary made from local materials     
 
Figure 6: Photo showing granary made of cement 
 
The materials used in the construction of the granary made of local materials are sourced 
from the environment at no cost. The materials include poles from trees, bamboo, grass, and 
clay soil for plastering. To keep termites away, farmers spray the poles with termite repellent 
or paraffin or diesel. In most cases such granary are made by the owners themselves. 
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However, after asking around, it was discovered that labour charge for someone to make the 
granary when all materials are provided is ZMK250, 000.00 (USD50.26).  
With respect to the granary made of cement some SSFs said it was expensive to construct. 
One of the SSF who benefited from the UNDP programme which sponsored the construction 
of the cement made granaries said ‘a lot of money went into its construction because 6 
pockets of cement was used, plus labour, sand and stones’. Another beneficiary from the 
same programme said ‘it took 6 bags of cement, so that if we speculate and compare the 
prices of cement these days, it was about ZMK72, 000.00 (USD 14.48) or ZMK74, 000.00 
(USD 14.88) per bag, now multiply that by 6, you will find that it is somewhat expensive’. 
None of the two beneficiaries mentioned above have built new granaries even if they have 
found that the facility stores their grain effectively. 
The UNDP supported cement made granary was made like the one made using local 
materials but instead of plastering with clay soil, cement was used. The other difference is the 
while the granary made from local materials is placed on tree poles about 60centimetres 
above the ground, the cement made granary is put on rocks to allow air ventilation so as to 
get rid of the problem of moisture getting in the granary and making the maize to rot. It was 
not possible to get the actual cost of constructing this type of granary as the farmers were just 
beneficiaries so they did not know the actual cost. Moreover, the fact that they have not 
constructed new ones from their own resources made it impossible to determine the cost of 
constructing the granary
There was another SSF among the research respondents who constructed a cement granary. 
However, his granary was made different from the UNDP supported granary. The owner 
could not give a breakdown by cost of the costs involved to construct it but just gave a round 
figure of ZMK1, 800, 000.00 (USD361.89). This farmer used bricks instead of bamboos. The 
other expenses were related to materials such as 10 bags of cement, sand, stones, brick force 
wire, damp proof plastic, and labour.
4.7 Cost and Returns of Maize Farming 
Maize farming is important for the SSFs in Nyimba because it is a main source of livelihood.
All the SSFs interviewed said that they grow maize so that they would have food. Besides 
that reason thirteen of the SSFs said they grow maize with the intention of selling in order to 
meet their other needs. Three of the SSFs said they grow maize for subsistence and only sell 
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part of it in times when they have surplus. The elderly argue that they grow maize because it 
is easy to grow, thus a very convenient crop to grow for them.  For example, a70 year old 
widowed SSF said ‘maize farming is very helpful and beneficial for us elders who cannot 
manage to grow cotton because cotton farming is very difficult and/or demanding’. Related to 
this, a 41 year old SSF said ‘labour involved in producing maize is minimal compared to 
cotton’. For the ten SSFs who grow nseenga the crop does not even require fertilizer and 
other chemicals for storage, meaning fewer expenses in its production and storage. Thus 
farmers can produce and store their staple food cheaply. 
Other farmers still have argued that maize farming is highly profitable. For example, one SSF 
said ‘looking at the crops I have been growing, I have seen that we get good money from 
maize’. Farmers however argue that this is the case only if they sell in a good market. And by 
good market they mean the government market. Refer to table A2:1 in appendix2 for details 
of maize prices per kilo gram. Table A2:1 shows the months when the SSFs sell and to whom 
they sell their maize based on data for the 2009 and 2010 seasons. The prices for FRA 
indicated in table A2:1 go beyond the fieldwork period as secondary data indicate that the 
marketing season went up to October, and since the price did not change the same price 
applies throughout.  
One SSF said that ‘one of the most notable outcomes is ‘we have been able to build this 
house [made of pan bricks].’ The high returns from maize farming have enabled him to build 
a house thus he has graduated from living in a mud house. One farmer said that maize 
farming was beneficial because maize is bountiful. For example, one SSF said ‘if I farm 
properly, it means I will be able to acquire most of the things I lack, because maize is 
bountiful’. Proper management coupled with good weather is apparently a guarantee for good 
harvest. In such times the farmer is assured of earning a lot of money from his farming to 
meet his/her needs.
In the 2009/2010 farming season, on average a SSF in Nyimba spent ZMK150, 000.00 (USD 
30.16) to produce twelve bags of nseenga maize (the expected yield from 1 lima) when land 
preparation, planting and weeding is done by oxen. One bag of the same maize would 
therefore cost ZMK12, 500.00 (USD 2.513) to produce. This is in a case where marketing 
costs have been ignored because the SSFs said they grow nseenga for home consumption. 
When marketing costs are taken into account, a SSF in Nyimba spent ZMK249, 600.00 
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(USD50.18) to produce twelve bags of nseenga, and ZMK20, 800.00 (USD4.18) to produce 
one bag of the same maize. Refer to table A2:2 in appendix2 for details.
Several variations were observed in the costs of labour to produce maize as opposed to 
production using oxen which was almost standardised among the SSFs. The figures given for 
labour were usually given as a block amount. So to establish the per lima charge, the data 
about the total surface area owned and farmed by the farmer was used to arrive at the 
approximate payment to labour.
Based on computation in table A2:4 (see appendix2) which shows the cost of production for 
25 bags of hybrid maize (expected yield from 1lima) when land preparation, planting and 
weeding is done by oxen, production costs are presented for both production with use of 
fertilizer bought from retail shops and subsidised fertilizer. 25 bags of hybrid maize produced 
with fertilizer bought from the retail shop cost a SSF ZMK620, 000.00 (USD124.65) to 
produce in the 2009/2010 farming season (exclusive of marketing costs). And a bag of hybrid 
produced with fertilizer bought from the retail shop on average would cost ZMK24, 800.00 
(USD4.99) (exclusive of marketing costs). On the other hand, if the price of fertilizer is 
pegged at the government subsidised price of ZMK50, 000.00 per 50kg bag, then the cost of 
production for 25 bags was ZMK374, 000.00 (USD75, 19) and that of a bag was ZMK14, 
960.00 (USD3.01) (exclusive of marketing costs).
The computations above indicate that the cost of producing a 50kg bag of nseenga which 
stands at ZMK12, 500.00 (USD 2.51) is lower than that of producing a 50kg bag of hybrid 
maize using subsidised fertilizer which is ZMK14, 960.00 (USD 3.01) if the yield per lima is 
25 bags or ZMK24, 933.33 (USD5.01) if the yield per lima is 15 bags. The difference in costs 
is even higher when the marketing costs are taken into account. The question therefore is why 
would the farmers opt to grow hybrid when it is more expensive to produce than nseenga?
One of the possible explanation could be that nseenga is too laborious to grow. For example, 
one SSF said that ‘when you plant local maize in an area like ours which has a lot of grass, 
when there is plenty of rain, if you don’t weed twice, all the stems will become canes without 
any cobs.’ In other words, what she was saying is, too much rain entails double work for 
nseenga growers. This could be the case because nseenga takes long to mature. In 
commenting on the issue one SSF said ‘nseenga and hybrid differ in their growth. Nseenga’s
growth is slow that even the Kaloi weed would catch up with it. But hybrid grows very fast 
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and matures quickly whereas nseenga is slow to mature and doesn’t even grow that well.’ 
What is not clear though is if this is only true for people who cultivate in areas where there is 
a lot of grass or not. Anyhow, the SSFs’ statements above allude to the fact that a farmer 
would have to weed twice which brings in an element of double time and weeding costs 
required to produce nseenga. Besides the time issue, the other issue this raises is that of effort 
expended. By singling out nseenga, this suggests that the cultivation of hybrid is not as 
laborious as nseenga cultivation. This could explain why the SSFs would opt to cultivate 
more hybrid than nseenga.
The other possible explanation for SSFs opting to produce hybrid when it costs more than 
nseenga to produce could be attributed to poor record keeping of the costs incurred to
produce the maize.  Only seven SFFs interviewed kept a written record of the costs they 
incurred to produce their maize. For the rest, they could recall by heart what they spent in 
terms of explicit costs but for the implicit costs no cost were attached. Those who kept record 
of their costs are those who went through some training of how to run a business where 
keeping record of costs was one of the topics taught. Some of the farmers who did not keep 
records too went through the same training but did not practice what they learnt sustainably 
for example, one SSF ‘I stopped [keeping record] because even the ones who used to go 
round to ensure that we record have stopped visiting us, We have even forgotten how to do 
it’. A lapse in extension services among others seems to have contributed to the SSFs not 
continuing with record keeping besides the farmer’s own forgetfulness. 
Table A2:6 shows the net returns for the two varieties, that is, nseenga and hybrid. The table
has been computed to show the net returns for production when both labour and oxen are 
used for land preparation, planting and weeding in the production of both hybrid and nseenga
maize varieties. Further, in the case of hybrid, the table shows net returns for both 
productions with subsidised fertilizer and with retail priced fertilizer. Two prices are used to 
calculate the total returns: FRA price and the private traders’ price prevailing at the time the 
research was undertaken (see table A2:1 in appendix2). The total costs figures have been 
imported from tables A2:2-5 (see appendix2).
The computations in table A2:6 suggest that overall the SSFs would receive higher net 
returns per bag if they sold nseenga than they would from selling hybrid, regardless of 
whether they used either labour or oxen in the production of the maize. Another general 
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observation is that whether labour or oxen are used in hybrid maize production, the SSF make 
losses if they apply fertilizer acquired from the private retailers. Conversely if the SSFs use 
subsidised fertilizer in their hybrid maize production, they have positive net returns. In 
addition, the other observation is that the SSFs who use labour in hybrid maize production are 
better off in terms of net returns than those who use oxen, whether in terms of losses or 
returns. However, net return is also highly dependent on the price received when sold and this 
is discussed more in detail in chapter five.
The picture is different if one were to just focus on net returns per lima. The computations in 
table A2:6 suggest that on average maize production using labour gives the SSFs highest 
returns. This is the case whether the SSFs sell their maize to the private traders or FRA. 
Another observation is that hybrid maize production using either labour or oxen and making 
use of market priced fertilizer gives the SSFs negative returns when they sell their produce to 
private traders. Conversely, hybrid maize production using subsidised fertilizer gives the 
SSFs higher returns regardless of whether they uses labour or oxen. Table A2:6 also indicates 
that production of maize is most rewarding when the SSFs sell their maize to FRA. What this 
suggests therefore is that access to subsidised inputs and/or access to FRA market are pivotal 
to profitable growth of hybrid maize. 
It could be that it makes sense for SSFs to focus on net returns from their entire piece of land 
and not net return per bag. Thus their decisions on what maize variety to produce could be 
based on the same.
4.8  Summary 
Maize farming is one among many other agricultural activities which the SSFs do. The SSFs 
still use traditional tools such as hoes and ploughs. Of the crops grown by the SSFs maize is 
one of the major crops on which they rely for their home consumption as well as income.
Both hybrid and nseenga maize varieties are grown but former is the more dominant of the 
two. Hybrid is mostly grown for sale while nseenga is mainly grown for consumption.
The government through FISP is the SSFs main supplier of inputs. All the SSFs were 
beneficiaries of FISP. It was for this reason that all the SSFs joined the farmers’ organisations 
besides gaining farming knowledge. Apart from being the conduit through which SSFs 
accessed subsidised inputs, farmers’ organisations also sold seed to SSFs either on cash or 
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credit basis. Some few SSFs in addition accessed the private retailers. Generally, SSFs apply 
fertilizer to hybrid and not to nseenga except in areas where soils are believed to be degraded.
With respect to yields, overall, SSFs were of the view that the yield of hybrid is higher than 
that of nseenga. However, they are divided about which of the two varieties’ yield is higher 
when hybrid is grown without fertilizer. Generally SSFs have encounter storage problems 
especially with respect to hybrid which is susceptible early weevil infestation, as most of 
them still use tradition storage facilities and methods. The study indicates that nseenga’s cost 
of production is lower than that of hybrid and yet the SSFs prefer to grow hybrid for sale.
Access to subsidised fertilizer and/or FRA market is pivotal to profitable production of 
hybrid.   
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Part I: Maize Marketing in Nyimba  
5.0 Introduction 
Maize marketing in Zambia has undergone several transformations. Nyimba District is no 
exception to these transformations. The chapter is divided into two parts: in Part one, I 
describe and discuss the current maize marketing system in Nyimba district. In the first 
section of Part one I analyse the SSFs’ maize buyers. The second section is a description and 
discussion of modes of exchange or simply how maize is sold. In the third section my focus is 
on the period when the SSFs sell their maize. Section four is a discussion of who sets the 
price at which the SSFs sell their maize. In the fifth section I briefly describe the markets. 
The sixth section is a highlight of the opportunities SSFs have observed arising from the 
changing maize marketing policies. Section seven is a summary of the problems that the 
SSFs said they encounter to sell their maize. In section eight I give a brief description of how 
the farmers access maize market information. Part two focuses on exploitation as experienced 
by SSFs. In the first section of Part II I describe and discuss the various types of both petty 
and structural exploitation. The second section is a summary of the whole chapter.
5.1 Characteristics of the buyers 
The buyer of the maize include the government through the FRA, petty maize traders who 
usually exchange various essential commodities for maize, local maize traders who buy 
maize from their fellow villagers on cash basis with the intention of selling to FRA, medium 
scale maize traders who buy maize basis and sell it milling companies in Lusaka, and large 
scale maize traders who also buy maize on cash basis. In the sections below I will briefly 
describe the various buyers.
5.1.1 Food Reserve Agency (FRA) 
FRA is a parastatal which started operating in 1996. FRA’s main functions from inception to 
2004 were to ‘administer national food reserves, management of storage facilities, establish 
and operate a market information system, promote use of weighing and grading standards, 
assess storage requirements for marketing’ (FRA 2011). In 2005 FRA was stripped off some 
of its initial functions and another function was added such that its functions since then have 
been to administer strategic national food reserves, ‘marketing and market facilitation, 
management of storage facilities’ (ibid). This change is what resulted in increased 
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government participation in the market. For example, an FRA official said ‘we are there 
[market] to provide a complementary access to the marketing system, for the farmers in areas 
where the private sector cannot reach’. This suggests that FRA is in the market to provide 
market to the SSFs in the far flung areas.
The FRA maize marketing season is normally from May to September. FRA administration 
at national level allocates to each district a target of bags of maize it would buy each season. 
On the basis of this target the district leadership allocates to the different satellite depots how 
FRA would buy from them. Once the targeted number of bags FRA planned to buy from a 
particular satellite depot is met, that market is closed. However there have been times when 
the targets have not been met within the stipulated time, in such times the marketing seasons 
have been extended. There have been other situations also when the targets have been met but 
because of bumper harvests, the government has increased the targets and called on the FRA 
to continue buying. For instance, referring to the 2009/2010 marketing season, an FRA 
official said ‘we are expecting definitely that we will go beyond the 300, 000 metric tons. 
And you’d probably be interested to learn that in areas where we have reached the target, we 
have told our staff to continue buying.’ The government is not very rigid with targets in times 
of bumper harvest. The FRA price during the 2009/2010 was ZMK65, 000.00 (USD13.00) 
per 50KG bag, that is, ZMK1, 300.00 (USD0.26) per kilo gram. Apparently, that was the
price for 2008/2009 maize marketing season also.
5.1.2 Large Scale Maize Traders 
The large scale maize traders include big companies such as Nyimba Supermarket (popularly 
known in the villages in Nyimba as Gulamu after the proprietor’s name), Olam, and Comaco. 
These companies buy a lot of maize and transport as much as 3,500 (50kg) bags of maize to 
Lusaka per day. For example, one of the administrative staff working for one of the maize 
trading companies who was interviewed said ‘we handle a lot of maize; we load about six to 
seven truck loads a day’. Such companies employ salaried buyers and deploy them in villages 
to buy the maize on their behalf. 
The large maize scale traders normally start buying maize around April/May and continue 
buying until rainy season starts. One of the buyers of the large scale maize traders, said ‘we 
continue buying depending on whether we have a place where to store the maize we go up to 
December. But when the rains start we close the market in October or November.’ 
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Apparently the availability of storage facility determines how far into the rainy season the 
traders continue to buy maize. Most importantly, though it is the availability of the maize that 
also to a large extent determines the farmers’ willingness to sell. One camp extension officer
said ‘the time maize is very much in demand, the critical time when the maize is needed, is 
that time when we have the rains, when they [farmers] need to use part of the maize for the 
labour and even for consumption’. There is critical need for maize by villagers during this 
period. For example, one SSF who sales maize to fellow villagers said ‘around November –
December, it means many will have exhausted their stocks, so locally, there will be local 
market, the villagers will be coming and being helped, as some of them sold theirs at low 
prices thus exhausted their stocks’. This suggests that the helpers assume that their friends are 
food insecure because they had to sell large volumes of maize when the prices were low to 
earn money to meet their financial needs. During this period villagers start ‘helping’ each 
other. Those who have the maize sell it to those who do not have. 
The large scale maize traders use scales to measure the maize they buy from farmers. These 
traders determine the prices at which they will buy the maize from the SSFs. When they start 
buying, the starting prices are around ZMK300.00 – ZMK400.00 (USD 0.06-0.08) per kilo 
gram. These traders accept any amount of maize the SSFs want to sell. According to one of 
the buyers there are no restrictions on the quantity a farmer can sell to the large scale traders 
as they buy any quantity a farmer is willing to sell to them ‘a person can sell to us a tin of 
maize, 5kg, 2kg any number of kg that a person wants to sell they can bring’.  Moreover, they 
do not demand that the farmers sort their maize to remove the coloured grains. For instance, 
one SSF who participated in the focused group discussion said ‘the other goodness with these 
other buyers is they don’t require us to sort the maize, they accept all grain types and colours 
we take there and give us the money’. The large scale maize traders thus do not have strict 
quality standards by which the farmers have to adhere to. An FRA official argued that could 
even be one of the reasons why private maize traders offer low prices for the maize they buy 
from SSFs: ‘when they are selling to traders they don’t have to clean the grain, and probably 
you can understand sometimes why they get the kind of prices [low prices] they get’. His 
argument was that the SSFs pass on the work of sorting to the traders at a price.  
Such companies sell their maize to millers in Lusaka for example. Some have their own 
milling companies in Lusaka where they take the maize for milling after which they sell the
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processed products such as maize meal, and stock feed. Nyimba Supermarket is one such 
company, and it sells the excess maize to other millers. 
5.1.3  Medium Scale Maize Traders 
Another category of maize traders is that of individuals who buy in order to sell to millers in 
Lusaka. One person would have maybe about 2-4 buying points where they engage buyers to 
buy maize on their behalf. The buyers they employ are paid commissions per bag of maize 
they buy. For example, one such trader said ‘we agree with the buyer to pay him/her ZMK1, 
000.00 (USD0.20) or ZMK1, 500.00 (USD0.30) per 60kg bag of maize he/she buys on my 
behalf’. They use scales to measure the maize and pay cash and they too set the prices at 
which they buy the maize. 
5.1.4 Local Small Scale Maize Traders 
Another category of private traders is those farmers who buy maize from their fellow farmers 
in order to sell to FRA. Such traders set up buying points at their homes or far flung places. 
They too like the large scale maize traders set the prices at which they will buy the maize. 
This is the category of traders who usually buy using medas, or dunavant, and tins. For 
example, one such maize trader said that ‘we started with ZMK2, 000.00 (USD0.40) per 
meda ... The thing is at that time, the moisture content in the maize was high, so the maize 
was heavy such that to weigh the maize was going to be unfair on our part. ... now we are 
using the scale it is ZMK650.00 (USD0.13) per kg’. They shift to the scale as the marketing 
season progresses. They too pay cash on delivery and accept any quantity that a farmer would 
bring to them. They also do not demand that the farmer sort his/her maize to remove the 
coloured grain. 
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5.1.5  Petty Maize Trader 
The petty maize traders are yet another category of buyers who bring various items and buy 
maize on barter basis. The petty maize traders bring with them items such as clothes, 
blankets, kitchen utensils, food stuffs such as meat, vegetable, fish, and beans among others. 
These maize traders too set the price at which the exchange takes place. Even if these traders 
set the price at which they exchange their goods for maize, one of the SSFs who sells his 
maize to such traders said their prices are negotiable. For example, one SSF said ‘as for these 
other merchants who deal in different merchandise like trousers, buckets, cloths, and kitchen 
utensils, with these you negotiate’.  However, the other SSFs who sell their maize to such 
traders disagree with the notion of the possibility to bargain because once these traders set the 
price. For example, one SSF said ‘Those who come with their items are the ones who set the 
price at which the exchange takes place, saying ‘I am selling this item at such and such a 
price’. They come with their own containers in which they measure the maize worth the price 
of the product they are exchanging it for.
There are also those traders who come with cash and empty grain bags which they give to the 
farmers before the harvesting period. These traders buy the maize before it is harvested. 
These traders determine the terms of exchange too. 
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5.1.6  Food Insecure Local Villagers 
Other maize buyers are the villagers who are food insecure. Payment for maize by such 
buyers varies. Some pay for the maize by offering their labour, while others come with cash 
or any other item they would want to pawn. At this time the farmers are the ones who 
determine the prices at which they sell their maize. The prices some farmers charge are more 
than the government price while others charge the government price and others still charge 
below the government price. For instance, one SSF said ‘we were selling a tin at ZMK22, 
000.00 (USD4.42) and a 50kg bag was going for ZMK65, 000.00 (USD13.07). Those who 
were coming with cash we would sell them maize for cash. Others were coming to work in 
our field, for those, we asked them to make 10 x 100 metres long lines [ridges] in exchange 
for a tin of maize’. Interesting though, farmers do not refer selling to their fellow villagers 
who are food insecure as selling but rather helping them. One SSF who sells maize to fellow 
villagers said ‘I sell to the community around here, those people that don’t have when they 
come to plead with me to help them ... I set the price, and depending on how they plead their 
case we negotiate. Sometimes we barter, they give me an item which I don’t have but they 
have. So I get that thing and I give them the maize by so doing we help each other.’ Some 
SSFs also allow room for negotiations on price.
5.2 How Maize is sold: Modes of Exchange 
The main modes of exchange for maize are either for cash and barter basis. The government 
and some private maize traders pay cash while some private maize traders barter. There are 
variations on when the cash is paid between the FRA and the private maize traders. The FRA 
pays for the maize after some time. Ideally, a farmer is supposed to be paid within ten days
after it has been verified that she/he indeed supplied the maize as per documentation 
assuming that FRA is funded for the exercise accordingly (FRA 2010, 5). An FRA official 
also said that there are cases when the verification process takes longer than usual because 
some districts are very vast and only one person has to go round all the satellite depots to 
verify the purchases. He said in such cases it would take about two weeks for the farmer to be 
paid. Apparently in most cases the period within which farmers receive payments for their 
maize has gone beyond the two weeks. Of the SSFs interviewed, only one said that 
sometimes it took two weeks for a farmer to receive payment for his/her maize. For example, 
one SSF said ‘It takes a long time to receive the money. Sometimes it takes 2 weeks. ... this 
same money from government, some people die leaving the money behind, not having 
72 
 
received it.’ Whereas he acknowledges that sometimes it is possible to receive payment 
within two weeks of selling, he also laments that it sometimes takes longer than that. 
The rest of the SSFs said the period exceeded the two weeks, for example, one SSF said 
‘FRA gives cash after a long period of waiting for the money, you see they just kongola [buy 
on credit] ... sometimes, [it takes] a month or two’ While an SSF who participated in the FGD 
said ‘most of the times the waiting period exceed 2 weeks and sometimes you receive the 
money the following year’. These sentiments indicate that the period within which the SSFs 
receive payment for their maize goes beyond the ideal two weeks maximum. A Public 
Relations Officer at FRA said “‘The marketing season is very active and the major challenges 
we have had is paying farmers on time”’ (Post Newspaper August 2010). This marketing 
season was no exception to the issue of late payment for maize. Senior chief Mukuni 
Ng’ombe was quoted as telling the president Rupiah Banda that ‘“We have several 
challenges in this area. One of them is that the Food Reserve Agency has not yet paid farmers 
for their maize. It has been months now and the farmers are still waiting for payments”’ (Post 
Newspaper October 2010). It appears that late payment to farmers for maize sold to FRA is 
actually pervasive in Zambia. 
The delayed receipt of payment by farmers has resulted in various problems for the farmers. 
First, the delay results in debt accumulation. For example, one SSF who participated in the 
FGD said that it led to debts and poverty ‘as a farmer borrows from different people with the 
expectation that he/she would soon receive his/her money ... and when he/she finally gets the 
money the following year he/she pays back the debts and remains with nothing thus 
contributing to poverty’. The hope of receiving the money within a few weeks led to the 
borrowing which would become unsustainable thus interferes with production and 
consequently trapping the farmer in poverty. 
Second, it hinders the pursuit of non-farm livelihood activities. For example, one SSF said ‘it 
makes it difficult for farmers to invest that money because by the time we are paid it will be 
time for farming again. ... it hinders us from investing the money in other activities to make 
more profit before the next farming season’. The delay in receiving the money in this case 
interferes with the pursuit of alternative non-farm livelihood activities before the beginning of 
subsequent farming season.
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Third, the difficulties in accessing inputs and hiring labour. For example, one SSF said ‘this 
makes the farmers suffer because it makes it difficult for them to prepare their land for 
farming’. Farmers require cash to buy inputs such as fertilizer and seed as well as pay for 
services offered by those people who help them in land preparation. These expenses are 
difficult for them to meet in the absence of readily available cash which is supposed to come 
from their preceding harvest.
Fourth, it results in scarcity of cash hence rampant barter system. For example, one SSF said 
‘those who bring relish like pork, when we have the maize we get and give them, even those 
who bring rape we get because we don’t have cash in hand’. Barter system thrives in maize 
growing communities because of scarcity of ready cash because of the delay in the farmers 
receiving their dues when they sell to FRA.
In contrast, the private maize traders pay for the maize there and then regardless of whether it 
is in exchange for cash or other items. Those maize traders who buy maize on barter basis 
come with containers in which they expect the farmer to put his/her in exchange for the items 
they are offering. These containers include meda, dunavant, chitundu (baskets made from 
reed), sacks, and tins (not necessarily metallic but also plastic containers of the same size are 
referred to as tins too). For instance, one SSF said ‘they [traders] set the price themselves, 
saying such a bag of maize we are buying at such a price, or a meda we buy at such a price, ... 
[or] “we are selling this rape, we measure the maize in this container”. They come with their 
own containers in which they measure the maize worth the price of the product they are 
exchanging it for’. Thus the traders are the ones who set the price but the exchange takes 
place instantaneously.
However, during the rainy season farmers have power over their produce. During that period 
the farmers are the ones who determine how the exchange will be like. For instance during 
the 2009/2010 farming season one SSF said ‘we were selling a tin at ZMK22, 000.00 
(USD4.42) and a 50kg bag was going for ZMK65, 000.00 (USD13.07). Those who were 
coming with cash we would sell them maize for cash. Others were coming to work in our 
field, for those, we asked them to make 10 x 100 metres long lines in exchange for a tin of 
maize’. Because of maize shortage during this period the SSFs has power over their produce
to the extent of dictating what to receive in exchange for the maize.
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5.3 When Farmers normally sell their Maize and why? 
The study indicates that there is really no specific period when the farmers sell their maize to 
the private traders as the sales were usually need driven. For example one SSF said ‘there is 
no specific time for selling of maize as it mainly depends on how fast the market is opened by 
FRA. The private maize traders start early, they start buying maize as early as April. 
Sometimes they come as early as March’. This suggests that depending on how pressed the 
SSFs are for cash, they start selling their maize as early as March. These are those who sell 
before they harvest their crop. For example, one SSF a father of two school going children
said ‘I also sold around June, yes. I sold in order to get money to pay for the 2 school going 
children’. Another SSF said ‘I sell ... when I am in need of money to enable me mill the 
maize that we eat here at home as I wait for the government market to open’. One SSF had 
this to say on the issue ‘we have already sold some in order to get money with which to buy 
the empty backs to pack the maize we want to sell to the government market’. Apparently, 
sales to the private maize traders in most cases are done when the SSFs are in need of cash to 
meet expenses that cannot be met by barter as they wait for FRA marketing season to open.
Farmers continue selling until the rainy season. Anyhow four periods stood out as the times
when most sells took place: March, in case of future selling; May to November selling to big 
private traders; November – December to fellow villagers who had run out of the commodity; 
and FRA from May - September. Refer to table A2:1 in the appendix for details of the 
months when the SSFs sell their maize and to whom they sell based on the 2009 and 2010 
seasons. 
According to Robinson, Govereh & Ndlela (2007), most sales usually take place during the 
beginning of the marketing season. However, my study shows that most sales take place 
during the third quarter of the year when the government market opens. Similarly, Donovan 
et al (2002) found the period between July and October to be the time when farmers sold 
most of their maize. Donovan et al (2002) in their study found that prices of maize 
throughout Zambia are at their peak between January and March and at their lowest between 
May and August. This would be true if the prices referred to are private traders’ prices during 
those years when FRA does not actively participate in the market. 
With respect to SSFs selling maize to the government, the specific period is determined by 
when the government opens its marketing season which is usually between May and 
September. For example, it was stated in the FRA Crop Marketing Arrangements for 2010 
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Marketing Season that ‘[t]he FRA maize purchase exercise for 2010 Marketing Season will 
run from 1st May, 2010 to 30th September, 2010. However, in areas where the moisture 
content is usually still high at the beginning of the marketing season in June, the exercise will 
delay’ (FRA 2010, 1). Sure enough the FRA markets in Nyimba opened in late July 2010. 
This suggests that the period when the SSFs sell to FRA varies depending on when FRA feels 
the maize is of the right moisture content.
Some SSFs who are able to store their maize also sell to fellow villagers. Such sells usually 
take place during the rainy season when there are food shortages and the farmers need people 
to help them with their field work. Those with cash pay cash for the maize while those 
without pay with whatever they have which is of course agreeable with the seller. This would 
include labour power, livestock among other things. One SSF said ‘sometimes we barter, they 
give me an item which I don’t have but they have. So I get that thing and I give them the 
maize by so doing we help each other’. There is some flexibility in the transaction. However, 
as can be seen in table A2:1 maize prices are at their peak during this same period.
However, in cases where they exchanged maize for other items, the time the traders brought 
those items which coincide with the SSFs needs at a particular determined when SSFs sold 
their maize.
5.4 Who sets the price at which maize is sold?  
The findings of the study suggest that who determines the price at which maize is sold is 
dependent on when the maize is sold and to whom it is being sold. For most part of the year it 
is the buyers who determine the price of maize. Just like the government, the private maize 
traders go to the farmers with a price at which they would buy the maize. For example, one 
SSF since 1994 said ‘since I started the farming business, I have found that the buyer is the 
one who sets the price for your products.  The person buying your stuff is the one who sets 
the price and tells you that “I am buying at such a price”’. Buyer price setting is a trend he 
has become accustomed to since 1994 when he started maize farming. Another SSF said ‘the 
one with the money is the one who sets the price’. It appears money speaks in this case. 
As already mentioned in section 5.3 the rainy season is the period when the SSFs have 
authority over their crop to the extent of determining the price at which they sell. For 
instance, one SSF said ‘here in the village mainly the terms of exchange depend on what the 
buyer is prepared to buy. We start with a meda, to a tin, up to a sack. The prices vary with the 
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time when people come to buy, there are times when maize is on demand and when it is not.’ 
So taking into account the demand a farmer sets the price.
5.5 Markets  
 
Figure 9: Photo showing Maize Buyer at Private Maize Buying Point 
The whole of Nyimba district had eight satellite depots where the government through the 
FRA was buying maize from the SSFs. In fact the number had been seven but was raised to 
eight in the 2009/2010 marketing season. In 2009 Nyimba district had approximately 15, 000 
households (MACO official).One camp extension officer’s comment on the issue of markets 
was ‘market is difficult because we have few markets but very many farmers and the distance 
to the marketing areas is too far.’ His comment suggests that there is a relationship between 
the number of satellite depots and the distance the SSFs have to travel to get there. In 
addition, he said the SSFs in his camp who were farthest from their nearest satellite depot 
were located about 20km away. Commenting on the issue of markets, an official from NDFA 
said ‘the government market itself is not enough and is far from where the SSFs stay’. He too 
attests to the problem of few government markets and long distance to the same. Most of the 
SSFs interviewed did not know the exact distance to their nearest satellite depot. For 
example, one SSF’s response to the question about distance to the market was ‘it’s a long 
distance, we don’t know how many kilo metres it is, but what we know is that it’s very far’. 
SSFs who were located far and could speculate the distance where located about 7 – 10km
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away from their nearest satellite depot. On the other hand those who were located closest 
where located about less than 1 to 2km from their satellite depots. 
With regard to the private maize traders’ markets, it was observed that these where located in 
most villages. For example, an official from NDFA which has district-wide presence in 
Nyimba said ‘there is a market for a private trader everywhere’.  I also observed that, in fact 
some villages had more than one such markets belonging to different traders.  Previous 
studies had found that the private sector does not go to remote areas because of poor 
infrastructure. It was for this reason inter alia that FRA’s mandate was actually changed to 
include marketing and market facilitation so as to provide market to SSFs in rural areas. For 
example, an FRA official said ‘SSFs have serious challenges in accessing markets for their 
produce ... And it is for that reason that government, in recognition of the challenges that the 
SSFs have and the fact that we are operating in a liberalisation market, obviously they fall 
prey to other players who are most advantaged, better placed, more and better informed, and
are aware of what is happening. So it was felt that government should intervene in this 
respect to relieve the problems the SSFs face with respect to marketing’. His comments 
suggest that private traders do actually conduct business in to rural areas, but the major 
problem is they take advantage of the SSFs.
However, other studies such as that by Govereh et al (2008) indicate that the policy 
environment whereby government has increased the role of FRA which buys maize at pan 
territorial prices in far flung areas makes it difficult for the private traders to conduct their 
business profitably. This suggests that private traders shun rural areas which are difficult to 
access because of government’s marketing activities there. It was however observed that 
there are more private maize traders buying points in Nyimba than there was FRA buying 
points. The study also seems to indicate that wherever FRA had a satellite depot, private 
traders also had buying points. Moreover, some private maize traders even went out of their 
way to help a farmer sell his/her maize by going to their door step. For example, one buyer 
also said that in situations where a farmer could not transport his/her maize to a buying point 
because it was far, he would actually go with the farmer to his/her home to weigh and buy the 
maize from there. For example, this buyer said ‘In some cases, people come and say for 
example in places like Zambu, a person can come and just say that “‘I have about 40 bags’”. I 
would go there with my scale and weigh the maize right there and buy the maize right there. 
When the driver comes with the company vehicle to collect the maize I have bought, I just 
78 
 
tell him that “‘I bought maize at such and such a village, let’s go and collect’”. And we go.’ 
Apparently the price is not affected in any way in such cases as the maize is bought at the 
same price as if the farmer had transported it to the buying point.
5.6 Opportunities arising from Liberalisation of Maize Markets 
When asked about the opportunities they have observed after the implementation of the 
liberalisation of the maize market policy, the views of the SSFs were varied. Most of the 
SSFs viewed the policy negatively. Their contention was that the coming of other buyers in 
the maize market presented more problems than opportunities. However, overall the SSFs
also acknowledged some opportunities such as:
x the freedom for them to sell unlimited amount of their maize to anyone whenever they 
felt like;
x ability to sell their maize when need arises thus able to access ready cash anytime
x no need to sort the maize to remove the coloured grains
x availability of markets situated at the SSFs’ door’s step or right in the villages where 
they live and also open for most of the year and also remain open late into the night
5.7 Problems associated with selling maize 
When the SSFs were asked to share the problems they encountered to sell their maize, several 
problems were highlighted and they can be broadly classified into infrastructure and/or 
market related, policy related, price related, and other problems (refer to table A3:1 in
appendix 3 for details).
5.8 Access to Maize Marketing Information 
Three main modes of communication were identified as ways through which the SSFs
received maize marketing information. These included MACO through their staff on the 
ground, farmers’ groups, and the radio. One SSF said he used the Short Message Services 
(SMS) to get information from millers in Lusaka. Another SSF identified newspaper as one 
way through which he accessed maize marketing information. Overall, MACO and the 
farmers’ organisations were the majors conduits through which farmers accessed information. 
I also observed that a member of the village who was tasked with responsibility of relaying 
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information would go round with a public address system announcing to the villagers about 
the government market. With respect to the private markets information flow was mainly 
through friends and observation once such a market was mounted.
Part Two. Exploitation as Experienced by SSFs in Nyimba  
5.9 Forms of Exploitation 
The forms of exploitation that where observed can be classified into two broad categories: 
petty and structural/systematic forms of exploitation. Petty forms of exploitation refer to the 
exploitation perpetrated by petty traders, small scale traders and buyers. While structural 
forms of exploitation refers to the exploitation perpetrated by the state and its institutions, and 
other stakeholders such as the farmers’ organisations, satellite agents, and better off farmers.
Part two is divided into three main parts. In the first section different manifestations of petty 
forms of exploitation are highlighted.  The second section highlights the different 
manifestations of the structural forms of exploitations. Then finally a summary of the chapter 
is given. 
5.9.1 Petty Forms of Exploitation 
5.9.1.1 Giving away more maize grain than normal.  
The farmers shared a number of ways through which they feel their customers got away with 
more maize than they should have. The several ways through which this is done include:
Future buying- this is a situation where traders or buyers come and give SSFs some money 
before they harvest the crop. Such traders come during the period when the SSFs are in
desperate need of money, as such accept to get meagre payments for their crop. For example, 
one SSF said that ‘they [private traders] start buying maize as early as April. Sometimes they 
come as early as March, they give you empty grain bags and money, there’s that system of 
giving money before the farmer has even harvested the maize. They give little money but 
they come to get large quantity of maize. Like for instance, they were giving ZMK20, 000.00 
(USD4.02) for almost 90, 80 or 70kg bag of maize’. In this way, the SSFs felt that they part 
away with more maize than would be the case if they had waited to sell their maize when 
they harvested. The SSFs felt that the buyers capitalised on the SSFs desperate need for 
money during this period to get more maize than usual from them. One MACO official 
highlighted another scenario of future buying, he said ‘at one time when there was a bit of 
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some, should I say hunger in one part, others used to buy maize meal, a 25kg a farmer gets, 
that is before harvest then at the end of it a farmer pays back three bags of maize.’ In this case 
again it is the desperate situation (hunger) that the buyers capitalised on to get more maize 
than usual from the farmers.  
Others would argue that they get large quantities because the moisture content at the time is 
high so the extra kilos compensate for the weight loss when the maize is dried. However, 
what is forgotten is that buyers usually sell the maize to millers almost immediately to be 
milled into maize meal. So the high moisture content argument is questionable. Of course 
there are also some traders who stock the maize until the government market opens in order 
to sell there.
It appears that the time when sells take place has a significant role to place in the amount of 
maize that a SSF parts away with and the returns he/she gets in exchange. Thus selling before 
harvesting would to a large extent mean that a SSF parts away with more grain for a small 
amount of money. The issue here is the desperate situation a farmer is in during that time.  
Selling in medas, tins, diinda. Traders and buyers alike use various ways to measure the 
maize they receive in exchange for whatever items they take to the SSFs. Some of the ways is 
by the use of a meda and dunavant (plastic containers), tins (metallic and/or plastic 
containers), and diinda (unweighed bag which usually exceeds the number of kilo grams 
indicated on the bag). 
It seems like there is no agreement among the SSFs about the actual weight of maize when 
measured using a meda or a dunavant. According to one SSF ‘a dunavant is equivalent to 
20kg while a meda is equivalent to 10kg’. According to another SSF a meda is equivalent to 
about 6kg of maize while a dunavant which takes 2 medas is equivalent to between 12-15 kg. 
According to the MACO Kabwe Agriculture Market Information Services (KAMIS) Bi-
Monthly bulletin, a meda is equivalent to 5kg worth of maize grain. Apparently this is the 
official measurement. Officially, a dunavant container is equivalent to 10kg worth of maize 
while a tin is equivalent to 20kg (CSO 2004).
In March when some traders start buying maize, most of them do not use the scale to weigh 
the maize they buy; they use the above mentioned ways to weigh the maize. Some traders 
have argued that they use these methods because during that time the moisture content of the 
81 
 
maize is very high. As such it would be to their disadvantage if they used the scales. One 
maize trader who has been in the business since 2009 said ‘the thing is at that time, the 
moisture content in the maize was high so the maize was heavy such that to weigh the maize 
was going to be unfair on our part’. Moisture content is used as justification for not weighing 
the maize on a scale and also for offering low prices at the beginning of the season. Another 
example is one given by another trader who said ‘this year we started with ZMK2, 000.00 
(USD0.40) per meda. K2, 000.00 was the starting price. ... I will say that now using the scale 
it is ZMK650.00 (USD0.13) per kg’. It means he was buying the maize at ZMK400.00 when 
opened his market. 
The SSFs are also squeezed when they sell their maize in a diinda bag. One SSF had this to 
say ‘if we sell to the government per kg the price is better such that if we sell a 50kg bag, it 
doesn’t fill dinda. And yet when we sell to the private maize trader, from 50kg you find that 
sometimes you will get twenty something thousand kwacha. But when you sell to 
government the correct measurement of 50kg you find that you get more money’. Apparently 
a diinda would usually contain about 60 - 70 kg of maize. And this is what the private buyers 
would demand from the SSFs in exchange during those times that they are not using a scale. 
In such transactions, a SSF ends up parting away with more grain to the tune of between 10 -
20 kg. In this case, it appears the buyers capitalises on the seemingly ignorance of the SSFs 
that a diinda contains grain beyond the weight indicated on the bag it is measured in. 
Buyers Tempering with Scales. The SSFs and the FRA officials apparently believe that the 
private maize buyers and/or traders temper with the scales. For example, one SSF said that 
‘the private buyers usually temper with the scales, their scales are not usually accurate or 
normal’ His observation is that about 5-10kg of maize is given away using this same method. 
In addition, an official from FRA argued that ‘the scales that are used by a number of the 
traders are not very accurate, in fact they are deliberately so, they are not accurate to the 
disadvantage of the farmer.’ Apparently this deception is widespread.  
A buyer working for one of the maize trading companies argued that employers do not 
provide for their food rations so they use part of the money they are given to buy the maize 
from farmers for food. And to cover the shortage they come up with initiatives. (Maybe this 
could be one of the explanations for the tempering with the scales.) In this case the traders 
would be oblivious of the inaccuracy of the scales but the buyers would be the culprits.
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Receiving less money than is normal. This is as a consequence of the reasons mentioned 
above. The money a SSF receives for the maize he/she parts with is less than ought to be the 
case because some kilo grams are deceptively not paid for. There is a belief that most traders 
do not usually go to remote areas because of distance issues. For example, an FRA official 
said ‘in a year where you have surplus or huge production for instance this year, farmers in 
such areas, if someone will go there to buy, they are bound to part away with their produce at 
a very low price’. The study indicates that the geographical location of the SSFs was not 
necessarily an issue. The statement alludes to how traders take advantage of the SSFs’ 
vulnerability. The traders also took advantage of the bumper harvest which entails supply 
outstripping demand thus low prices. Traders choose these remote areas because they know 
they can be able to get away with offering very low prices and then make a big killing. 
5.9.1.2 Unequal barter exchange.  
Some traders especially petty traders take various items and use the meda, dunavant, diinda, 
and tin to measure the maize they receive in exchange for the items they take to the SSFs. 
They decide the terms of exchange before they arrive at the SSF’s door step. For example, 
one SSF argues that traders who bring various items to exchange with maize are after making 
abnormal profit. He argues that ‘there are some who bring blankets which cost ZMK25, 
000.00 (USD5.03) or ZMK30, 000.00 (USD6.03) in the shops in Lusaka but they ask for two 
diinda bags in exchange. I think it doesn’t make sense for me to give him those two diinda
bags of maize which would fetch about ZMK120, 000.00 (USD24.13) for a blanket worth 
ZMK30, 000.00 (USD6.03), it is not worth it, their price is exorbitant, they are like thieves’. 
When such a trader sells say for argument’s sake to government, he will get around ZMK156, 
000.00 (USD31.36) that is when a diinda is for example equivalent to 60kg at ZMK1, 300.00 
(USD0.26) per kg. This therefore gives the trader huge profit. The SSF’s comment suggests 
that he feels that the fact that trader is the one who bought the product in the city and took it 
to his door step does not give the trader the right to charge such an exorbitant amount for the 
product. 
Another issue worth mentioning related to barter system is the lack of or the possibility to 
negotiate. While some SSFs such as the one quoted above see barter system as broad daylight 
theft, other SSFs argue that barter is good because it allows room for negotiations. For 
example, one SSF said ‘you can negotiate with the merchants who deal in different 
merchandise like trousers, buckets, cloths, and kitchen utensils’. In this case the fact that one 
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can negotiate with the trader is seen as a good thing. While some SSFs argue that it is
possible to negotiate with some traders, some SSFs argue that it is not the case with most
traders. For example, one SSF said ‘we don’t negotiate because they just say we have 
brought. So we just get in order to satisfy our need’. Apparently the experience of other SSFs 
is that no room exists for negotiations. [The Agricultural Market Development Plan also 
attests to the vulnerable situation of SSFs, for example, ‘Small-scale farmers are currently weak 
sellers of maize and other products and therefore suffer unduly poor prices for their produce. They 
tend to offer their produce in small quantities, they do not grade their produce, and they are cash 
strapped at time of harvest’ (GRZ 2004b,6).]
Box 1: Unequal form of exchange 
One day during my fieldwork, some traders came with rape (vegetable) at my auntie’s house. 
He was exchanging the rape with maize but I did not know. I took it for granted that he 
wanted cash for his vegetable. So in wanting to please my aunt and cousins, I told the young 
man ‘give us the vegetable’. Surprisingly though, there was no mention of money. So I asked 
‘how much are you selling the rape for’. He said, ‘I use this’ (pointing at a small basket 
(katundu) he had). I then said ‘put the rape there then’. It was then that he explained how it 
was done. He said ‘the basket is used to measure the maize’. I told him ‘give me the rape I 
will pay cash’. He refused to transact saying ‘I only accept maize in exchange’. I said ‘well! I 
don’t have maize but I have money and I want the rape’. After some few minutes of thinking 
he said ‘do you really have the money? As if doubting if I could afford to buy at the price he 
was thinking of charging for the rape. I said ‘yes, name your price’. He said ‘it’s ZMK1, 
000.00 (USD0.20) per batch’. I gave him the money and when time came for him to leave he 
said to me ‘you should go back where you come from as you are not good for my type of 
business.’ It was then I realised that for some reason, it was more profitable for such petty 
traders to get maize in exchange than cash. 
Source: 2010 Fieldwork Observation 
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5.9.2 Structural Exploitation 
5.9.2.1 Extra costs (e.g. sewing, stacking) passed on to the farmer.  
The study indicates that SSFs unfairly incur extra costs in two main ways. First, satellite 
agents passing the costs of sewing and stacking to SSFs. According to an FRA official ‘the 
stacking and sewing is supposed to be done by the satellite agent not the farmer.’ FRA 
contracts satellite agents to buy the maize on its behalf. Apparently these agents are
responsible for rebaging the maize into FRA bags after the quality standard of the maize has 
been certified, sewing the bags, and stacking them. However, the study indicates that the 
agents do not do this but there are some youths who provide this service to the farmers at a 
fee. For example, One SSF who participated in the FGD complained that ‘for them (youths) 
to sew the bag, they charge ZMK100.00 (USD0.02) and then ZMK200.00 (USD0.04) per bag 
for stacking’. This activity was apparently widespread in the district. Even the fees were the 
same in other satellite depots too. One SSF who participated in the FGD lamented that 
because of such activities ‘the farmers are suffering, spending a lot thus not profiting as they 
should’. This activity added to the costs that the farmers had to incur further reducing their 
profit. The fact that the SSFs pay these youths for these services could be an indication that 
they do not know who is responsible for paying for these services. Thus speculation could be 
that the satellite agents could be said to have capitalisation on the SSFs’ lack of knowledge to 
pass this extra cost on them.
Second, SSFs incur extra costs through bribery. For example, a SSF who participated in the 
FGD argued that ‘when you reach the market the buyers show favouritism when buying the 
maize’. Such acts where apparently as a result of the buyers requesting for bribes from SSFs
with the view of serving them faster. For fear of not being accorded the opportunity to sell to
the government which pays good money given that there was a target to be met, some SSFs
have succumbed. According to two FGD participants, the amount involved is not fixed but 
depends on what the SSFs and the buyer agree based on the number of bags the SSF wants to 
sell. The SSFs choose to bear this extra cost even if it reduces their profit because they felt 
that they are still better off than if they sold to the private traders. The study indicates that the 
buyers take advantage of the SSFs’ fear of the FRA targets being met without them selling to 
FRA to solicit for bribes.  (Robinson, Govereh & Ndlela (2007) argue that market 
liberalisation has resulted in SSFs bearing more risks.)
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5.9.2.2 Buyer Price setting.   
The study indicates that the perception of the SSFs is that the FRA price is a good price. This 
is because the FRA is the only buyer which offers to buy maize at prices double those offered 
by the private traders and/or buyers. The FRA takes several factors into account to arrive at 
its price. For example, an FRA official said ‘we look at the cost of production here in Lusaka 
and also cost of production outside Lusaka. We also did a weighted average on those farmers 
receiving FISP and those not receiving so that we have a weighted average and then also 
looked at the yield ... there’s a small profit margin of 10 percent’. Meanwhile, FRA provides 
market for the rural-based SSFs who are also the beneficiaries of the FISP. 
The study indicates that in most cases buyers set the price except during the rainy season 
when some SSFs who had stored some maize sell for either cash or in exchange for labour to 
fellow villagers who had run out of the commodity. The study also indicates that private 
traders set prices which SSFs feel are very low. For example one SSF said ‘their prices are 
very low.’ The SSFs feel this way because they compare the private traders’ prices to the 
FRA price.
The current maize marketing system is different from the one in the past were SSFs were 
obligated to sell to NAMBOARD where they got their subsidised inputs (Robinson, Govereh 
& Ndlela 2007). Moreover, the prices they received for their maize were deliberately set low 
(ibid). On the contrary, in the current FRA marketing system, farmers are at liberty to sell 
their maize to anyone. In addition, the FRA prices are set higher than the market price. 
The trend in the past has been that farmers would delay to sell their maize so that they sell 
later in the year when prices were higher. According to Robinson et al (2007), farmers who 
stored their maize in order to sell later in the year earned more from their maize than those 
who sold earlier when supply was relatively high. The study indicates that SSFs endeavour to 
sell to FRA but because FRA markets delay to open and close early, the SSFs sell to private 
traders when need arises. 
To counter the problem of low prices, SSFs are advised to diversify their farming activities.
For example, an NDFA official said ‘we are encouraging our farmers to diversify, so that 
they don’t depend on one crop’. The idea is that when in need of cash, farmers would sell 
other crops or livestock whose prices are not very low during their time of need. SSFs are 
also advised to hoard their maize in order to sell to FRA. For example, a MACO official said 
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‘We are trying to advise them to wait in order to sell at a better price.’ The better price 
referred to here is that offered by FRA. This could be seen as an acknowledgement that no 
private trader offers prices higher than the FRA price. And sure enough, even in October or 
November when the private traders’ prices are deemed high these prices are still below the 
FRA price (refer to table A2:1). For example, one buyer when asked about buying prices 
around that period said ‘It [price] depends with the scarcity of maize around that time. But it 
would reach around K800.00 or K1, 000.00 per kg.’ FRA on the other hand buys maize at 
K1, 300.00 per kg. So farmers sell most of their maize to FRA. For example, one SSF said 
‘actually, I can just estimate in terms of percentages, 75% is taken to FRA and the remaining 
25% goes to the rest of the buyers’. FRA is the major customer for this SSF. This is a change 
from what was observed by Robinson et al (2007). In their studies they found that farmers 
usually store their maize to sell it later in the year when prices were higher.  
5.9.2.3 Wage Labour in Exchange for Maize  
The SSFs who do not produce enough and/or sell all their maize such that by rainy season 
they have run out of their maize stock are usually very vulnerable. The study suggests that in 
such situations such SSFs turn to the better off SSFs for assistance. The food insecure SSFs
offer to work in the fields of the better off SSFs in exchange for maize. For example, one SSF 
said ‘we use it [maize] as payment to those who work in our field’. Another SSF said ‘that is 
cheap labour and we tell them “you will be given a tin of maize if you work up to here”. In 
fact you are lucky that time there is no counting because people are hungry, so you just say 
“you go up to that point’”. The better off SSFs recognise the desperation of their fellow SSFs
and take advantage of it. Some better off SSFs do not consider what would be fair work in 
exchange for a tin of maize, as they know that because of desperation the food insecure SSFs
would work regardless of the size of the portion they are given to till/weed. This is a problem 
that arises due to seasonality nature of maize farming.
5.9.2.4 Sell of Seed to SSFs on Credit by Farmers’ Organisations 
As has been highlighted in section 4.3, the farmers’ group also sale seed to the SSFs on credit 
for specified number of bags when the SSFs harvest. For example, one SSF said ‘they gave 
us 10kg bag of seed and we are supposed to pay back 3 x 55kg of maize’. It was however 
surprising that the SSFs did not see this as a form of exploitation because it was in form of 
loan. For example, one SSF said ‘I think it is beneficial because even if you harvest two ox 
carts all you have to give them is one bag and all the rest is yours but meanwhile you got
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seed.’ The fact that the SSF retained more maize than she gave the farmer group is what is 
important to the SSF. Another possible explanation could be because the same SSFs are the 
beneficiaries of the profits farmer’ organisations make. For example, one cooperative official 
said ‘when the cooperative has enough money, and invests it in a business venture, members 
earn interest on their contribution’.
5.10 Summary 
The SSFs sell their maize to multiple buyers namely: the government, the private traders 
and/or buyers, and food insecure fellow villagers. Maize is either sold for cash or barter 
exchange. Most of the maize traders and/or buyers pay cash on delivery except for 
government which pays after some time. Most of the maize sales to the private traders was 
found to be need driven, thus the sales took place almost throughout the year as long as the 
traders and/or buyers’ markets were open. On the contrary, sales to the government were 
determined by the time when the government marketing season opened. Sales to the food 
insecure villagers took place during the rainy season when there such villagers run out of 
their maize stocks. Who set the price at which maize was sold to the different categories of 
buyers was dependent on who the buyer was. The private traders and government set the 
price at which they bought the maize. The SSFs set the price for the maize they sold to food 
insecure villagers. The study indicates that there are more private traders markets than 
government buying points (markets) in the study area. The almost all year presence of the 
private sector in the maize market was appreciated by the SSFs as it made it possible for the 
SSFs to meet most of their urgent financial needs before the government market opened and 
after it closed. The SSFs argued that they experience numerous problems to sale their maize. 
These problems can broadly be categorised into price related problem, policy related 
problems, market access related problems, and other. MACO through its extension officers
and the farmers’ organisations stood out as the main conduits of information transmission to 
SSFs.
Several forms of forms of exploitation which can broadly be categorise as petty and 
structural. Petty forms of exploitations were mostly perpetrated by petty traders, small scale 
traders and buyers. Problems are inherent in the various terms of exchanges between the 
SSFs and these traders. The observed main ways through which SSFs were exploited were 
when they gave away more grain than normal through future selling, selling of maize using 
other measuring tools other than scales, buyers tempering with scales; and unequal barter 
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exchange of maize with consumable goods. Structural forms of exploitation were perpetrated 
by the state and its institutions, farmers’ organisations, satellite agents and better off SSFs. 
Structural forms of exploitation took the form of  extra costs passed on to SSFs, and buyers 
setting maize prices, sale of labour in exchange for maize, and sale of seed on credit.
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CHAPTER SIX 
Summary and Conclusion  
Maize Marketing Policy Changes and SSFs’ Vulnerability to 
Exploitation 
6.0 Introduction 
The maize marketing system in Zambia has under gone several changes from independence 
in 1964 to date. The notable changes policy-wise were that from 1964 to 1990 the state 
substantially controlled both maize production and marketing. Other notable changes in 
maize market policies took place in 1991 when a new government was ushered into office. 
This new government liberalised the maize markets. From 1991 – 2004 the state institutions 
which were in charge of marketing of markets and distribution of inputs were disbanded as 
the state endeavoured to create an environment for the private sector to thrive. From 2005 to 
date there is a dual system where state marketing system exists side by side with the private 
sector. The state is again substantially involved in the production and marketing of maize. 
These policies changes have impacted the SFFs who are the main producers of maize and 
also among the poorest group of people in the country differently. The question is have these 
changes eased or exacerbated the SSFs’ vulnerability to exploitation? 
In this chapter I endeavour to relate theory with the empirical findings of the study, give a 
consolidated summary and conclusion of the whole study. To begin with, I discuss the SSFs 
rationale for the choice of what maize variety to grow. Then, I discuss the different forms of 
exploitation that have been observed in the light of the theory. Thereafter, I highlight factors 
that exacerbate SSFs’ vulnerability to exploitation. I then give a summary of main issues 
discussed in the study. Lastly, I highlight the main conclusion of the study.
6.1 Subsistence Ethics 
6.1.1 Risk Aversion 
All the SSFs I interviewed in Nyimba were engaged in multiple agricultural activities. The 
SSFs gave various reasons for their engaging in those agricultural activities. The primary 
reasons included production for home consumption as well as for sale. 
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It was interesting to note that a sizeable number (ten out of fifteen) of the interviewed SSFs 
preferred to produce hybrid solely for sale and nseenga for home consumption. Various 
reasons were given for this course of action. For example, they argued that the nseenga grain 
is hard thus difficult for weevils to destroy; nseenga, does not require chemicals to store for 
long time; the grain is heavier than that of hybrid thus one gets more maize meal and less 
maize bran from it compared to hybrid; the maize meal made from it is whiter than that of 
hybrid. With respect to hybrid, they said they choose to grow hybrid for sale because the 
hybrid grain is soft thus easily attacked by weevils by September/October/November; fear 
that the grain would be infested by weevils; they do not have funds to buy chemicals to 
protect the grain from attacks by weevils; they do not have proper storage facility in which to 
store the grain; and it gives high yield thus is good for business.
Anyhow, from their responses it appears that the underlying reason for the SSFs’ course of 
action is to secure their subsistence. Several factors seem to attest to this. First, Nyimba 
SSFs’ choice of which maize variety to grow for sell and which one to grow for home 
consumption could be said to be determined by the knowledge they have gained through their
experience of growing the two varieties. Apparently through experience they have come to 
discover that nseenga is reliable in terms of storage, as it can be stored up to the next farming 
season without being infested with weevils thus not requiring insecticides to store. In this 
regard nseenga assured the SSFs of subsistence. On the other hand, experience has taught 
SSFs that hybrid requires insecticides in order to be stored. This suggests that SSFs in 
Nyimba adhere to Scott’s (1976) safety first principle in their selection of which variety to 
grow. The study suggests that Nyimba SSFs are rational in their decision making process
under the circumstance.
However, as has been argued by Martinussen (1997) and Scott (1976), when it comes to 
nseenga cultivation, the underlying factor is risk aversion. Sentiments by the SSFs indicate 
that this is the case, for example, one SSF quoted a local proverb which says “‘osataya chi 
kabudula chakale, chanyowani pakine chingambike lombapano chisile  (don’t throw away 
own pants or shorts because you never know whether the new pair of pants will soon get torn 
and be good for nothing)’”. This proverb suggests that the SSF is somewhat sure of the 
performance of nseenga and not so sure about that of hybrid. Further, risk aversion could be 
inferred from the proverb as the SSF prefers safety than to regret.
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The empirical evidence from the study is not conclusive about which of the two maize 
varieties (nseenga and hybrid) is most risky and the SSFs were divided on the issue as some
argued that hybrid is more risky while others argued that nseenga was more risky. There are 
two main issues that SSFs have to contend with respect to risk, one is storage and the other is 
changing weather patterns. The study indicates that nseenga is less risky than hybrid in terms 
of storage. This is because according to the SSFs ‘by the time you are harvesting, hybrid 
maize will have already been infested, the insects attack it while it is right in the field ... I 
prefer local maize because it lasts for a long time, like this year, I am expecting it to last up to 
May next year’. These statements portray nseenga to be more reliable in terms of storage.
With respect to changing weather patterns, the study is not conclusive. Some of the findings 
seem to indicate that nseenga assured SSFs of subsistence even when the weather was not 
very favourable. A revealing statement to this effect is that of a MACO official who cited 
uncertainty associated with changing rainfall patterns as one of the possible reasons why
SSFs are probably still clinging to nseenga: ‘in case the rains are not okay, hybrids are a 
problem as they will all be wiped out. So he would go for a one lima (a quarter of a hectare) 
or one hectare local maize which will give him less than what he was supposed to get from 
the same’. This comment seems to suggest that in times of poor rainfall, nseenga performs 
better than hybrid. In this regard SSFs could be said to conform to Scott’s (1976) argument 
that, they rather avoid agricultural activities whose failure could spell disaster for those which 
minimise loss. 
This notion is challenged when one takes into account the fact that there are variations in 
maturity time for the different hybrid varieties. It appears this variation somewhat counters 
the effects of changing weather patterns. Hybrid producers argue that the different hybrid 
species make hybrid more reliable when it comes to changing weather patterns and that the 
fact that hybrid has been customised into early, medium and late maturing varieties, assures 
them of harvesting something whatever the vagaries associated with weather. For example, 
one SSF said ‘we grow early maturing varieties so that if the rains come early and stop, from 
these we can harvest something, the same goes for medium and late maturing varieties, 
depending on the rainfall patterns whatever the case we will be able to harvest something if 
we prepared.’ This of course could be said to be true for those SSFs who plant all three 
varieties in any given rainy season. Anyhow this suggests that hybrid could be said to be 
reliable for subsistence except for its vulnerability to weevil infestation. Aside from this, if a 
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SSF took the necessary precaution and applied insecticides to the grain before storage hybrid 
assured him/her of subsistence. For example, one SSF said ‘If you don’t apply insecticides, 
by November all the maize [hybrid] is maize bran most of the times’. This suggests that for 
hybrid to assure SSFs of subsistence, SSFs have to invest in insecticides failure to which their
harvest is destroyed by weevils. Thus the SSFs’ growing of different hybrid varieties could 
be looked at as one way of hedging against total crop failure. However, this statement could 
still be considered to be consistent with the reaction of risk averse person who seeks to 
minimise the probability of maximum loss thereby secure his/her subsistence whatever the 
circumstances.
Something worth noting also is that five out of the 15 SSFs only grew hybrid maize part of 
which they used for home consumption and sold the rest.  The decision for their choice to 
grow only hybrid for these purposes were influenced by the changing rainfall patterns and the 
guaranteed high yield offered by hybrid. The decision of the five SSFs who grow only hybrid 
maize with the intention of consuming part and selling the rest of their produce could be 
perceived as their initiative to spread risk. As highlighted in the preceding paragraph, when 
hybrid growers grow all three hybrid varieties, whatever happens weather-wise they are 
assured of harvesting something from at least one of the varieties. The SSFs’ adoption of 
hybrid given the changing weather patterns could also be indicative of their awareness of the 
risks of crop failure which bad weather can cause even with hybrid. As Scott (1976) argued 
reliable and stable subsistence can be achieved through several ways such as (in this case) the 
cultivation of a variety of seed so as to hedge against complete crop failure. This suggests 
that hybrid could secure the SSFs subsistence better than nseenga.
Contrary to Leonard Joy’s assertion that ‘subsistence farmers may resist innovation because it 
means departing from a system that is efficient in minimising the risk of catastrophe for one 
that significantly increases this risk’ (cited in Scott 1976, 19), majority (ten) of the SSFs have 
neither altogether resisted the technological innovation (hybrid) nor altogether abandoned
production of nseenga in preference for hybrid maize even if they acknowledge that they get 
higher yields from the hybrid which entails more returns when they sell. The SSFs have 
instead chosen to spread the risk while at the same time securing their subsistence. 
Apart from that all the SSFs attested to the fact that hybrid yield is higher than that of 
nseenga. On this issue one SSF said ‘when you plant on equal pieces of land in terms of 
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surface area, the yield for nseenga will be lower than that of hybrid’. If a SSF would harvest 
double hybrid than he would nseenga from a similar piece of land, then he/she is assured of
subsistence. It would follow therefore, that the SSFs would receive more net returns from 
hybrid production than from nseenga especially when one looks at it in terms of volumes. To 
this effect, table A2:6 indicates that a SSF would get as much as ZMK940, 750.00 as against 
ZMK571, 650.00 in net returns from 1lima. This somewhat indicates that hybrid could indeed 
be good for not only subsistence but also for business as one SSF commented ‘the yield for 
hybrid is high thus it is good for business’. The SSFs’ line of argument for growing hybrid 
for business could also suggest that they are rational in decision making, that is, they have 
recognised and exploited the opportunity to increase production and make money by growing 
hybrid (Martinussen 1997). The only shortcoming is that hybrid required the use of fertilizer 
to give the expected high yield. This therefore could mean that hybrid has extra financial 
implications. 
Second, Nyimba SSFs’ resolve to sell their produce even to buyers who offer low prices just
so that they could support their families could be looked at as pursuit for subsistence. For 
instance, one SSF said ‘when I don’t have money for milling of my maize, or money to pay 
for school requisites for my school going children, I end up telling them to get the maize 
almost for free, “get the bags and give me whatever little amount so that I can give my school 
going children”’. This statement gives the impression that when need arises in the family, the 
SSF is compelled to sell his/her maize at a very low price just so that he could provides for 
the family. This is consistent with Scott’s (1976) argument that the desire to meet one’s 
family’s subsistence needs compels SSFs to sale their produce for any amount or pay more. 
With regard to paying more, the study indicates that SSFs pay more for items they buy 
through barter. For example, one SSF said ‘we don’t negotiate because they just say we have 
brought. So we just get in order to satisfy our needs’. 
6.1.2 Profit maximisation 
The fact that SSFs are sometimes risk averse for the sake of securing their subsistence has 
been used by some as the reason why they do not seek to maximize profit. The study 
indicates that SSFs in as much as subsistence security is important to them, they try to 
maximise profits in their own way. For example, two SSFs with plots of land along river 
banks or streams engage in gardening in order to maximize profits. These SSFs were able to 
seize the opportunity to diversify their agricultural activities because they are strategically
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positioned. Whereas, some studies which Ellis (1993) alluded to argued that SSFs diversify 
because they are risk averse, this example suggests that crop diversification can sometimes be 
due to the SSFs’ quest to exploit opportunities which they identify as being within their reach 
thus maximise profits. This is consistent with Feeny’s (1983) findings that the type of land a 
farmer owns may necessitate that he/she diversifies and not risk aversion as is believed by 
others.
The SSFs took several factors into account in order to reach a point where they designate 
hybrid maize to be grown for commercial purposes. Some of these factors indicate that the 
SSFs’ choice is guided by their profit maximization goal. For example, the SSFs argue that 
the yield for hybrid is high than that of nseenga as such it is good for business. For example, 
one SSF said ‘if I farm properly, it means I will be able to acquire most of the things I lack, 
because hybrid maize is bountiful’. Another SSF said ‘looking at the crops I have been 
growing, I have seen that we get good money from maize’. The FRA price being higher than 
the market price enables the SSFs earn more money from selling their maize. Apart from that, 
hybrid’s high vulnerability to attacks by weevils makes it a difficult variety to store. So SSFs 
choose to dispose of it as soon as possible.   
6.2 Exploitation  
Exploitation as defined in section 2.1.3 thrives where there are weaknesses which the 
exploiter can capitalise on. SSFs have been disappointed by the prices offered by and other 
activities of some of the buyers of their maize. This has led to their feelings of discontent 
which they express using a variety of phrases which have been mentioned in section 2.1.2.  
The source of discontent is the disparity between what they part away with and the actual 
returns which they receive in return. The reason for this turn of events can be explained by 
looking at what happens when and how the SSFs sell their maize. 
6.2.1 Barter System and Exploitation  
The study suggests that there is economic surplus extraction perpetrated by traders through 
unequal exchange of consumer goods and agricultural products, with prices of consumer 
goods artificially pegged higher than that of agricultural products. The unequal exchange of 
maize and other products taken to the SSFs is a typical example of economic surplus 
extraction by the traders. Martinussen (1997) argues that the state uses pricing policies to 
extract economic surplus from agriculture, in Nyimba it is the buyers who artificially peg the 
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prices of the consumer goods they sell to SSFs higher than that of maize they get in 
exchange. As was highlighted in section 5.9.1.2, the traders relying on barter demand a lot of 
maize in exchange for the products they take to the SSFs. For example one SSF said ‘I think 
it doesn’t make sense for me to give him two diinda bags of maize which would fetch about 
ZMK120, 000.00 (USD24.13) for a blanket worth ZMK30, 000.00 (USD6.03)’. The SSF’s 
argument is that it is not fair for the trader to demand grain worth three times more than the 
value of the blanket. What could be inferred from the transaction is that when the trader 
factors in the transport costs to and from the city, he feels it is alright to demand for three 
diinda bags of maize. The study indicates that the SSFs feel exploited because the buyers 
seem to assume that they have a right to demand for more maize than usual simply because 
they are the ones to travel to the city to buy the products which they later come to sale to the 
SSFs. The fact that the buyers set the price and do not allow any room for negotiations could 
also be looked at them having more power than the SSFs. It is supposedly this situation 
which puts the SSFs in a subordinate position which the buyers capitalise on to get more 
maize from them or cause them to pay more for the products.
The study indicates that in Zambia, the state since 1991 does not perpetrate economic surplus 
extraction through unequal exchange of industrial goods and agricultural products. From 
1991 to 2004, the study suggests that the state’s participation in the market was very minimal 
to the extent that no subsidies were provided. However, since 2005, the study suggests that 
the state actually started encouraging maize production through both the provision of
subsidised inputs and also buying the maize at prices higher than the market price. This is 
contrary to Bates’ (1988) assertion that African government tend to encourage production by 
lowering both the prices of inputs and prices of output. The GRZ’s policy intervention could 
be said to result in increasing the SSFs’ income. Net revenue as was computed in table A2:6 
also suggests that government intervention through price policies actually leads to an increase 
in the SSFs’ income. 
6.2.2 Social Surplus Appropriation 
Ellis (1993) argues that this takes place through three main ways: the market, rent, and the 
state. Relevant to this study is that done through the market and the state. Social surplus 
appropriation through the market is done through price. The study revealed that the SSFs 
were squeezed through low maize prices offered by the private maize traders. For example, 
one SSF said ‘we make losses when we sell to the private buyers who have money’. When he 
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did his math, the prices were low resulting in loss on his part. The SSFs argue that not only 
do private buyers/traders set the price, but the worst aspect of the transaction is that they set 
very low prices which result in the SSFs incurring losses. The SSFs felt that in most cases the 
buyers of their maize got away with more grain than they should have in this way. This 
suggests that given the prices the SSFs received for the sale of their grain, the buyers did not 
deserve to get as much grain as they got. The study seems to indicate that traders/buyers take 
advantage of the desperate situation of the SSFs to exploit them.
Ellis (1993) also argues that peasant squeeze is a result of unequal market power relations. 
The SSFs argue that the buyers/traders in all categories set the price for maize except for the 
food insecure villagers. So for the most part the buyers/traders have more market power than 
the SSFs, hence their ability to buy maize at their preferred price. What could be inferred 
from the SSF’s statement above is that the fact that the trader had the money put the SSF in a 
subordinate position. Apart from that, other SSFs also said that it was not possible to 
negotiate with the petty traders when they came to buy maize. For example, one SSF said ‘we 
don’t negotiate because they just say we have brought. So we just get in order to satisfy our
need’. The money the traders had and the SSFs’ need for it conferred more power on the 
buyers. Nancy Holmstrom (1977) argues that exploitation is a relationship where the 
exploiter uses force or coercion to extract surplus (cited in Arneson 1981). She argues that 
force does not necessarily have to be physical but that when the other party has no other 
option then they can be deemed to have been forced or coerced. In the case of the SSFs, their 
need for the goods which the traders bring in a way forces them to sale their maize even when 
the prices these traders offer are very low. In this case the SSFs can be said to be exploited by 
the traders.
The study indicates that the state has facilitated social surplus appropriation through its 
compulsion of SSFs to grow hybrid maize varieties. As has been mentioned in section 4.3,
the state through FISP and MACO officials has been instrumental in facilitating the SSFs’
adoption of hybrid maize varieties. The state’s influence in this turn of events can be inferred 
from the statement of one of the camp extension officers who said ‘with our interaction with 
these farmers, they are doing away with local maize, only a few farmers are still sticking to 
local maize’. This can also be observed by the fact that all the SSFs were beneficiaries of the
FISP. The study suggests that FISP has been instrumental in facilitating the SSFs adoption of
these technologies. Productivity is facilitated by the government which in turn comes to buys 
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the surplus from the farmers through its agent the FRA. This is consistent with what
Bernstein’s (1982) simple reproduction squeeze whereby SSFs costs of production go up due 
to the adoption of expensive technological innovations promoted by the state through rural 
development programmes such as FISP.
Moreover, the study suggests that SSFs sale hybrid maize and not nseenga maize. This could 
be suggestive of how the state has facilitated the squeezing of the SSFs, most especially when 
one considers the fact that the state does not buy all the maize produced by the SSFs but that 
the private sector is the one that buys at prices which are relatively low. The state in a way 
has facilitated the abandonment of nseenga.
Bernstein’s (1982) simple reproduction squeeze is yet another way through which the 
exploitation of SSFs can be explained. Selling of maize at low prices translates into simple 
reproduction squeeze through two ways. First, it increases the SSFs’ cost of production 
through intensification of factors of production and self exploitation. Second, it increases the 
cost of the SSFs’ simple reproduction. 
6.2.3 What is left? 
Most forms of petty exploitation could be explained by Scott’s (1976) peasant test of ‘what is 
left?’ For example, SSFs seemed convinced that in most of the transactions they parted away 
with more maize than was normal. Future buying of maize as has been highlighted in section 
5.9.1.1 is one of the mechanisms through which SSFs feel traders take more maize from them 
than they should. For example, one SSF said ‘there’s that system of giving money before the 
farmer has even harvested the maize, they give you empty grain bags and money. They give 
little money but they come to get large quantity of maize’. The SSF feel that the money 
farmers get from such transactions is not commensurate to the amount of grain the traders 
get. This could be considered exploitative because the buyer capitalises on the SSFs’ 
desperate need for cash to get more maize from them than would be the case if they were not 
desperate. 
Traders’ measuring of the maize they by using measuring tools other than the scale is yet 
another way traders could be said to exploit the SSFs by taking more from them. The study 
seems to indicate that buyers use the moisture content argument and the seemingly ignorance 
of SSFs to exploit them. For example, one buyer said ‘ZMK2, 000.00 (USD0.40) is the price 
at which I started buying a meda of maize in May when I opened the market ... The thing is at 
 98 
 
that time, the moisture content in the maize was high so the maize was heavy such that to 
weigh the maize was going to be unfair on our part’.  This means in May, he was buying 
maize at ZMK400.00 (USD0.08) per kilo gram. The buyer uses the moisture content 
argument not only to get more grain but also to pay a lower price for the same. 
Another example is where one SSF complained that ‘if we sell to the government per kg the 
price is better such that if we sell a 50kg bag, it doesn’t fill a diinda, but by selling to the 
other traders we get a lot of our produce and just waste it, give it away, that why a life of lack 
continues’. This is suggestive of the fact that the private traders’ use of a diinda is one way in 
which they get more grain from the SSFs.  In this case it appears the buyer capitalises on the 
seemingly ignorance of the SSFs about the disparity between the actual amount of grain in 
the bag and the weight indicated on the bag in which it is packed to get more grain from the 
SSF. Contrary to the belief by the buyers that SSFs are ignorant of the disparity, the SSFs 
know because when they take bags that have been filled in the same way to the FRA market 
they find that a 50kg bag has more than 50kg worth of maize. The question is why is it that 
the SSFs choose not to challenge the buyers? 
The study indicates that the farmers’ organisations also take advantage of the SSFs when they 
sell seed on credit to the SSFs. However, has already been highlighted in section 5.9.2.4, the 
SSFs themselves do not see this as exploitation because they retained more maize than they
gave the farmers’ groups. This is consistent with Scott’s (1976) findings that SSFs’ definition 
is in terms of ‘what is let’ and not ‘what is taken’.
6.2.4 Lack of infrastructure Argument 
The lack of infrastructure argument and high cost of transportation are claimed to be major 
impediments for development of agriculture and an issue that might lead to low prices in 
rural areas. However, this argument is suspect. Ideally, the government is supposed to sets up 
markets in far flung areas where the private sector does not go because of lack of 
infrastructure. What is interesting to note is that the study suggests that wherever there was a 
government market the private sector set up their markets too. In fact the study revealed that
there were more private markets in the study areas than government markets. Besides as one 
buyer revealed, that he followed SSFs who could not transport their produce to his buying 
point to their homes and buy the maize from there without reducing the price of the maize to 
cater for transport to fetch the maize from the SSFs’ home. This could be an indication that 
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lack of infrastructure and/or transportation costs does not really hinder the traders from going 
to far flung areas provided it is in their advantage they go.
6.2.5 SSFs Exploiting other SSFs 
Structural exploitation also takes the form of SSFs exploiting other SSFs. The relatively 
better of SSFs also exploit the food insecure SSFs who turn to them for wage labour in 
exchange for maize during the rainy season when their maize stocks run out. Gill (1991) 
argues that ‘because of their vulnerable position they often become both economically and 
socially subordinate to the rich peasants on whom they depend for assistance during the 
‘hungry season’ (cited in Martinussen 1997, 134). The study seems to indicate that the only 
time that SSFs have power over their produce is when they sell to food insecure fellow SSFs 
during the rainy season. During this time SSFs dictate the terms of exchange. For example, 
one SSF said ‘that is cheap labour and we tell them “you will be given a tin of maize if you 
work up to here”. In fact you are lucky that time there is no counting because people are 
hungry, so you just say “you go up to that point’”. The better off SSFs take advantage of the 
food insecure SSFs desperation to exploit them as the better off SSFs know that because of 
desperation the food insecure SSFs will work regardless of the size of the portion they are 
give them to till/weed. This form of exploitation can be explained by Bernstein’s (1982) 
commodity relations intensification through class differentiation. The better off SSFs use 
their stored maize as capital when they invest it into further production of maize by using it 
as payment for cheap labour.  
6.3 What Factors Exacerbates SSFs’ Vulnerability to Exploitation? 
Several factors could be said to exacerbate SSFs’ vulnerability to exploitation. First, 
government’s delay in opening FRA marketing season. The SSFs sell their maize to private 
traders and buyers in order to meet their urgent financial needs before FRA markets open. 
While the SSFs’ appreciate the existence of these market players, they complain that their 
prices are too low. Second, the government’s delay in paying the SSFs for their maize. As has
been alluded to earlier, the government does not pay cash on delivery like the private 
traders/buyers do, it pays the SSFs after some time. This makes SSFs sale their maize to 
private traders even when they know that the prices are not as good as those offered by the 
government.  Third, failure by FRA to monitor the activities of its buying agents. The buying 
agents FRA contracts, have also contributed to increasing the SSFs’ costs by passing on the 
costs of sewing and stacking to the SSFs. Fourth, incomplete information. The changing 
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policies have resulted in SSFs not knowing who is responsible for some of the services as 
such sewing and stacking. It is this weakness which the farmers’ groups are capitalising on to 
pass the extra costs to SSFs. 
6.4 Summary 
The main objective of this study was to investigate to what extent the changing policies of 
maize marketing have contributed to the SSFs’ vulnerability to exploitation. The study 
undertook an in-depth examination of the opportunities and problems SSFs experience from 
the last 2005 maize marketing policy changes to date in order to see if the policy changes 
have contributed to the SSFs’ vulnerability to exploitation.
The study drew from political economy, peasant rationality and risk aversion theories to 
explain the phenomenon under study. Qualitative research methodology was used in this 
study to collect and analyse the data.   
SSFs in Nyimba use still use traditional tools in their maize cultivation. They grow both 
hybrid and nseenga maize varieties. Fertilizer is only applied to the hybrid varieties. To 
secure their subsistence the SSFs have to contend with storage and changing weather patterns 
issues.  The study indicates that the SSFs are rational and seize the opportunities available to 
them in order to make more profits as can be inferred from their engagement in gardening 
and adoption of hybrid maize to be the crop sold. 
The study is not conclusive on which of the two varieties hybrid and nseenga is more risky 
than the other. However, what seems to come out is that nseenga is good for subsistence only 
in terms of storage. Hybrid on the other hand is good for subsistence in terms of vagaries of 
the weather and also because its yield are higher than that of nseenga.
The profitability of hybrid maize production depends on the SSFs’ access to subsidised inputs 
and/or access to FRA market.
The study indicates that almost all maize buyers with the exception of the food insecure SSFs 
set the prices at which they buy the maize from the SSFs. These prices are in most cases not 
negotiable except in some few barter cases. Almost all the maize buyers with the exception of 
FRA pay cash on delivery or exchange the maize with other products simultaneously. It is 
only in a few isolated cases that SSFs say FRA has paid them within the ideal two weeks 
otherwise the SSFs argue that they have received the monies several months later. The study 
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also seems to indicate that this delay has to somewhat contributed to their vulnerability to 
exploitation as it has contributed to the further scarcity of ready cash among SSFs who had to 
resort to the exploitative barter system and/or sell their maize for cash to private traders at 
relatively low prices in order to meet some of their needs.
The study seems to challenge the lack of infrastructure argument which has been used by 
many as justification for private sector to offer low prices in far flung areas. The study 
indicates that some private buyers go to rural areas with or without infrastructure and still 
charge the same price. The study indicates that by so doing such traders subsidise the SSFs in 
far flung areas while simultaneously squeeze those located in not so remote areas.
The study indicates that there are more private buyers than there are FRA satellite depots in 
the study area. The SSFs argued that this scenario has led to more problems than it has 
solved. Anyhow they appreciated the presence of the private sector because it enable them 
meet their urgent financial and materials needs because of their almost all year presence and 
acceptance of any quantity the SSFs wanted to sell. The maize market policy changes 
resulted in problems that could broadly be categorised into infrastructural and market related, 
policy related, price related and other problems.
The SSFs mainly depend on MACO officials and the farmers’ organisations for government 
maize market information and on social networks for private maize markets information.
The study indicates that there are two forms of exploitations facing the SSFs in Nyimba: 
petty and structural. In future buying, the buyers capitalised on the SSFs’ desperate need for 
cash or food to exploit them. The study also indicates that SSFs are exploited when they sell 
their maize using other tools prescribed by the maize buyers. In such transactions, some 
maize buyers capitalise on two main aspects to exploit SSFs: moisture content argument and 
their seemingly ignorance. With respect to moisture content, some maize buyers use this 
argument to both get more maize than usual as well as offer a lower price for it. Secondly, 
some maize buyers capitalise on the SSFs’ seemingly ignorance of the disparity between the 
actual amount of maize a 50kg bag can take and the weight indicated on the bag to get more 
grain from them. 
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The study also indicates that some maize buyers temper with the scales to the disadvantage of 
the SSFs. In this regard, the study indicates that maize buyers seem to capitalise on the SSFs’ 
silence about the deception even if they are aware of it to get more maize from them. 
In the case of barter system, the SSFs feel that the buyers seem to assume that it was alright 
for them to demand more maize than usual simply because they travelled to the city to buy 
the products and presented them at the SSFs’ door step. Meanwhile the SSFs feel defrauded 
because they argue that the prices are exorbitant.
The study indicates that the SSFs do not know that the satellite agents are responsible for 
costs of  sewing and stacking the bags of maize after they sell to FRA, as this cost has now 
been passed on to them. Due to the changes in policy the SSFs seem to have assumed it is one 
of the changes and have ignorantly borne the cost. The study indicates that the satellite agents 
have capitalised on the SSFs’ ignorance or lack of knowledge to pass these extra costs on 
them.
The fact that FRA sets targets of the amount of maize it would buy from SSFs each 
marketing season exposes SSFs to corruption. The buyers also take advantage of the SSFs’ 
fear of FRA meeting its targets before they sell their maize to solicit bribes from them. 
6.5 Recommendations  
Based on the findings of the study it is recommended that:
x mechanisms be put in place to monitor the activities of the FRA buying agents
x the FRA come up with measures that will ensure that SSFs receive payments for their 
maize within the shortest possible time
6.6 Conclusion 
Nyimba SSFs are not altogether risk averse as they show in some of their choices that they 
seek to maximize profits. The changing maize marketing policies have somewhat contributed 
to the SSFs’ vulnerability to exploitation in several ways. Most of the exploitation which was 
observed was perpetrated by the private traders who came on the scene after policy changes 
in 1991. The SSFs’ weaknesses such as desperate need for cash, lack of alternative markets, 
incomplete information, fear of not being able to sell to FRA markets before its markets 
closed, and their silence even when they realised that they were being defrauded are some of 
the factors which the maize buyers capitalised on to exploit them.  The study indicates that 
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certain factors fuel the SSFs’ vulnerability to exploitation: delay in opening of FRA 
marketing season; FRA’s delay in paying the SSFs for their maize after the sale; lack of 
monitoring of FRA maize buying agents’ activities, SSFs’ passivity, and incomplete 
information.
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 Appendix 1: Interview Guides 
Interview Guides 
Themes to pursue:
x Problems associated with selling maize
x Price changes for both inputs and output
x Exploitation
x Changes if any before and after liberalisation
x Interests
SSFs’ Interview Guide
1. What types of crops do you cultivate and how long have you been cultivating?
2. What agricultural activities are you involved in and for how long? Wage labour, 
poultry, animal husbandry 
3. How important is maize farming for you?
4. I would like you to tell me about the opportunities that you have seen now that there 
are many maize buyers than before. 
5. I would also like to know if you experience any problems with respect to selling the 
maize you harvest
6. Who are your customers?
7. When do you normally sell your maize and why?
8. How do you sell your maize? Is it for cash or barter? If barter, what kind of items do 
you exchange your maize. What are the terms of trade?
9. Who determines the price at which you sell your maize? OR How is the price at 
which you sell your maize arrived at?
10. How do you get information about government floor prices?
11. What about the fertilizer and seed who supplies you with them and what are the terms 
of payments?
12. How do you pay for your inputs? (cash or barter) OR What are the modes of payment 
for the inputs?
13. In your opinion how are the prices of the inputs?
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14. Do you experience any problems to access inputs? What kind of problems (if any) do 
you experience?  
15. What other costs from sowing to marketing of maize do you incur? How much do 
they amount to?
16. I would like to discuss the seed varieties that you grow. 
x Could you please share with me what maize varieties do you grow? 
x Are there any differences in the requirement of fertilizer and insecticides with 
the varieties that you grow? 
x What changes in terms of output/yield have you observed since you started 
growing these varieties? 
x How long can you store the harvested maize and how different are they from 
the local maize variety? 
x Do you experience any problems with storage of your maize?
17. Are you a member of any farmers’ union, cooperative?
18. Why did you join the organisation? What benefits does the organisation offer you?
19. How close are you to the nearest satellite depot?
20.
Interview Guide for Interview with Other Research Participants 
A. Staff at MACO and Extension Worker
1. Maize marketing policies have undergone several transformations over the years, 
could you tell about them and why this has been the case?
2. What do you see as the problems facing the rural-based small scale maize farmers in 
the area/country? 
3. What do you think are the solutions to those problems?
4. What is or has the government done to mitigate these problems?
5. How effective do you think the current government’s intervention measures in 
mitigating the problems faced by rural-based small scale maize farmers?  
6. How does the government relate with the small scale maize farmers?
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7. I would like to discuss the seed varieties grown in this area? (just for the extension 
worker)
x Could you please share with me what maize varieties are mostly grown in this 
area? 
x Are there any differences in the requirement of fertilizer and insecticides with 
these varieties? 
x What changes in terms of output/yield have you observed since the start of 
growing these varieties? 
x How long can one store the harvested maize and how different are they from 
the local maize variety? 
x What problems are associated with storage of these maize varieties?
B. Farmers Union Official
1. What is the mission of the Union and how does it go about achieving this mission?
2. Who are your members and how does one become a member?
3. What services both direct and indirect does your organisation offer its membership?
4. How does the Union relate with its members?
5. How does your organisation relate with government and what are the main issues on 
which the Union engages with government?
6. How responsive is government to these same issues?
7. In your opinion what are the problems facing the small scale maize farmers in this 
area/Zambia? 
8. How is the Union helping to mitigate these problems?
9. In your opinion how effective are the intervention measures put in place to mitigate 
the small scale maize farmers’ problems? 
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C. Traders
1. May you share with me what is involved in buying maize from the farmers in the rural 
areas and selling the same OR could you please tell me about your experiences in 
trading in maize?
2. Who are your maize suppliers?
3. How do you acquire your maize supplies?
4. What are the modes of payments? And how much?
5. Who are your customers, and how do they pay for it?
6. What are the costs involved and profitability?
7. What problems do you encounter to buy maize from remote areas and why?
8. Do you pay different prices for the maize you buy from the remote areas and why?
9. What do you think should be done to mitigate the problems that you encounter as 
traders?
10. What do you think about the liberalisation policy which has facilitated your 
participation in the maize markets? 
D. Millers
1. Who are your suppliers of maize?
2. How do you get your maize supplies?
3. How much do you buy the maize for it?
4. How you determine the maize prices? 
5. What types of processed maize products to you produce?
6. Who are your customers for these products?
7. What are the prices for these products?
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E. FRA Official
1. I learnt that that you buy maize specifically from SSFs, may I know the reason why 
this is the case?
2. I learnt that there are specific quantities that the government says they buy from each 
farmer, a minimum and maximum. For example I heard that 10 bags is the minimum 
and the maximum as 153 bags. I would like to find out the rationale for that?
3. Are there plans or discussions about maybe looking at those SSFs who are not able to 
sale that minimum number of bags?
4. I would like to find out who your maize customers are, as I know that you sometimes 
sell maize. 
5. Coming back to the standards, what I got is that previously, there was nothing like 
sorting the maize to remove the coloured grains, cleaning it to ensure that there was 
chaff which thing from last year and this year. What is the motivation behind or why 
have things changed these past two years?
6. I was wondering if nationwide you haven’t had more requests for more requests for 
satellite depots than you have established?
7. What are the payments modalities like, could you describe that for me?
8. Who is responsible for rebagging, sewing and stacking the maize that FRA buys at the 
satellite depots now? 
9. Who are your buying agents?
10. What are the main determinants of the FRA price? I was wondering what are the main 
determinants of how do you arrive at that price?
FGD Topic:
1. What are the effects of Maize marketing Policies on the small scale maize farmers?
2. What are the effects of government set maize floor price on the small scale maize 
farmers?
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3. What are the effects of the government buying the maize through FRA on the small 
scale farmers?
4. What effects does the proliferation of maize traders have on the small scale maize 
farmers?
5. What effects does government provision of subsidised inputs have on the small scale 
farmers?
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Appendix 2 Calculations for Cost and Return of Maize FarmingTable 
A2: 8. Estimation of Production Costs for Nseenga for 1lima (were oxen are used in Land Preparation, Planting and 
Weeding) 
Item Description Quantity Unit Cost (ZMK) Total (ZMK)
Land Preparation 1 Lima 45, 000.00 
(USD9.05)
45, 000.00   (USD9.05)
Planting 1 Lima 45, 000.00 
(USD9.05)
45, 000.00  (USD9.05)
Weeding 1 Lima 45, 000.00 
(USD9.05)
45, 000.00  (USD9.05)
Harvesting Ox Carts 1 ¼ 12, 000.00 
(USD2.41)
15, 000.00 (USD3.02)
Total Cost 150, 000.00 (USD30.16)
Marketing Costs
Shelling 12 3, 000.00 36, 000.00
Transport to Market 12 3, 000.00 36, 000.00
Empty grain bags 12 2, 000.00 24, 000.00
Sewing 12 100.00 1, 200.00
Stacking 12 200.00 2, 400.00
Total Marketing Costs 99, 600.00 (USD20.02)
Grand Total Cost
249, 600.00 (USD50.18)
Source: 2010 Fieldwork (Interviews and FGD with SSFs)
The computation in table A2:2 is based on the data given by the farmers. The computation is 
based on expenses incurred by the SSFs for 2009/2010 farming season. For example, with 
respect to seed, they said that they do not buy seed, as they continue recycling from the 
previous harvests. Furthermore, they said that they do not use fertilizer to grow nseenga.
Even the storage of the same maize is also traditional as in most cases the grain does not need 
chemicals/herbicides to protect it from insect infestation. The farmers also said that one 
expects to harvest about 12 bags of nseenga from a Lima. It was on the basis of this data that 
table 3 above was computed. Based on the above, when marketing costs are ignored, twelve 
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Appendix 2 Calculations for Cost and Return of Maize Farmingbags 
of nseenga maize would cost a SSF ZMK150, 000.00 (USD 30.16) to produce. One bag of 
the same maize would therefore cost ZMK12, 500.00 (USD 2.513) to produce. Marketing 
costs have been ignored because the SSFs said they grow nseenga for home consumption. 
Several variations when observed in the costs of labour to produce maize as opposed to 
production using oxen which was almost like standardised among the SSFs. The figures 
given for labour were usually given as a block amount. So to establish the per lima charge the 
data about the total surface area owned and farmed by the farmer was used to arrive at the 
approximate payment to labour. I now take a case of one of the SSFs who gave data about all 
the expenses he incurred to produce maize in order to provide some idea of how much it cost 
him to produce maize using labour.
What can be observed from table A2:3 below is that the cost of producing twelve bags of
nseenga maize from 1lima in 2009/2010 farming season when land preparation, planting and 
weeding was done using hired labour was ZMK108, 750.00 (USD21.87), or ZMK9, 062.50 
(USD1.82) per bag (exclusive of marketing costs). When marketing costs are taken into 
account, a SSF in Nyimba spent ZMK208, 350.00 (USD41.89) to produce twelve bags of 
nseenga, and ZMK17, 362.50 (USD3.49) to produce one bag of the same maize. 
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Table A2: 9. Estimation of Production Costs for Nseenga for 1lima (were Labour is used for Land Preparation, Planting 
and Weeding) 
Item Description Quantity Unit Cost (ZMK) Total (ZMK)
Land Preparation 1 Lima 50,000.00
(USD10.05)
50, 000.00   (USD10.05)
Planting 1 Lima 25,000.00
(USD5.03)
25, 000.00  (USD5.03)
Weeding 1 Lima 18,750.00
(USD3.77)
18, 750.00  (USD3.77)
Harvesting Ox Carts 1 ¼ 12,000.00
(USD2.41)
15, 000.00 (USD3.02)
Total Cost 108, 750.00 (USD21.87)
Marketing Costs
Shelling 12 3, 000.00 36, 000.00
Transport to Market 12 3, 000.00 36, 000.00
Empty grain bags 12 2, 000.00 24, 000.00
Sewing 12 100.00 1, 200.00
Stacking 12 200.00 2, 400.00
Total Marketing Costs 99, 600.00 (USD20.02)
Grand Total Cost 208, 350.00(USD41.89)
Source: 2010 Fieldwork (Interviews and FGD with SSFs)
What can be observed from table A2:3 is that the cost of production of maize is ZMK108, 
750.00 (USD21.87) for a lima. It was also observed that those who exchange labour with 
maize actually paid more in monetary terms. For example one SSF who owns 9 limas said 
‘for weeding we paid using maize and we used about 17 bags at ZMK65, 000.00 (USD13.07) 
per bag’. This translates into ZMK1, 105, 000.00 (USD222.16) for 9limas or ZMK122, 
777.78 (USD24.68) per lima.
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A2: 10. Estimation of Production Costs for Hybrid Maize for 1lima (when Land Preparation, Planting and weeding is done 
using oxen 
Item Description Quantity Unit Cost (ZMK) Total (ZMK)
Production Costs
5kg Hybrid Seed 1 63, 000.00 63, 000.00
Land Preparation 1 Lima 45, 000.00 45, 000.00
Planting 1 Lima 45, 000.00 45, 000.00
Weeding 1 Lima 45, 000.00 45, 000.00
50 kg bag Top dressing 
Fertilizer
1
1
186, 000.00
*50, 000.00
186, 000.00
*50, 000.00
50kg bag Basal Fertilizer 1
1
160, 000.00
*50, 000.00
160, 000.00
*50, 000.00
Transport for fertilizer 2 8, 000.00 16, 000.00
Transport to buy inputs 2 15, 000.00 30, 000.00
Harvesting Ox Carts 2 ½ 12, 000.00 30, 000.00
Total Production Cost (using fertilizer bought at market price)
*Total Production Cost (using subsidised fertilizer)
620, 000.00 (USD124.65)
*374, 000.00 (USD75.19)
Marketing Costs
Shelling 25 3, 000.00 75, 000.00
Transport to Market 25 3, 000.00 75, 000.00
Empty grain bags 25 2, 000.00 50, 000.00
Insecticide (Shumba Super) 6 24, 000.00 144, 000.00
Sewing 25 100.00 2, 500.00
Stacking 25 200.00 5, 000.00
Total Marketing Costs 351, 500.00
Grand Total Cost
*Grand Total Costs (using subsidised fertilizer)
971, 500.00 (USD195.32)
*725, 500.00 (USD145.86)
Source: 2010 Fieldwork          *Cost with subsidised fertilizer 
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computations for tables A2:4 and A2:5 are based on data from the SSFs. On that basis several 
assumptions have been made. For example, the yield used in the computation is 25 bags 
(50kg) based on the expected yield of about 20 – 25 bags from 1lima as stated by the SSFs. 
Further, SSFs gave data of the standard required quantities of seed and fertilizer that are 
supposed to be used on 1lima.  As such one 50kg bag of each of the types of fertilizer has 
been adopted as that is the recommended amount of fertilizer that has to be applied per lima 
(Donovan et al 2002). 5kg of seed was used in the computation because that is the 
recommended quantity that is supposed to be planted on 1lima. Apparently there is not much 
difference with the standard requirement used in other countries such as Bangladesh where 
Karim et al (2010) in their studies attest that the recommended amount of maize seed is 
between 19 to 21 kg per hectare. The SSFs did not provide explicit data about how much it 
costs to harvest the maize from 1lima. They however, provided data about cost per ox cart 
load. In addition, they said that from one ox cart load one is expected to get about 10 bags of 
shelled maize. It is on that basis that the cost of harvesting was calculated. 
Based on computation in table A2:4 (see appendix2) which shows the cost of production for 
25 bags of hybrid maize (expected yield from 1lima) when land preparation, planting and 
weeding is done by oxen, production costs are presented for both production with use of 
fertilizer bought from retail shops and subsidised fertilizer. 25 bags of hybrid maize produced 
with fertilizer bought from the retail shop cost a SSF ZMK620, 000.00 (USD124.65) to 
produce in the 2009/2010 farming season (exclusive of marketing costs). And a bag of hybrid 
produced with fertilizer bought from the retail shop on average would cost ZMK24, 800.00 
(USD4.99) (exclusive of marketing costs). On the other hand, if the price of fertilizer is 
pegged at the government subsidised price of ZMK50, 000.00 per 50kg bag, then the cost of 
production for 25 bags was ZMK374, 000.00 (USD75, 19) and that of a bag was ZMK14, 
960.00 (USD3.01) (exclusive of marketing costs). To produce 25 bags of hybrid maize using 
subsidised fertilizer based on assumption of 25 bags yield per lima and taking marketing 
costs into account would cost ZMK725, 500.00 (USD145.86) and that of a bag would be 
ZMK29, 020.00 (USD5.83). Whereas, to produce 25 bags of maize using fertilizer bought 
from the retail shops, based on the assumption of 25 bags per lima and taking marketing costs
into account would cost ZMK971, 500.00 (USD195.32) and that of a bag would be ZMK38, 
860.00 (USD7.81).
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A2: 11. Estimation of Production Costs for Hybrid Maize for 1lima (when land Preparation, Planting and Weeding is done 
using hired labour) 
Item Description Quantity Unit Cost (ZMK) Total (ZMK)
Production Costs
5kg Hybrid Seed 1 63, 000.00 63, 000.00
Land Preparation 1 Lima 50, 000.00 (USD10.05) 50, 000.00 (USD10.05)
Planting 1 Lima 25, 000.00 (USD5.03) 25, 000.00 (USD5.03)
Weeding 1 Lima 18, 750.00 (USD3.77) 18, 750.00 (USD3.77)
50 kg bag Top dressing 
Fertilizer
1
1
186, 000.00
*50, 000.00
186, 000.00
*50, 000.00
50kg bag Basal Fertilizer 1
1
160, 000.00
*50, 000.00
160, 000.00
*50, 000.00
Transport for fertilizer 2 8, 000.00 16, 000.00
Transport to buy inputs 2 15, 000.00 30, 000.00
Harvesting Ox Carts 2 ½ 12, 000.00 30, 000.00
Total Production Cost (using fertilizer bought at market price)
*Total Production Cost(using subsidised fertilizer)
578, 750.00 (USD116.36)
*332, 750.00 (USD66.90)
Marketing Costs
Shelling 25 3, 000.00 75, 000.00
Transport to Market 25 3, 000.00 75, 000.00
Empty grain bags 25 2, 000.00 50, 000.00
Insecticide (Shumba Super) 6 24, 000.00 144, 000.00
Sewing 25 100.00 2, 500.00
Stacking 25 200.00 5, 000.00
Total Marketing Costs 351, 500.00
Grand Total Cost (using fertilizer bought at market price)
*Grand Total Costs (using subsidised fertilizer)
930, 250.00 (USD187.03)
*684, 250.00 (USD137.57)
Source: 2010 Fieldwork *Cost using subsidised fertilizer
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A2.5 shows an estimation of the 2009/2010 farming season cost of production for hybrid 
maize for SSFs in Nyimba where land preparation, planting and weeding is done using hired 
labour. As in is the case with table 5, the production costs are presented for both production 
with use of fertilizer bought from retail shops and subsidised fertilizer. On average, a SSF 
spent ZMK578, 750.00 (USD116.36) to produce 25 bags of hybrid maize using fertilizer 
bought at retail price while ignoring marketing costs. To produce 25 bags hybrid maize using 
subsidised fertilizer but ignoring marketing costs cost a SSF ZMK332, 750.00 (USD66.90).  
when marketing costs are taken into account, 25 bags of hybrid maize produced with 
fertilizer bought at market price cost ZMK930, 250.00 (USD187.03) while that produced 
with subsidised fertilizer cost ZMK684, 250.00 (USD137.57). 
When the calculations are based on the expected yield per lima according to MACO of 15-20
bags, the cost of production using the lower limit of 15 bags per lima to allow for poor 
management, a bag produced with subsidised fertilizer inclusive of marketing costs would 
cost ZMK39, 633.33 (USD 7.97), while a bag produced with fertilizer bought from the retail 
shops including marketing costs would cost ZMK56, 033.00 (USD 11.27) to produce. To 
produce a bag of hybrid maize using subsidised fertilizer based on assumption of 15 bags 
yield per lima but ignoring marketing costs would cost ZMK24, 933.33 (USD5.01). Whereas, 
to produce a bag of maize using fertilizer bought from the retail shops, based on the 
assumption of 15 bags per lima but ignoring marketing costs would cost ZMK41, 333.00 
(USD8.31)
Table A2:6 below shows the net returns for the two varieties, that is, nseenga and hybrid. The
table has been computed to show the net returns for production when both labour and oxen
are used for land preparation, planting and weeding in the production of both hybrid and 
nseenga maize varieties. Further, in the case of hybrid, the table shows net returns for both 
productions with subsidised fertilizer and with retail priced fertilizer. Two prices are used to 
calculate the total returns: FRA price and the private traders’ price prevailing at the time the 
research was undertaken (see table A2:1 in appendix). The total costs figures have been 
imported from tables A2:2-5 (see appendix2).
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